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POLICING PREDICTIVE POLICING 
ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON 
ABSTRACT 
Predictive policing is sweeping the nation, promising the holy grail of 
policing—preventing crime before it happens. The technology has far 
outpaced any legal or political accountability and has largely escaped 
academic scrutiny. This article examines predictive policing’s evolution 
with the goal of providing the first practical and theoretical critique of this 
new policing strategy. Building on insights from scholars who have 
addressed the rise of risk assessment throughout the criminal justice system, 
this article provides an analytical framework to police new predictive 
technologies. 
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[T]he Santa Cruz Police Department became the first law 
enforcement agency in the nation to implement a predictive policing 
program. With about eight years of data on car and home burglaries, 
an algorithm predicts locations and days of future crimes each day. 
Police are given a list of places to go to try to prevent crime when 
they were not responding to calls for service.1 
We could name our top 300 offenders. . . . So we will focus on those 
individuals, the persons responsible for the criminal activity, 
regardless of who they are or where they live. . . . We’re not just 
looking for crime. We’re looking for people.2 
INTRODUCTION 
In police districts all over America, “prediction” has become the new 
watchword for innovative policing.3 Using predictive analytics, high-
powered computers, and good old-fashioned intuition, police are adopting 
predictive policing strategies that promise the holy grail of policing—
stopping crime before it happens.4 Major cities in California, South 
 
 
 1. Stephen Baxter, Modest Gains in First Six Months of Santa Cruz’s Predictive Police Program, 
SANTA CRUZ SENTINEL (Feb. 26, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://www.santacruzsentinel.com/ general-
news/20120226/modest-gains-in-first-six-months-of-santa-cruzs-predictive-police-program 
[https://perma.cc/U8JC-HZGW]. 
 2. Robert L. Mitchell, Predictive Policing Gets Personal, COMPUTERWORLD (Oct. 24, 2013, 7:00 
AM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2486424/government-it/predictive-policing-gets-
personal.html?page=2 [https://perma.cc/3YLU-5JHH] (quoting Police Chief Rodney Monroe, 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg County, N.C.).  
 3. See Ellen Huet, Server and Protect: Predictive Policing Firm PredPol Promises to Map Crime 
Before It Happens, FORBES (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/ 
02/11/predpol-predictive-policing/#175113db407f (“In a 2012 survey of almost 200 police agencies 
70% said they planned to implement or increase use of predictive policing technology in the next two to 
five years.”) (citing CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FUTURE TRENDS IN 
POLICING 3 (2014), http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/Leadership/ 
future%20trends%20in%20policing%202014.pdf); DAVID ROBINSON & LOGAN KOEPKE, UPTURN, 
STUCK IN A PATTERN: EARLY EVIDENCE ON “PREDICTIVE POLICING” AND CIVIL RIGHTS 4–5 (2016), 
https://www.teamupturn.com/static/reports/2016/predictive-policing/files/Upturn_-_Stuck_In_a_ 
Pattern_v.1.01.pdf. 
 4. Justin Jouvenal, Police are Using Software to Predict Crime. Is it a ‘Holy Grail’ or Biased 
Against Minorities?, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-
safety/police-are-using-software-to-predict-crime-is-it-a-holy-grail-or-biased-against-minorities/2016/ 11/ 
17/525a6649-0472-440a-aae1-b283aa8e5de8_story.html?utm_term=.72a9d2eb22ae; Sidney Perkowitz, 
Crimes of the Future, AEON (Oct. 27, 2016), https://aeon.co/essays/should-we-trust-predictive-policing-
software-to-cut-crime; Darwin Bond-Graham & Ali Winston, All Tomorrow’s Crimes: The Future of 
Policing Looks a Lot Like Good Branding, SFWEEKLY (Oct. 30, 2013), 
http://archives.sfweekly.com/sanfrancisco/all-tomorrows-crimes-the-future-of-policing-looks-a- lot-like-
good-branding/Content?oid=2827968&showFullText=true [https://perma.cc/G35D-F543] (“[M]ore than 
150 police departments nationally are deploying predictive policing analytics. Many departments are 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/5
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Carolina, Washington, Tennessee, Florida, Pennsylvania, and New York, 
among others, have purchased new predictive policing software to combat 
property crimes such as burglaries, car thefts, and thefts from automobiles.5 
Data from past crimes, including crime types and locations, are fed into a 
computer algorithm to identify targeted city blocks with a daily (and 
sometimes hourly) forecast of crime.6 Police officers patrol those predicted 
areas of crime to deter and catch criminals in the act.7 In large cities such as 
Los Angeles, Chicago, and New Orleans, complex social network analysis 
has isolated likely perpetrators and victims of gun violence.8 Social maps 
link friends, gangs, and enemies in a visual web of potential criminal actors.9 
Intervention strategies seek to reach these potential victims and perpetrators 
before the violence occurs.10 
Law enforcement’s embrace of predictive technology mirrors its 
adoption in other areas of the criminal justice system.11 New pretrial risk 
 
 
developing their own open-source algorithms, and a few tech heavyweights like IBM and Palantir are 
getting in on the game.”). 
 5. Huet, supra note 3 (“PredPol is being used in almost 60 departments, the biggest of which are 
Los Angeles and Atlanta, but [PredPol] is eyeing more. ‘[The] goal by the end of 2015 is to have the 
majority of large North American metro areas using this [technology].’”) (quoting Larry Samuels, 
PredPol CEO). See also infra notes 119–130.  
 6. See Erica Goode, Sending the Police Before There’s a Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/us/16police.html; Guy Adams, LAPD’s Sci-Fi Solution to Real 
Crime, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/lapds-scifi-
solution-to-real-crime-6287800.html [https://perma.cc/84J5-KD3N] (describing maps with targeted 
“boxes” of predicted criminal activity measuring 500 feet by 500 feet). 
 7. Predictive Policing: Don’t Even Think About It, THE ECONOMIST (July 20, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21582042-it-getting-easier-foresee-wrongdoing-and-spot-
likely-wrongdoers-dont-even-think-about-it; Leslie A. Gordon, Predictive Policing May Help Bag 
Burglars—But it May Also be a Constitutional Problem, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 1, 2013, 8:40 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/mobile/mag_article/predictive_policing_may_help_bag_burglars--but_ 
it_may_also_be_a_constitutio/ [https://perma.cc/A9PX-2JJD]. 
 8. See, e.g., John Buntin, Social Media Transforms the Way Chicago Fights Gang Violence, 
GOVERNING (Oct. 2013), http://www.governing.com/topics/urban/gov-social-media-transforms-
chicago-policing.html [https://perma.cc/CM2B-LPRN]; Darwin Bond-Graham & Ali Winston, Forget 
the NSA, the LAPD Spies on Millions of Innocent Folks, LA WEEKLY (Feb. 27, 2014), 
http://www.laweekly.com/news/forget-the-nsa-the-lapd-spies-on-millions-of-innocent-folks-4473467 
[https://perma.cc/67WQ-TZQK]; PALANTIR, NOLA MURDER REDUCTION: TECHNOLOGY TO POWER 
DATA-DRIVEN PUBLIC HEALTH STRATEGIES (2014) (describing NOLA for Life, a project to reduce 
homicides in New Orleans).  
 9. Scott Harris, Product Feature: Predictive Policing Helps Law Enforcement “See Around the 
Corners”, POLICE CHIEF MAG. (Nov. 2014), http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/ 
index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=3539&issue_id=112014.  
 10. See, e.g., Michael Sierra-Arevalo, How Targeted Deterrence Helps Police Reduce Gun Deaths, 
SCHOLARS STRATEGY NETWORK (June 3, 2013), http://thesocietypages.org/ ssn/2013/06/03/targeted-
deterrence/ [https://perma.cc/88MD-TZVR]; Mark Guarino, Can Math Stop Murder?, THE CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR (July 20, 2014); http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2014/ 0720/Can-math-stop-murder-
video [https://perma.cc/UDT2-A4FH]. 
 11. See infra Part I. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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assessment models claim to be able to predict future dangerousness.12 Post-
trial sentencing predictions forecast likely recidivism.13 Probability 
outcomes forecast likely probation violations.14 It is no wonder, then, that 
predictive analytics have begun to shape policing strategies. Predictive 
analytics not only sounds like a futuristic solution to the age-old problem of 
crime, but also has the appeal of seemingly being based on empirical data 
free from human biases or inefficiencies.15 Such marketing allure has 
resulted in a series of national news stories that have proclaimed predictive 
policing to be the future of law enforcement.16 
Predictive policing thus raises some profound questions about the nature 
of prediction in an era influenced by data collection and analysis. The first 
generation of predictive policing technologies represents only the beginning 
of a fundamental transformation of how law enforcement prevents crime.17 
Identifying a future location of criminal activity may be statistically possible 
by studying where and why past crime patterns have developed over time.18 
But forecasting the precise identity of the future human “criminal” presents 
a far more troubling prediction. Both may be based on historical data with 
statistically significant correlations, but the analyses and civil liberties 
concerns differ.19 
This article addresses the deeper questions behind the adoption of 
predictive analytics by law enforcement. The article develops a framework 
for how predictive technologies must be policed by legislators, courts, and 
the police themselves. Building off a wealth of theoretical insights of 
scholars who have addressed the rise of risk assessment in other areas of 
criminal justice, the article provides an analytical structure for future 
adoption of any new predictive technology. 
 
 
 12. See, e.g., Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 
500 (2012); Cynthia E. Jones, “Give Us Free”: Addressing Racial Disparities in Bail Determinations, 
16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 919, 931–32 (2013). 
 13. See, e.g., Melissa Hamilton, Adventures in Risk: Predicting Violent and Sexual Recidivism in 
Sentencing Law, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 5 (2015); Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C. L. 
REV. 671, 718 (2015); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of 
Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 807 (2014). 
 14. See, e.g., Martin Hildebrand et al., Predicting Probation Supervision Violations, 19 PSYCHOL. 
PUB. POL’Y & L. 114, 115 (2013). 
 15. See Nate Berg, Predicting Crime, LAPD-style, THE GUARDIAN (June 25, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/jun/25/predicting-crime-lapd-los-angeles-police-data-
analysis-algorithm-minority-report. 
 16. See, e.g., supra notes 1–8.  
 17. Beth Pearsall, Predictive Policing: The Future of Law Enforcement?, 266 NAT’L INST. JUST. 
J. (May 2010), http://www.nij.gov/journals/266/Pages/predictive.aspx [https://perma.cc/6UR2-
MXMD]. See also infra Part II. 
 18. See infra Part II.A. 
 19. See infra Part II.C. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/5
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This article offers three insights to the rather sparse literature on the 
subject of predictive policing.20 First, the article situates predictive policing 
within the decades-long search for predictive solutions to criminal justice 
problems. Predictive policing may be new, but the lure of predictive 
techniques is not. Second, the article examines the rapid evolution from 
place-based property crimes to place-based violent crimes and then to 
person-based crimes. This evolution has largely gone unchallenged, even 
though the social science justifications for the different crime types remain 
contested. Third, and most importantly, the article uses the example of 
predictive policing to develop a theoretical framework to police all future 
predictive techniques. With the rise of big data, the Internet of Things, 
intelligence-driven prosecution, and as yet uncreated surveillance tools, law 
enforcement will continue to adapt and innovate.21 
Part I situates the debate over predictive policing within the larger 
context of prediction in the criminal justice system. Prediction has been a 
“new thing” for decades and significant scholarly work has been done 
demonstrating its effects on other aspects of the criminal justice system.22 
From pretrial release to parole, predictive mechanisms now control many 
aspects of the criminal justice system. Predictive policing is but the next 
iteration of this move toward actuarial justice.23 
Part II examines the evolution of predictive policing techniques from 
placed-based property crime to place-based violent crime. I call this the 
move from Predictive Policing 1.0 to Predictive Policing 2.0, in which the 
insights of a rather rigorous empirical and scholarly approach to studying 
property-based crimes have been adopted without equivalent empirical 
studies to the problem of violent crime.24 While similar logic prevails, 
equivalent research does not. Part II also analyzes a separate technique 
focusing on the identification of individuals predicted to be involved in 
 
 
 20. See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. 
PA. L. REV. 327, 329 (2015) [hereinafter Big Data]; Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and 
Reasonable Suspicion, 62 EMORY L.J. 259, 265–69 (2012) [hereinafter Predictive Policing]; Fabio 
Arcila Jr., Nuance, Technology, and the Fourth Amendment: A Response to Predictive Policing and 
Reasonable Suspicion, 63 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 87, 89 (2014). 
 21. See, e.g., Ferguson, Big Data, supra note 20; Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Internet of Things 
and the Fourth Amendment of Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 812–23 (2016) [hereinafter The Internet 
of Things]; Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Prosecution, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705, 705–06 
(2016) [hereinafter Predictive Prosecution].  
 22. See infra Part I.A. 
 23. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN 
ACTUARIAL AGE 145 (2007); Malcolm Feeley & Jonathan Simon, Actuarial Justice: The Emerging New 
Criminal Law, in THE FUTURES OF CRIMINOLOGY 173 (David Nelken ed., 1994) (coining the term 
“actuarial justice”). 
 24. See infra Part II.B. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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crime.25 This is what I call Predictive Policing 3.0, with a focus away from 
places to persons. In cities like Chicago and New Orleans, sophisticated data 
programs are mapping shootings and studying the underlying human 
connections.26 Mirroring a public health approach to disease, this focus on 
societal violence targets both potential shooting victims and offenders.27 
Targeted individuals are identified and interventions conducted to address 
(and hopefully prevent) future violent acts. 
Part III then develops an analytical framework to evaluate police 
prediction. Specifically, I study nine core issues that must be addressed 
before adopting any predictive policing technology. These fundamental 
issues—data, methodology, social science, transparency, accountability, 
practical implementation, administration, vision, and security—present 
substantial risks and vulnerabilities for adopters of the technology. Because 
of the industry’s rapid growth, police administrators and agencies have not 
adequately addressed these risks. The goal of this section is to move beyond 
Predictive Policing 2.0 or 3.0 to address universal concerns that will affect 
the next generation of technology, and all future predictive techniques. 
The foundational insight of predictive policing is that certain aspects of 
the physical and social environment encourage quite predictable acts of 
criminal wrongdoing.28 Interfering with that environment or those 
connections will—the theory goes—deter crime.29 Predictive policing, thus, 
is less about blind fortunetelling, and more about divining hidden crime-
inducing environmental conditions which can be deterred by an intentional 
police response. The same deterrence principle also can be applied to the 
predictive technologies themselves. This article seeks to show that parallel 
vulnerabilities exist in the adoption of new predictive technologies—
vulnerabilities that can be addressed by identifying and remediating the 
underlying risks. This article then offers an analytical framework to analyze 
and improve implementation of predictive technologies, while allowing for 
continued innovations in the technology. 
 
 
 25. See infra Part II.C. 
 26. See infra notes 182–189, 204–208.  
 27. TRACEY MEARES ET AL., PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS IN CHICAGO, HOMICIDE AND GUN 
VIOLENCE IN CHICAGO: EVALUATION AND SUMMARY OF THE PROJECT SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS 
PROGRAM 2 (2009), http://www.saferfoundation.org/files/documents/2009-PSN-Research-
Brief_v2.pdf. 
 28. Ferguson, Predictive Policing, supra note 20, at 277–78 (discussing the theory of 
environmental vulnerability).  
 29. Patrick Healey, Predictive Policing Forecasts Crime That Officers Then Try to Deter, NBC4 
News (Jan. 7, 2013, 10:19 PM), http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/LAPD-Chief-Charlie-Beck-
Predictive-Policing-Forecasts-Crime-185970452.html [https://perma.cc/35MG-9HWQ]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/5
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I. PREDICTION AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
At some level, most decision-making systems involve prediction. The 
criminal justice system is no exception. Police officers, judges, juries, 
probation officers, and parole boards all make risk-based assessments every 
single day. Predictive tools which seek to help make these difficult, life-
altering decisions more objective and fair have been embraced throughout 
the criminal justice system.30 
This article seeks to situate the specific technique of predictive policing 
within the larger move toward predictive technologies in the criminal justice 
system. This context is necessary because predictive policing has been 
billed as a new, magical “black box” solution to preventing crime,31 yet like 
all “once new” predictive technologies it suffers from the same limitations 
and challenges of all predictive techniques.32 Whether good, bad, 
ineffective, or distracting, the long-term trend has been to adopt predictive 
technologies regardless of effectiveness. Communities across the country 
will thus soon be confronted with the implementation of new technologies 
that promise to systematize and target the problem of crime. The next two 
sections detail the rise of data-driven prediction as a background to analyze 
the particular promise and concerns of predictive policing. 
A. A Brief History of Actuarial Justice 
The first experiments with prediction in the criminal justice system can 
be traced to the late 1920s and the Chicago School of Sociology’s work on 
parole recidivism.33 Early adopters such as Ernest Burgess looked at 
individual risk factors to predict the likelihood of convicted parolees 
 
 
 30. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275 (1976) (“[P]rediction of future criminal conduct is an 
essential element in many of the decisions rendered throughout our criminal justice system. The decision 
whether to admit a defendant to bail, for instance, must often turn on a judge’s prediction of the 
defendant’s future conduct. And any sentencing authority must predict a convicted person’s probable 
future conduct when it engages in the process of determining what punishment to impose. For those 
sentenced to prison, these same predictions must be made by parole authorities.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 31. Hannes Grassegger, Simple Truth Inside the Black Box. Interview with Spencer Chainey, 
W.I.R.E. (2016), http://www.thewire.ch/en/abstrakt/no-12---das-grosse-rauschen/in-der-black-box-
gespraech-mit-spencer-chainey [https://perma.cc/67TJ-USDQ]. 
 32. See infra Part III. 
 33. J.C. Oleson, Training to See Risk: Measuring the Accuracy of Clinical and Actuarial Risk 
Assessments Among Federal Probation Officers, 75 FED. PROBATION 52, 52 (2011) (“The statistical 
prediction of recidivism risk has an 80-year history, and can be traced at least as far back as the 1928 
parole prediction instrument developed by Ernest Burgess.”) (citation omitted); Nadya Labi, Misfortune 
Teller, THE ATLANTIC (Jan./Feb. 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/ 
2012/01/misfortune-teller/308846/ (“In 1927, Ernest Burgess, a sociologist at the University of Chicago, 
drew on the records of 3,000 parolees in Illinois to estimate an individual’s likelihood of recidivism.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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reoffending.34 By systematizing risks and applying those factors to 
individual persons, Burgess institutionalized what we now know as the 
actuarial approach.35 In his book, Against Prediction, Bernard Harcourt sets 
forth a detailed history of the influence of Burgess and other sociologists 
who experimented with designing the first risk assessment tools for 
parolees.36 The history spans the mid-twentieth century, beginning with the 
slow adoption of actuarial recidivism predictions and then shifting to a more 
rapid growth during the later part of the twentieth century and the early part 
of the twenty-first century, when risk assessment mechanisms became the 
norm and not the exception.37  
While initially focused only on parolees, the concept of actuarial 
prediction began to catch on in other parts of the criminal justice system. 
Actuarial (or statistical) prediction can be defined as: 
[A] formal method…[that provides] a probability, or expected value, 
of some outcome. It uses empirical research to relate numerical 
predictor variables to numerical outcomes. The sine qua non of 
actuarial assessment involves using an objective, mechanistic, 
reproducible combination of predictive factors, selected and 
validated through empirical research, against known outcomes that 
have also been quantified.38 
Actuarial prediction turns on identifying and weighing specific factors that 
correlate with a probability of future actions.39 The shift toward empirical, 
 
 
 34. Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Ne’er-Do-Well to the Criminal History Category: The 
Refinement of the Actuarial Model in Criminal Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 112 (2003). 
 35. Id. 
 36. HARCOURT, supra note 23, at 47–107. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Jordan M. Hyatt et al., Reform in Motion: The Promise and Perils of Incorporating Risk 
Assessments and Cost-Benefit Analysis into Pennsylvania Sentencing, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 707, 726 (2011) 
(quoting Don M. Gottfredson, Prediction and Classification in Criminal Justice Decision Making, 9 
CRIME & JUST. 1 (1987)), See also Barbara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting 
Behavior with Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1420–21 (1979) 
(“The alternative [to the clinical] method for making predictions evaluates each applicant according to 
a predetermined rule for counting and weighting key characteristics. The relevant characteristics are 
specified in advance, and so is the rule for combining them to produce a score for each applicant. . . . 
This method of making predictions is often called statistical prediction.”). 
 39. Melissa Hamilton, Public Safety, Individual Liberty, and Suspect Science: Future 
Dangerousness Assessments and Sex Offender Laws, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 697, 720 (2011) (“The general 
idea for actuarial ratings for any risk at issue is to identify those factors that are correlative to the potential 
occurrence of the future event at issue, and to effectively assign appropriate weights to each factor based 
on the observation that some factors have greater correlative abilities than others relating to the particular 
result.”); Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise Redux, 56 EMORY L.J. 275, 283 (2006) 
(“An actuarial approach relies, like insurance actuaries do, on a finite number of pre-identified variables 
that statistically correlate to risk and that produce a definitive probability or probability range of risk.”) 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/5
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replicable, and validated factors also meant a rejection of the “clinical 
method”40 of prediction, which required an individualized, “expert” 
judgment not controlled by predetermined already-identified variables. The 
clinical method, while individualized, had recognized methodological 
flaws.41  
Examples of actuarial prediction instruments include the Violence Risk 
Appraisal Guide (VRAG), which measures potential violent recidivism for 
offenders with mental disorders; the Rapid Risk Assessment for Sexual 
Offense Recidivism (RRASOR), which predicts sexual offender recidivism; 
and the Level of Services Inventory-Revised (LSI-R), which predicts parole 
and supervised release success.42 Each of these assessment mechanisms 
shares a structure consisting of set questions, the answers to which 
statistically correlate with predictive scores for some future action. These 
assessments require responses to a series of questions that correlate to 
higher or lower risks of reoffending. For example, the LSI-R has been used 
in states to predict parole recidivism and asks questions about the 
individual’s criminal history, education, employment, financial problems, 
family or marital situation, housing, hobbies, friends, alcohol and drug use, 
emotional or mental health issues, and attitudes about crime and 
supervision.43 The questions are detailed, asking about school suspensions, 
dissatisfaction with spouses, use of free time, and mental health.44 Of 
course, the questions also exist within certain socioeconomic realities, such 
that individuals can be penalized for living in a high-crime area, not having 
a job, accepting social assistance, or having friends with criminal records.45 
The difficulty of disentangling these poverty-correlated factors from 
individualized factors has opened these types of risk assessment 
 
 
(emphasis omitted). 
 40. William M. Grove & Paul E. Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of Informal (Subjective, 
Impressionistic) and Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction Procedures: The Clinical-Statistical 
Controversy, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 293, 294 (1996); Bernard E. Harcourt, The Shaping of 
Chance: Actuarial Models and Criminal Profiling at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century, 70 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 105, 116–17 (2003).  
 41. Slobogin, supra note 39, at 283 (“Until the late 1980s, almost all expert testimony regarding 
dangerousness was clinical in nature.”) (emphasis omitted); Alexander Scherr, Daubert & Danger: The 
“Fit” of Expert Predictions in Civil Commitments, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 17 (2003) (“Clinical opinions 
have never received high marks for reliability. Early literature and studies almost completely discounted 
them, finding that clinicians did little better than chance. . . . Over the past decade, these second 
generation research methods have led to a conclusion that clinical methods perform somewhat better 
than random, but are still deeply imperfect.”). 
 42. HARCOURT, supra note 23, at 78, 84. 
 43. Id. at 79–81.  
 44. Id. at 81, tbl.3.2. 
 45. Id.; Sonja B. Starr, The New Profiling: Why Punishing Based on Poverty and Identity Is 
Unconstitutional and Wrong, 27 FED. SENT’G. REP. 229, 229 (2015). 
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mechanisms to criticisms of racial and economic bias.46 
Nevertheless, most states have adopted some measure of actuarial 
prediction in sentencing or parole determinations.47 These risk assessment 
measures represent the firm, if contested, belief that formalized measures 
provide superior insight compared to traditional, clinical practices.48 This 
belief has also impacted other parts of the criminal justice system, which 
will be discussed in the next section. 
B. The Prevalence of Prediction in the Criminal Justice System 
Today, actuarial prediction impacts almost all aspects of the criminal 
justice system, from the initial bail decision to the final parole release.49 In 
the pretrial detention stage, judges in many states routinely rely on risk 
assessment instruments to predict future dangerousness before deciding on 
release conditions.50 These measures have become so accepted that some 
researchers have proposed replacing individualized, human pretrial 
interviews with an automated assessment of predetermined risk factors to 
determine release.51 Pretrial service workers would, in essence, be replaced 
with a risk assessment algorithm. While scholars have critiqued reliance on 
 
 
 46. Starr, supra note 45, at 229. 
 47. See Starr, supra note 13, at 809. 
 48. Compare Christopher Slobogin, Prevention as the Primary Goal of Sentencing: The Modern 
Case for Indeterminate Dispositions in Criminal Cases, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1127, 1146 (2011) 
(“[R]esearch has firmly established that predictions based on the clinical method, although typically 
better than chance, are less valid than actuarial predictions by a significant magnitude.”), with Grove & 
Meehl, supra note 40, at 295 (noting that “in around two fifths of studies the two methods were 
approximately equal in accuracy”). See also Thomas R. Litwack, Actuarial Versus Clinical Assessments 
of Dangerousness, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 409 (2001). 
 49. Shima Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and Discretion, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 157, 176–77 
(2013) (“Criminal justice actors often predict which defendants are going to commit an additional crime 
in determining whether to arrest defendants, to release them on bail, or to release them on parole, or in 
determining their sentence. This prediction is often based not only on individual evaluation, but also on 
a group’s criminality and past behavior.”). 
 50. Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 12, at 513 (“While states have different considerations and 
definitions of dangerousness, the majority of states currently allow judges to detain the accused pretrial 
based on predictions of dangerousness.”); Jack F. Williams, Process and Prediction: A Return to a Fuzzy 
Model of Pretrial Detention, 79 MINN. L. REV. 325, 337–38 (1994); Peggy M. Tobolowsky & James F. 
Quinn, Drug-Related Behavior as a Predictor of Defendant Pretrial Misconduct, 25 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 
1019, 1028 (1994).  
 51. MARIE VANNOSTRAND & CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., 
ASSESSING PRETRIAL RISK WITHOUT A DEFENDANT INTERVIEW (2013), http://www.arnoldfoundation. 
org/sites/default/files/pdf/LJAF_Report_no-interview_FNL.pdf. 
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such correlative factors,52 some jurisdictions are beginning to adopt them.53 
At the other end of trial, during sentencing, judges rely on established 
risk assessment instruments in an attempt to make sentences more uniform 
and predictable.54 While judges have always had to make predictions about 
future danger, the difference today is that formalized mechanisms exist to 
guide the judges’ discretion.55 These mechanisms include actual risk 
assessment instruments, as well as formal sentencing guidelines, which 
were based on actuarial studies.56 Further, upon release, probation, parole, 
or supervision officers also make predictions of recidivism based on risk 
assessment mechanisms which have been created for the task.57  
Particular types of crimes (or criminals) have generated particularized 
predictive tools to assess future risk. In sex offender cases, risk assessment 
mechanisms58 have been used to preventively detain suspects before trial,59 
and civilly commit them after they have served their sentences.60 In 
 
 
 52. Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 12, at 521–23 (analyzing past studies on predicting future 
dangerousness in the pretrial release context); Julia Angwin et. al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 
23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing.  
 53. DEVELOPING A NATIONAL MODEL FOR PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD 
FOUND. (Nov. 2013), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF-research-
summary_PSA-Court_4_1.pdf.  
 54. J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and Evidence-Based 
Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329, 1337 (2011) (discussing actuarial sentencing); Michael A. Wolff, 
Evidence-Based Judicial Discretion: Promoting Public Safety Through State Sentencing Reform, 83 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1389, 1404 (2008) (proposing risk assessment models for sentencing); Starr, supra note 
13, at 807 (critiquing the rise of risk assessment instruments for sentencing). 
 55. Hyatt et al., supra note 38, at 724 (“Risk assessment is not a new concept in the criminal justice 
system. It is a tool—nothing more and nothing less. . . . Informally, sentencing judges have long assessed 
risk of re-offense in crafting a defendant’s sentence.”). 
 56. See generally Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938 (1988). 
 57. Matthew G. Rowland, Too Many Going Back, Not Enough Getting Out? Supervision Violators, 
Probation Supervision, and Overcrowding in the Federal Bureau of Prisons, 77 FED. PROBATION 3, 5 
(2013) (“Since the 1990s, the federal probation and pretrial services system has used the Risk Prediction 
Index (RPI), an actuarial risk assessment tool developed by the Research Division of the Federal Judicial 
Center, to empirically measure the risk level of the supervisee population.”). 
 58. Hamilton, supra note 39, at 726–27 (challenging the testing and scientific method for sex 
offender assessment measures).  
 59. Stephen J. Morse, Preventive Confinement of Dangerous Offenders, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
56 (2004). 
 60. John A. Fennel, Punishment by Another Name: The Inherent Overreaching in Sexually 
Dangerous Person Commitments, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 37, 51–52 (2009); 
Fredrick E. Vars, Rethinking the Indefinite Detention of Sex Offenders, 44 CONN. L. REV. 161, 164 
(2011); Slobogin, supra note 39, at 276 (“Since 1990, about one third of the states have enacted laws 
that permit indeterminate post-sentence commitment of sex offenders considered to be ‘predisposed’ to 
violent behavior.”); Robert A. Prentky et al., Sexually Violent Predators in the Courtroom: Science on 
Trial, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 357, 358 (2006); Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use 
of Actuarial Risk Assessment with Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1443, 1454–55 (2003) (describing trial court use of actuarial instruments). 
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domestic violence cases, courts have utilized Intimate Partner Violence 
(IPV) screening tools to identify factors that might signal future violence.61 
In non-domestic violence cases, predictors of future dangerousness are 
relied upon to determine sentences.62 In juvenile cases, over 85% of 
jurisdictions use risk assessment mechanisms to evaluate young people.63 In 
capital cases, experts regularly must make a determination of future 
dangerousness using risk assessment tools.64 While each instrument 
incorporates a different calculus, they share the same underlying assumption 
that certain reliable correlations can be drawn from patterns in data.  
This faith in predictive accuracy is not limited to the criminal context, as 
court decisions about child protection,65 civil commitment,66 and prisoner 
status67 have been guided by new predictive tools. Determinations about 
civil liberty or family autonomy are also now guided by pre-determined 
assessments that help shape court decision-making.  
 
 
 61. Amanda Hitt & Lynn McLain, Stop the Killing: Potential Courtroom Use of a Questionnaire 
That Predicts the Likelihood That a Victim of Intimate Partner Violence Will Be Murdered By Her 
Partner, 24 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 277, 283 (2009) (“Since the late 1970’s, as researchers clamored 
to create instruments that could accurately predict the threat of physical violence, over thirty-three IPV 
screening tools have been created.”). 
 62. John Monahan, Violence Risk Assessment: Scientific Validity and Evidentiary Admissibility, 
57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 901, 905–10 (2000); Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Genetic 
Predictions of Future Dangerousness: Is There a Blueprint for Violence?, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
301, 318–19 (2006) (“The predominant instrument used in assessing violence (including sexual 
violence) is the Violence Risk Assessment Guide (VRAG).”). See also id. at 308 (“Predicting future 
dangerousness has become important as the criminal justice system has changed its focus from 
punishment to preventing violent recidivism.”).  
 63. Christopher Slobogin, Risk Assessment and Risk Management in Juvenile Justice, 27 CRIM. 
JUST. 10, 11 (2013) (“Today over 85 percent of juvenile court jurisdictions in the United States use 
formal risk assessment at some point in the process, compared to 33 percent of American jurisdictions 
prior to 1990.”); Jeffrey Fagan & Martin Guggenheim, Preventative Detention and the Judicial 
Prediction of Dangerousness for Juveniles: A Natural Experiment, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415 
(1996); Albert R. Roberts & Kimberly Bender, Overcoming Sisyphus: Effective Prediction of Mental 
Health Disorders and Recidivism Among Delinquents, 70 FED. PROBATION 19, 21–23 (2006) (evaluating 
risk prediction models for juveniles). 
 64. Jonathan R. Sorensen & Rocky L. Pilgrim, Criminology: An Actuarial Risk Assessment of 
Violence Posed By Capital Murder Defendants, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1251, 1252 (2000); Lisa 
M. Dennis, Constitutionality, Accuracy, Admissibility: Assessing Expert Predictions of Future Violence 
in Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 292, 307 (2002).  
 65. Marsha Garrison, Taking the Risks Out of Child Protection Risk Analysis, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 5, 
19–20 (2012) (describing the use of algorithms to guide child protection policymakers and case 
workers). 
 66. Douglas Mossman et al., Risky Business Versus Overt Acts: What Relevance Do “Actuarial,” 
Probabilistic Risk Assessments Have for Judicial Decisions on Involuntary Psychiatric 
Hospitalization?, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 365, 368 (2011); Alexander Tsesis, Due Process in 
Civil Commitments, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 253, 287 (2011). 
 67. John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, 
Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 434–35 (2006) (discussing the release status of sexually 
violent prisoners). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/5
  
 
 
 
 
2017] POLICING PREDICTIVE POLICING 1123 
 
 
 
 
The prevalence of predictive technologies in the criminal justice system 
has not gone unchallenged, and many scholars have critiqued the growing 
reliance and even legitimacy of some of the chosen tools.68 Interestingly, 
these critiques have not necessarily slowed the acceptance of actuarial 
justice, although perhaps they have moderated a complete reliance on the 
new tools.69 No matter the criticism, actuarial predictions are still 
considered superior to clinical predictions, and so the temptation has been 
to adopt and test new data-driven versions.70  
That same temptation has impacted police administrators, who like 
judges wish to predict recidivism and future violence before it happens. The 
next section discusses the evolving impacts prediction has had on policing. 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF PREDICTIVE POLICING  
Prediction has always been part of policing. Police officers regularly 
predict the places and persons involved in criminal activity and seek to deter 
this pattern of lawbreaking. The move toward predictive policing, then, is 
more a shift in tools than strategy.71  
Police use of predictive techniques parallels the history of actuarial 
prediction. The same Chicago School of Sociology that sought to predict at-
risk individuals also generated interest in studying at-risk places.72 The rise 
of environmental criminology grew alongside early experiments that 
studied the geography of crime.73 These experiments informed police 
practice as crime mapping became a way to identify and study patterns of 
criminal behavior. As data collection and data analysis grew more 
sophisticated, new predictive techniques and computer-mapping 
 
 
 68. See, e.g., Starr, supra note 45, at 229. 
 69. Stephen D. Hart, The Role of Psychopathy in Assessing Risk for Violence: Conceptual and 
Methodological Issues, 3 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 121, 126 (1998) (“Reliance—at least 
complete reliance—on actuarial decision-making by professionals is unacceptable.”); Harcourt, supra 
note 40, at 114.  
 70. See Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 439–40 (2016) (discussing 
the superior accuracy of actuarial risk assessments to determine future dangerousness in sentencing and 
for pretrial release); Erica Beecher-Monas, The Epistemology of Prediction: Future Dangerousness 
Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 353, 363 (2003) (“Repeated studies 
of actuarial methods have demonstrated them to be superior to clinical judgment standing alone.”). 
 71. Some predictive techniques such as Risk Terrain Modeling have adopted a strategic shift to 
accompany new technological innovations. See infra Part II.A (discussing the Risk Terrain Modeling 
attempt at addressing environmental vulnerabilities based on predictive analytics).  
 72. Calvin Morrill et al., Seeing Crime and Punishment Through A Sociological Lens: 
Contributions, Practices, and the Future, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 289, 291 (2005). 
 73. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the Fourth Amendment: Redrawing “High-
Crime Areas”, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 179, 186 (2011). 
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technologies also developed to make use of the information.74  
Over the course of the twentieth century, push-pin wall maps identifying 
daily crimes morphed into digital maps displaying historical patterns of all 
recorded crimes.75 Similarly, the insights of academic criminologists 
inspired police departments to hire professional crime analysts.76 Those 
crime analysts, in turn, began crunching the collected data and advising 
police administrators about how best to deploy resources. “High crime 
areas,”77 “hot spots,”78 and other techniques informed by Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) were developed to visualize and respond to 
problem areas.79 Large-scale experiments like the CompStat system in New 
York City, in which crime data literally became the organizing principle of 
police response, were met with accolades and attention.80 Suddenly the idea 
of “smart policing” turned from buzzword into reality.81  
These predictive, data-driven techniques drew strength from the growing 
work of predictive analytics in other criminal justice fields. The predictive 
techniques were perceived as objective, focused on correlations as opposed 
to causation, and widely applicable across jurisdictions.82 Especially after 
the economic recession in 2008, when police departments were faced with 
 
 
 74. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High-Crime Area” Question: Requiring 
Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1587, 1605, 1607–08 (2008); WALTER L. PERRY ET AL., PREDICTIVE POLICING: THE ROLE OF 
CRIME FORECASTING IN LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 2 (2013) (ebook) (“The use of statistical and 
geospatial analyses to forecast crime levels has been around for decades.”). 
 75. Predictive Crime Fighting, IBM, http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/us/en/icons/ 
crimefighting (last visited Nov. 13, 2016) (describing early hand drawn crayon maps of crime in New 
York City). 
 76. For a complete history of crime mapping technology, see Ferguson, supra note 73. 
 77. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). 
 78. Anthony A. Braga et al., The Relevance of Micro Places to Citywide Robbery Trends: A 
Longitudinal Analysis of Robbery Incidents at Street Corners and Block Faces in Boston, 48 J. RES. 
CRIME & DELINQ. 7, 9 (2011) (“Criminological evidence on the spatial concentration of crime suggests 
that a small number of highly active micro places in cities—frequently called ‘hot spots’—may be 
primarily responsible for overall citywide crime trends.”). 
 79. See, e.g., DEREK J. PAULSEN & MATTHEW B. ROBINSON, CRIME MAPPING AND SPATIAL 
ASPECTS OF CRIME 154 (2009); KEITH HARRIES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MAPPING CRIME: PRINCIPLE 
AND PRACTICE 92 (1999), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178919.pdf. 
 80. James J. Willis et al., Making Sense of COMPSTAT: A Theory-Based Analysis of 
Organizational Change in Three Police Departments, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 147, 172 (2007) 
(discussing the rise of COMPSTAT). 
 81. Charlie Beck & Colleen McCue, Predictive Policing: What Can We Learn from WalMart and 
Amazon about Fighting Crime in a Recession?, 76 POLICE CHIEF MAG. 18–24 (Nov. 2009); Steve Lohr, 
The Age of Big Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, at SR1 (“Police departments across the country, led 
by New York’s, use computerized mapping and analysis of variables like historical arrest patterns, 
paydays, sporting events, rainfall and holidays to try to predict likely crime ‘hot spots’ and deploy 
officers there in advance.”). 
 82. CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY 
AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY, 85–91 (2016). 
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dwindling budgets, a cost-effective, supposedly high-tech solution to crime 
became especially attractive and drew investment.83 With newspaper 
headlines hyping the technology as the future of policing, and federal grant 
money being invested in its design, predictive policing found itself leading 
the movement toward smart policing.84  
Before discussing the evolution of predictive policing, the actual claims 
of predictive policing companies and technologies must be separated from 
the hype of media coverage around the technology. This is somewhat 
difficult, because the companies themselves helped to generate the hype.85 
In fact, one might cynically argue that companies promoting predictive 
policing technologies benefit from the misconception that their algorithms 
actually predict crime.86 But, examined carefully, the claims and promises 
are much less grand. Predictive policing merely provides additional 
information about the places and persons involved in criminal activity that 
supplements, rather than replaces, existing police techniques and strategy.87 
It offers assessments of risk, rankings of risky areas or people, and can 
provide insights into associations and patterns that might be missed in the 
ordinary course of criminal investigation. As will be discussed in the next 
few sections, it has evolved rapidly, but, at base, remains a risk assessment 
tool adaptable to different problems and different jurisdictions.  
 
 
 83. Pearsall, supra note 17, at 17 (“George Gascón, chief of police for the San Francisco Police 
Department, noted that predictive policing is the perfect tool to help departments become more efficient 
as budgets continue to be reduced. ‘With predictive policing, we have the tools to put cops at the right 
place at the right time or bring other services to impact crime, and we can do so with less,’ he said.”); 
Huet, supra note 3 (“It’s impossible to know if PredPol prevents crime, since crime rates fluctuate, or to 
know the details of the software’s black-box algorithm, but budget-strapped police chiefs don’t care.”). 
 84. See Christopher Beam, Time Cops: Can Police Really Predict Crime Before it Happens?, 
SLATE (Jan. 24, 2011, 6:06 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2011/ 
01/time_cops.html [https://perma.cc/WG3B-X9GM]; Lev Grossman et al., The 50 Best Inventions of the 
Year, TIME MAGAZINE (Nov. 28. 2011), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/ 
0,9171,2099708,00.html [https://perma.cc/EA92-328K] (discussing preemptive policing); Vince Beiser, 
Can Computers Predict Crimes of the Future?, PAC. STANDARD (July 5, 2011), https://psmag. com/can-
computers-predict-crimes-of-the-future-5dd5ecaab617#.uz71u3fty [https://perma.cc/9S7K-4MJP]. 
 85. See Tim Kushing, ‘Predictive Policing’ Company Uses Bad Stats, Contractually-Obligated 
Shills To Tout Unproven ‘Successes’, Techdirt (Nov. 1, 2013, 9:48 AM) https://www.techdirt.com/ 
articles/20131031/13033125091/predictive-policing-company-uses-bad-stats-contractually-obligated-
shills-to-tout-unproven-successes.shtml [https://perma.cc/YD94-8SAT]. 
 86. Bond-Graham & Winston, supra note 4. 
 87. PERRY ET AL., supra note 74, at 6, 115 (discussing the “hype” problem of predictive policing 
advertising). 
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A. Predictive Policing 1.0: Targeting Places of Property Crime 
The origin myth of predictive policing has its birthplace in California 
under the leadership of Police Chief William Bratton.88 Bratton, along with 
Jack Maple, has been credited with championing the CompStat system with 
the New York Police Department (NYPD), and when Bratton was asked to 
lead the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), he brought his faith in 
data-driven policing to the West Coast.89 The idea, simply put, involved a 
data-analytics command structure that directed police resources to targeted 
areas of criminal activity.90 In its first iteration, this version of predictive 
policing was basically computer-augmented hotspot policing. While given 
the label “predictive policing,” it had all of the same characteristics of past 
crime pattern identification strategies that had been in use for years.  
However, in collaboration with several academics at major 
universities,91 the LAPD experimented with a predictive algorithm to 
identify predicted locations of criminal activity.92 While other cities had 
experimented with data-driven systems,93 two California cities, Los Angeles 
and Santa Cruz, embraced these predictive technologies and promoted their 
success.94  
As originally designed in Los Angeles, predictive policing focused on 
addressing three types of crime: burglary, automobile theft, and theft from 
automobiles.95 These crimes were selected for four main reasons. First, 
property crimes, while not the most serious, generated a significant amount 
of public concern for the safety of a community. Second, property crimes 
 
 
 88. Like most origin myths, this story is incomplete and subject to interpretation and debate.  
 89. Interview by Jim Burch and Kris Rose with William Bratton, former LAPD Chief, in Los 
Angeles, Cal. (Nov. 2009), available at https://www.bja.gov/publications/podcasts/multimedia/ 
transcript/Transcripts_Predictive_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KRN-V42W]. 
 90. Beck & McCue, supra note 81, at 18 (“Predictive policing allows command staff and police 
managers to leverage advanced analytics in support of meaningful, information-based tactics, strategy, 
and policy decisions in the applied public safety environment.”). 
 91. The LAPD collaborated with academics Jeffrey Brantingham (UCLA) and George Mohler 
(Santa Clara). See Jouvenal, supra note 4; Huet, supra note 3. 
 92. G.O. Mohler et al., Self-Exciting Point Process Modeling of Crime, 106 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 
100 (2011); Martin B. Short et al., Dissipation and Displacement of Hotspots in Reaction-Diffusion 
Models of Crime, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 3961 (2010). 
 93. Andrew Ashby, Operation Blue C.R.U.S.H. Advances at MPD, MEMPHIS DAILY NEWS (Apr. 
7, 2006), http://www.memphisdailynews.com/editorial/Article.aspx?id=30029 [https://perma.cc/ 
TZ5D-Y4SP] (“Operation Blue C.R.U.S.H. (Crime Reduction Using Statistical History) involves using 
mapping and statistical information to target crime hot spots and chronic perpetrators.”). See also 
Chicago Police Department Adopts Predictive Crime-Fighting Model, 2 GEOGRAPHY & PUB. SAFETY 
(Cmty. Oriented Policing Servs.), Mar. 2011, at 14 (“In April 2010, the Chicago Police Department 
began piloting a crime prevention strategy called predictive analytics.”). 
 94. Berg, supra note 15.  
 95. Ferguson, Predictive Policing, supra note 20, at 267. 
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tended to be reported, unlike drug crimes or even certain violent crimes, so 
police had a good sense of the level of crime, and could more easily measure 
any changes in frequency. Third, a large body of social science research 
suggested that these types of property crimes arose out of certain 
environmental vulnerabilities that could be identified and remedied.96 
Finally, because the crimes arose from place-based environmental factors, 
the theory became that targeted police presence in those areas might deter 
future criminal actions.  
In practice, this first iteration of predictive policing97—Predictive 
Policing 1.0—involved the collection of historical crime data (time, place, 
and type) and the application of an experimental computer algorithm that 
used data to predict likely areas of criminal activity.98 The predicted areas 
were precise—usually 500 by 500 square feet—and forecast a particular 
type of crime.99 Police officers on patrol received highlighted maps and 
visited those targeted areas as often as practicable within their regular 
patrols.100 It was believed that increased police presence at the identified 
areas would disrupt the continued pattern of property crimes.101 In Los 
Angeles, police officers in the Foothill Division were provided maps to 
guide them on patrol.102 In Santa Cruz, every morning at roll call officers 
were handed detailed maps with predictive forecasts of crime broken down 
 
 
 96. See, e.g., Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Hot Spots of Predatory Crime: Routine Activities and 
the Criminology of Place, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 27 (1989); Braga et al., supra note 78, at 9; Leslie W. 
Kennedy et al., Risk Clusters, Hotspots, and Spatial Intelligence: Risk Terrain Modeling as an Algorithm 
for Police Resource Allocation Strategies, 27 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 339, 358 (2011); Spencer 
Chainey et al., The Utility of Hotspot Mapping for Predicting Spatial Patterns of Crime, 21 SECURITY 
J. 4, 4–5 (2008). 
 97. The analysis here primarily focuses on what is now understood to be the model designed by 
PredPol. The precursor to PredPol was tested and developed with the LAPD under Chief Bratton.  
 98. Gordon, supra note 7; Ronald Bailey, Stopping Crime Before It Starts, REASON (July 10, 2012, 
5:00 PM), http://reason.com/archives/2012/07/10/predictive-policing-criminals-crime [https://perma.cc 
/LYK5-U6K]; Zach Friend, Predictive Policing: Using Technology to Reduce Crime, FBI LAW 
ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN (Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-
enforcement-bulletin/2013/April/predictive-policing-using-technology-to-reduce-crime 
[https://perma.cc/GRN5-GD8A]. 
 99. Adams, supra note 6.  
 100. See Lawrence W. Sherman, The Rise of Evidence-Based Policing: Targeting, Testing, and 
Tracking, 42 CRIME & JUST. 377, 426 (2013) (“PredPol, the predictive policing company, sells police 
agencies proprietary software that identifies extremely tight bounding of time and place in which crime 
is predicted to occur.”). 
 101. Goode, supra note 6. 
 102. Aaron Mendelson, Can LAPD Anticipate Crime with ‘Predictive Policing’?, THE CALIFORNIA 
REPORT (Sept. 6, 2013), http://audio.californiareport.org/archive/R201309061630/b [https://perma.cc/Z 
QS2-2ZJ2]. 
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by location and time.103 In other jurisdictions, patrol car computers 
displayed the data in real time.104 In all cases, police hoped their presence 
would deter lawbreaking.105 
The theory behind Predictive Policing 1.0 can be traced back to the work 
of criminologists who found that certain property-based crimes tended to 
have ripple effects in neighboring areas. Like contagious viruses,106 these 
crimes spurred additional crimes in the area, because either the same 
criminals came back to commit them, or certain environmental 
vulnerabilities existed to encourage crime.107 For example, a successful 
burglary of one house might encourage future attempts at nearby houses 
because the area would be familiar to the burglar, the houses might be built 
similarly, or the police presence inadequate.108 Perhaps the same burglar or 
group would strike again, or perhaps word would get out about easy targets 
in the area. Empirical studies had confirmed this “near repeat effect,”109 and 
 
 
 103. Tessa Stuart, Santa Cruz’s Predictive Policing Experiment, SANTACRUZ.COM (Feb. 14, 2012), 
http://www.santacruz.com/news/santa_cruzs_predictive_policing_experiment.html [http://perma.cc/U2 
YD-VPYC]. 
 104. Zen Vuong, Alhambra Police Chief Says Predictive Policing Has Been Successful, PASADENA 
STAR-NEWS (Feb. 11, 2014, 6:53 PM) http://www.pasadenastarnews.com/government-and-politics/201 
40211/alhambra-police-chief-says-predictive-policing-has-been-successful [https://perma.cc/ACE2 
-X55B] (“In addition to printouts of potential crime areas, [Alhambra Police Chief] Yokoyama said 
every police car is now equipped with in-car computers that receive refreshed information every five 
minutes.”); Maurice Chammah, Policing the Future, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 3, 2016, 7:15 AM), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/02/03/policing-the-future#.fFzTrlZ 
Vp [https://perma.cc/QZ3V-838D]. 
 105. Timothy B. Clark, How Predictive Policing Is Using Algorithms to Deliver Crime-Reduction 
Results for Cities, GOV’T EXEC. MEDIA GRP.: ROUTE FIFTY (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.govexec.com/ 
state-local/2015/03/predictive-policing-santa-cruz-predpol/107013/ [https://perma.cc/G3L3-NYHA] 
(“LAPD patrol cars are equipped with GPS-enabled mini-iPads to automatically track ‘time in the 
box.’”). 
 106. Daniel B. Neill & Wilpen L. Gorr, Detecting and Preventing Emerging Epidemics of Crime, 4 
ADVANCES IN DISEASE SURVEILLANCE, no. 13 (2007). 
 107. Jerry H. Ratcliffe & George F. Rengert, Near-Repeat Patterns in Philadelphia Shootings, 21 
SECURITY J. 58, 58 (2008) (“The near-repeat phenomenon states that if a location is the target of a crime 
such as burglary, the homes within a relatively short distance have an increased chance of being burgled 
for a limited number of weeks.”); Kate J. Bowers & Shane D. Johnson, Who Commits Near Repeats?: 
A Test of the Boost Explanation, 5 W. CRIMINOLOGY REV. 12, 13 (2004) (“[T]he (communicated) risk 
of burglary to nearby properties (within 400m of each other) was shown to be elevated for a short period 
of time, typically one-month, after which risks returned to pre-event levels. This pattern of space-time 
clustering has been referred to as the ‘near repeat’ phenomenon to reflect the association with repeat 
victimisation.”).  
 108. Shane D. Johnson, Repeat Burglary Victimisation: A Tale of Two Theories, 4 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 215, 236 (2008); Gordon, supra note 7 (quoting George Mason 
University professor Cynthia Lum as saying, “[crime is] most likely to occur tomorrow where it occurred 
yesterday. We know that about offenders too: People who commit crimes are likely to commit them 
again.”). 
 109. Wim Bernasco, Them Again?: Same-Offender Involvement in Repeat and Near Repeat 
Burglaries, 5 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 411, 412 (2008) (“Since the introduction of victimization surveys 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/5
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theories of “routine activity,”110 “rational choice,” and “crime patterns”111 
all have identified a similar phenomenon with these types of property 
crimes.112 Additional variables such as the weather (hot, dry), season 
(holidays), time of day (night), day of the week (paydays), or nearness to a 
particular event (concert, club) could increase the risk of crime.113 Predictive 
Policing 1.0 reduced those theories to data points and provided rather 
precise predictions for certain crimes at certain times and in certain areas.114 
If accurate, this theory supports why placing a police officer at the 
predicted location of crime might create a deterrent effect. Car thieves prefer 
dark, isolated parking lots with easy escape routes and limited police 
presence.115 If the attraction to the place for the criminal is the 
environmental vulnerability of the area, a heightened police presence will 
(temporarily) cure the vulnerability.116 Other remedial options might 
include better lighting, surveillance cameras, or civilian guards.117 For 
crimes of opportunity like car theft, the deterrence rationale makes sense.118  
In application, the early rollouts of Predictive Policing 1.0 were reported 
 
 
in the 1970s, it has become widely recognized that crime is concentrated among relatively few victims. 
A significant number of people become repeat victims, some of them over and over again.”) (citation 
omitted); Bowers & Johnson, supra note 107, at 12, 21 (“[P]rospective mapping is significantly more 
accurate than extant methods, correctly identifying the future locations of between 64%–80% of burglary 
events for the period considered.”). 
 110. Lisa Tompson & Michael Townsley, (Looking) Back to the Future: Using Space-Time Patterns 
to Better Predict the Location of Street Crime, 12 INT’L J. POLICE SCI. & MGMT. 23, 24 (2010) 
(“Research has repeatedly demonstrated that offenders prefer to return to a location associated with a 
high chance of success instead of choosing random targets.”). 
 111. Shane D. Johnson et al., Space-Time Patterns of Risk: A Cross National Assessment of 
Residential Burglary Victimization, 23 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 201, 203–04 (2007); Bowers & 
Johnson, supra note 107, at 13; Chainey et al., supra note 96, at 5 (“Crime also does not occur randomly. 
It tends to concentrate at particular places for reasons that can be explained in relation to victim and 
offender interaction and the opportunities that exist to commit crime.”). 
 112. Megan Yerxa, Evaluating the Temporal Parameters of Risk Terrain Modeling with Residential 
Burglary, 5 CRIME MAPPING 7, 10–11 (2013) (discussing environmental criminology and the different 
theories underlying predictive crime modeling).  
 113. PERRY, ET AL., supra note 74, at 44–45. 
 114. Josh Koehn, Algorithmic Crime Fighting, SANJOSE.COM (Feb. 22, 2012), 
http://www.sanjose.com/2012/02/22/sheriffs_office_fights_property_crimes_with_predictive_policing
/ (recognizing that the most common time for vehicle and residential crimes was between 5:00 PM and 
8:00 PM on Tuesdays and Thursdays).  
 115. Jill Drucker, Risk Factors of Larceny-Theft, RTM INSIGHTS (2010), http://www.rutgers 
cps.org/uploads/2/7/3/7/27370595/theftrisks.pdf. 
 116. Joel Rubin, Stopping Crime Before It Starts, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2010), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/aug/21/local/la-me-predictcrime-20100427-1 [https://perma.cc/J5CJ-
JVTJ] (“[A] would-be criminal must find a target that is sufficiently vulnerable to attack and that offers 
an appealing payout. An empty house with no alarm on a poorly lighted street, for example, has a much 
higher chance of being burglarized than one with a barking dog on a busy block.”). 
 117. Researchers of environmental criminology have well documented this phenomenon. 
 118. Tompson & Townsley, supra note 110, at 25. 
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as successful. In the Los Angeles test, the first six months saw a 25% drop 
in burglaries.119 In Santa Cruz, California, property crimes reportedly 
dropped between 4% and 11%.120 In Alhambra, California, police reported 
that after a year of using the technology, thefts from automobiles dropped 
21% and auto theft dropped 8%.121 In Modesto, California, property crimes 
dropped by double digits.122 Outside California, metropolitan areas like 
Seattle,123 Atlanta,124 and Reading, Pennsylvania125 adopted the technology 
with similar positive results. Of course, these initial studies may provide an 
imperfect sampling because crime across the country also decreased, and 
not all of the experiments have resulted in positive outcomes.126 Follow-up 
studies have been inconclusive,127 with some cities—including Los 
 
 
 119. Mitchell, supra note 2 (citing a 25% reduction in burglary for the first six months using 
PredPol). 
 120. Koehn, supra note 114 (“[D]uring the first half of 2011, Zach Friend, a spokesman for the 
Santa Cruz Police Department, says that after using its predictive policing algorithm, the department 
reported a drop in property crimes ranging somewhere between 4 and 11 percent.”); Baxter, supra note 
1 (“From the program’s start in Santa Cruz in July 2011 to Jan. 1, 2012, car burglaries and residential 
burglaries declined by 4 percent compared with the same period a year earlier, according to Santa Cruz 
crime analyst Zach Friend. Vehicle thefts remained about the same.”); Brian Heaton, Predictive Policing 
a Success in Santa Cruz, Calif., GOV’T TECH. (Oct. 8, 2012), http://www.govtech.com/ public-
safety/Predictive-Policing-a-Success-in-Santa-Cruz-Calif.html [https://perma.cc/AW8X-853Q] 
(reporting that a comparison of the first six months of 2012 with the first six months of 2011 showed 
thefts were down 19% without any change in police resources).  
 121. Vuong, supra note 104 (“The Alhambra Police Department focused on the two most common 
crimes in Alhambra, Yokoyama said. By year’s end, when compared to 2012 numbers, car burglaries 
decreased by 21 percent, and auto theft declined by 8 percent, a statistics report showed.”). 
 122. Rosalio Ahumada, Modesto Sees Double-Digit Drop in Property Crimes—Lowest in Three 
Years, MODESTO BEE, (Nov. 11, 2014, 4:24 PM), http://www.modbee.com/news/local/crime/ 
article3790616.html [https://perma.cc/X5NX-Z3CA]. 
 123. Martin Kaste, Can Software That Predicts Crime Pass Constitutional Muster?, NPR (July 26, 
2013, 4:55 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/07/26/205835674/can-software-that-predicts-crime-pass-
constitutional-muster, [https://perma.cc/8TJZ-D6C8] (reporting on predictive policing in Seattle). 
 124. Will Frampton, With New Software, Norcross Police Practice Predictive Policing, CBS 
ATLANTA (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.cbsatlanta.com/story/23178208/with-new-software-norcross-
police-utilize-predictive-policing.; Clark, supra note 105 (“The Atlanta Police Department, for example, 
conducted a 90-day pilot project in two of its six policing zones late in 2013. The test showed a marked 
decline in crime as compared with the previous year.”). 
 125. Clark, supra note 105 (“Reading, which adopted the technology in October 2013, observed a 
23 percent decline in burglaries in the next 12 months, the police department reported.”); Press Release, 
City of Reading, Pa., New Predictive Policing Strategies in Reading: Reducing Crime & Increasing 
Community Engagement, http://www.readingpa.gov/content/new-predictive-policing-strategies-reading 
-reducing-crime-increasing-community-engagement [https://perma.cc/CFN6-EDTG]. 
 126. Vuong, supra note 104. But see id. (“Yet the crime rate for certain activities has increased. 
Residential burglaries went up by 17 percent and robberies increased by 22 percent, a report found.”). 
 127. As of early 2016 there has only been a single peer-reviewed study of Predictive Policing 1.0, 
written in collaboration with the founders of PredPol. See George O. Mohler et al., Randomized 
Controlled Field Trials of Predictive Policing, 94 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 1399 (2015), http://amstat.tandf  
online.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01621459.2015.1077710. See also infra notes 287–289.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/5
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Angeles—showing a spike in crime after initial decreases.128 In addition, 
questions exist about the validity of the crime statistics (absent any 
independent accounting).129 In fact, during one of the few independent tests 
of predictive policing the RAND Corporation found no statistically 
significant improvement in crime reduction over control districts employing 
conventional hotspot mapping techniques.130 
Nevertheless, as a result of the reported successes, the concept of 
predictive policing received widespread national attention. Media reports 
from national and international sources touted the technology.131 The 
professors who began their initial tests with the LAPD formed a company, 
PredPol, to sell the software.132 Other academics133 and large technology 
players including IBM, Motorola, and Lexis-Nexis now compete in the 
growing analytics industry.134 In short, the idea of predicting crime has 
 
 
 128. Ben Poston, Crime in Los Angeles Rose in All Categories in 2015, LAPD Says, L.A. TIMES 
(Dec. 31, 2015, 6:10 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/crime/la-me-crime-stats-20151230-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/G6TC-AQY2]; Mike Aldax, Richmond Police Chief Says Department Plans to 
Discontinue ‘Predictive Policing’ Software, RICHMOND STANDARD (June 24, 2015), 
http://richmondstandard.com/2015/06/richmond-police-chief-says-department-plans-to-discontinue-
predictive-policing-software/ [https://perma.cc/EF84-QP8E] (quoting Richmond, California Police 
Chief Chris Magnus as saying, “In Richmond crime went down, yes, but now it’s going back up. . . . 
We’re seeing double digit increases.”). 
 129. Bond-Graham & Winston, supra note 4 (suggesting that PredPol’s creators have been “most 
successful [with] its marketing algorithms”). 
 130. PRISCILLIA HUNT ET AL., RAND CORP., EVALUATION OF THE SHREVEPORT PREDICTIVE 
POLICING EXPERIMENT 33 (2014) http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/ 
RR500/RR531/RAND_RR531.pdf. 
 131. See, e.g., Goode, supra note 6; Bob Orr, LAPD Computer Program Prevents Crime by 
Predicting It, CBS NEWS, (Apr. 11, 2012, 8:40 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/lapd-computer-
program-prevents-crime-by-predicting-it/ [https://perma.cc/SP93-Q4VD]; Rubin, supra note 116; 
Beam, supra note 84; Predictive Policing, supra note 7. 
 132. PREDPOL: MANAGEMENT TEAM, http://www.predpol.com/about/company/ [https://perma.cc/ 
3Z76-LSAS] (last visited Jan. 13, 2017). 
 133. RUTGERS CTR. ON PUB. SEC., RISK TERRAIN MODELING COMPENDIUM (Joel M. Caplan & 
Leslie W. Kennedy eds., 2011); Yerxa, supra note 112, at 27–29 (discussing Risk Terrain Modeling’s 
(RTM) positive prediction for residential burglaries). 
 134. Rachael King, IBM Analytics Help Memphis Cops Get ‘Smart’, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK 
(Dec. 5, 2011, 9:30 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/technology/ibm-analytics-help-memphis-cops-
get-smart-12052011.html [http://perma.cc/Q77C-WCXW] (describing the technology used by law 
enforcement in Memphis, Tennessee, which has contributed to the lowest crime rates there in a quarter-
century); Paul Bowers, Predictive Policing Arrives in Charleston, CHARLESTON CITY PAPER (June 27, 
2012), http://www.charlestoncitypaper.com/charleston/predictive-policing-arrives-in-charleston/Conte 
nt?oid=4101684 [http://perma.cc/JWL7-35TD] (discussing the use of predictive analytics to reduce 
armed robberies in Charleston, South Carolina); Juliana Reyes, Philly Police Will Be First Big City Cops 
to Use Azavea’s Crime Predicting Software, TECHNICALLY MEDIA INC. (Nov. 7, 2013, 12:30 PM), 
http://technical.ly/philly/2013/11/07/azavea-philly-police-crime-prediction-software [https://perma.cc/ 
MC69-84M2] (explaining that during 2013, Philadelphia became the first large city to use Azavea’s 
HunchLab crime software); ROBINSON & KOEPKE, supra note 3, at 3–5 (listing adoption of 
technologies). 
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become a multi-million dollar business, and a large-scale marketing 
campaign to sell predictive policing programs has commenced across the 
country.135  
Two points should be highlighted in this brief overview of Predictive 
Policing 1.0, with its focus on the PredPol technology. First, both the 
underlying theory and initial experiments focused on a limited number of 
property-based crimes and were firmly tied to place-based theories. 
Predicting violent crimes or individual criminals did not inform the early 
studies. Second, the excitement and promise of predictive policing has 
largely overtaken any perceived limitations. The belief that data-driven 
insights can transform policing has been with predictive policing since the 
beginning.136 With the same enthusiasm that actuarial predictions displaced 
clinical predictions as the primary recidivism assessment tool, the lure of 
data-driven enlightenment has replaced traditional law enforcement 
strategy.137 
B. Predictive Policing 2.0: Targeting Places of Violent Crime 
Preventing property crimes, while important, pales in comparison to the 
goal of preventing violent crimes. Thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
despite its brief history, predictive policing technologies have already 
evolved to target violent crime.138 Predictive policing software has been 
marketed to address robberies, shootings, and gang-related violence. This 
section looks at the move from Predictive Policing 1.0 (property crimes 
focused on place) to Predictive Policing 2.0 (violent crimes focused on 
place). This section also builds on traditional, computer-assisted hotspot 
policing. 
Violent crimes repeatedly occur in particular locations. Certain alleys 
may be conducive to robberies because of dim lighting, easy escape routes, 
 
 
 135. ROBINSON & KOEPKE, supra note 3, at 3–5. 
 136. Stephen D. Mastrofski & James J. Willis, Police Organization Continuity and Change: Into 
the Twenty-First Century, 39 CRIME & JUST. 55, 92–93 (2010) (“Predictive policing is then a forward-
looking crime diagnostic system designed to help police identify where and how their interventions can 
be most effective in preventing future crime. Its proponents envision a system that can focus narrowly 
(predicting future offenses of a serial killer) or large scale (predicting homicide patterns of an entire 
city), short term (predicting crime occurrences in hot spots over the next few days) or long term 
(predicting how city development plans will affect police resource allocations for many years).”). 
 137. See Somini Sengupta, In Hot Pursuit of Numbers to Ward Off Crime, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 
2013, 10:48 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/in-hot-pursuit-of-numbers-to-ward-off-
crime/.  
 138. See THE PREDICTIVE POLICING CO., PREDPOL PREDICTS GUN VIOLENCE (2013), 
http://cortecs.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/predpol_gun-violence.pdf; RUTGERS CTR. ON PUB. SEC., 
supra note 133. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/5
  
 
 
 
 
2017] POLICING PREDICTIVE POLICING 1133 
 
 
 
 
or close proximity to a victim-class.139 Certain clubs may be conducive to 
violent fights because of the typical mix of alcohol, drugs, and late-night 
errors in judgment.140 Certain streets might demarcate gang territory and 
thus be the locus of battles for control. These place-based attractors of 
violence have long been studied.141 Predictive policing has both mined this 
prior knowledge and developed new factors—like geographic 
vulnerabilities, precursor crimes, and temporal patterns—to allow for more 
sophisticated predictions.142 
Several police departments were early adopters of predictive policing 
programs for violent crimes. For example, IBM partnered with the 
Charleston, South Carolina Police Department to address armed 
robberies.143 Building off of an established system which collected robbery 
data in a CompStat-like system,144 the new predictive approach targeted 
particular blocks at particular times to reduce robberies.145 IBM has also 
worked with police in Memphis, Tennessee, utilizing similar technology but 
across a broader spectrum of crime.146 
Criminologists funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance developed 
several pilot projects in Boston, Baltimore, Kansas City, Las Vegas, and 
Los Angeles to apply smart policing principles to shootings.147 In Boston, 
for example, researchers found that “fewer than 5 percent of Boston’s street 
corners and block faces generated 74% of fatal and non-fatal shootings 
between 1980 and 2008, with the most-active 65 locations experiencing 
 
 
 139. Jeffrey S. Paul & Thomas M. Joiner, Integration of Centralized Intelligence with Geographic 
Information Systems: A Countywide Initiative, GEOGRAPHY & PUB. SAFETY (Cmty. Oriented Policing 
Servs.), Oct. 2011, at 5, 6. 
 140. Joel M. Caplan, Mapping the Spatial Influence of Crime Correlates: A Comparison of 
Operationalization Schemes and Implications for Crime Analysis and Criminal Justice Practice, 
CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RES. (U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev.), 2011, at 57, 70. 
 141. See e.g., David Weisburd, Does Hot Spots Policing Inevitably Lead to Unfair and Abusive 
Police Practices, or Can We Maximize Both Fairness and Effectiveness in the New Proactive Policing?, 
2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 661, 664–65 (2016) (“Perhaps the most important innovation to emerge in the 
new proactive policing to control crime is what has been termed ‘hot spots’ or ‘place-based’ 
policing….Hot spots policing emerged out of empirical observations that crime was highly concentrated 
in urban areas. The logic behind it was simply that if crime was highly concentrated on specific streets 
in the city, the police should focus their interventions at those places.”) (citing Lawrence W. Sherman 
et al., Hot Spots of Predatory Crime: Routine Activities and the Criminology of Place, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 
27, 37–42 (1989)).  
 142. See infra notes 153–56, 273, 282.  
 143. Bowers, supra note 134 (discussing the use of predictive analytics to reduce armed robberies 
in Charleston, South Carolina). 
 144. See sources cited supra note 80, 89 (discussing COMPStat).  
 145. Id. 
 146. King, supra note 134. 
 147. ANTHONY A. BRAGA ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SMART APPROACHES TO REDUCING 
GUN VIOLENCE 4 (2014). 
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more than 1,000 shootings during this time period.”148 In addition, “[t]he 
bulk of Boston shootings take place immediately after school dismissal and 
during the weekend evening hours, and tend to increase during summer 
months.”149 Thus, the targeted solution involved focusing on those predicted 
blocks during those particular times with intensive community patrols.150 
The results showed a dramatic reduction in violence, with a 17.3% reduction 
in violent crime, including a 19.2 percent reduction in robberies and a 15.4% 
reduction in aggravated assaults.151 Similar projects using a place-based 
focus and proactive intervention have been implemented in other cities.152 
PredPol has also adapted its focus to include gun violence. Using its 
predictive software, PredPol examined the 38,740 gun-related crimes that 
occurred in Chicago during 2009–2011 and analyzed them against the 1,331 
homicides during that same timeframe.153 The data revealed a correlation 
between precursor crimes involving handguns and future gun homicides. By 
studying these non-fatal precursor crimes, a fairly general predictive 
judgment could be made about fatal shootings.154 An internal PredPol study 
of this Chicago data demonstrated that the technology could predict the 
location of 50% of gun homicides within a broad timeframe.155 Specifically, 
the technology could show an elevated risk of a homicide for 30–100 days 
after the handgun crimes and within a half mile of the precursor crime.156 
Researchers have also looked at gang violence as a similarly predictable 
event.157 Gangs are territorial, defending and protecting particular areas 
from rival gangs.158 In addition, gang violence tends to be retaliatory in 
nature, with one gang attacking another in response to a prior violent act.159 
 
 
 148. Id. (citing Anthony A. Braga et al., The Concentration and Stability of Gun Violence at Micro 
Places in Boston, 1980–2008, 1 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 26, 33–53 (2010)). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 5. 
 152. Id. at 1–9. 
 153. See THE PREDICTIVE POLICING CO., supra note 138. This number included 17,020 robberies, 
6,560 assaults, 8,252 weapons violations, 5,274 batteries, and 303 criminal sexual assaults, all described 
as involving a handgun. This data can also be found at https://data.cityofchicago.org/Public-
Safety/Crimes-2001-to-present/ijzp-q8t2.  
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See, e.g., Damon Paulo et al., Social Network Intelligence Analysis to Combat Street Gang 
Violence (2013), http://arxiv.org/pdf/1306.6834.pdf. 
 158. Leslie Brokaw, Predictive Policing: Working the Odds to Prevent Future Crimes, MIT SLOAN 
MGMT. REV. (Sept. 12, 2011), http://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/predictive-policing-working-the-odds-
to-prevent-future-crimes/ [https://perma.cc/GX8M-UCGT] (“Crime is often a clustering event: if there 
is an act of inter-gang violence, for instance, there’s likely to be a retaliatory act shortly after.”).  
 159. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/5
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The locations in between rival gangs’ territories thus tend to be the focus of 
more violent actions. George Mohler, one of the founders of PredPol, 
worked with colleagues to study and map predicted gang shootings.160 Other 
studies claim that 58% of gang crimes in Los Angeles occurred within two 
blocks of a known gang border, and 83% occurred within three blocks of 
that location.161 This type of geographical awareness could be useful for 
diffusing gang tensions or preventing retaliatory attacks. 
Other researchers have developed more sophisticated models to predict 
robberies, aggravated assaults, and shootings. Researchers at the Rutgers 
Center for Public Security have developed a risk assessment technique 
called Risk Terrain Modeling (RTM),162 which has been successfully used 
to study certain types of violent crime.163 RTM develops digitized risk 
terrain maps identifying particular factors associated with particular crimes. 
Identified factors are layered on a computer map to highlight the intensity 
of risk in particular micro-areas. Instead of focusing on past crimes, RTM 
focuses on current environmental risk factors which heighten the risk for 
crime. For example, the risk factors for armed robbery were found to be an 
area’s proximity to or high density of each of the following seven types of 
location: drug dealing areas; prostitution areas; bus stops and rail stations; 
bars, pubs and exotic clubs; leisure and fast-food outlets; universities; and 
banks.164 As can be seen, many of the factors attract potential victims who 
are then targeted by potential robbers. In a year-long study in Newark, New 
 
 
 160. Laura M. Smith et al., Adaption of an Ecological Territorial Model to Street Gang Spatial 
Patterns in Los Angeles, 32 DISCRETE & CONTINUOUS DYNAMICAL SYS. 3223 (2012). See also 
Predictive Policing: George Mohler Interview, DATA SCI. WKLY., http://www.datascienceweekly.org/ 
data-scientist-interviews/predictive-policing-george-mohler-interview [https://perma.cc/QF64-K958]. 
 161. Meg Smith, Remapping Gang Turf, Math Models Show Crimes Cluster on Borders Between 
Rivals, UCLA NEWSROOM (June 25, 2012) (discussing P. Jeffrey Brantingham, et al., The Ecology of 
Gang Territorial Boundaries, 50 CRIMINOLOGY 851, 867 (2012)).  
 162. Kennedy et al., supra note 96, at 345–46; Leslie W. Kennedy et al., Results Executive 
Summary: A Multi-Jurisdictional Test of Risk Terrain Modeling and a Place-Based Evaluation of 
Environmental Risk-Based Patrol Deployment Strategies, RUTGERS CTR. ON PUB. SEC. 4–6 (2015), 
http://www.rutgerscps.org/uploads/2/7/3/7/27370595/nij6city_resultsexecsum_final.pdf [hereinafter 
Results: Executive Summary]. 
 163. Jie Xu et al., Crime Generators for Shootings in Urban Areas: A Test Using Conditional 
Locational Interdependence as an Extension of Risk Terrain Modeling, RUTGERS CTR. ON PUB. SEC.,2 
(2010) (“Gun shootings are not randomly distributed throughout a terrain; but rather, are concentrated 
in a statistically significant way around certain features. In Newark and Irvington, these features are 
middle and high schools, bus stops, and public housing.”). As a disclosure, I have worked in a very 
limited capacity as an unpaid consultant with Professor Joel Caplan, Leslie Kennedy, and Eric Piza as 
part of a National Institute of Justice Grant studying “A Multi-Jurisdictional Test of Risk Terrain 
Modeling and a Place-Based Evaluation of Environmental Risk-Based Patrol Deployment Strategies.” 
My role has been limited to a handful of brief consultations without financial compensation and I have 
had no role in the development of the RTM technology or the studies.  
 164. RUTGERS CTR. ON PUB. SEC., supra note 133, at 74. 
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Jersey, an RTM map demonstrated that for every additional risk factor there 
was a 2.3% increased risk of a robbery.165 
For shootings, RTM examines the following factors: “locations of drug 
arrests, proximity to ‘at-risk’ housing developments, ‘risky facilities,’ 
locations of gang activity, known home addresses of parolees previously 
incarcerated for violent crimes and/or violations of drug distribution laws, 
locations of past shooting incidents, and locations of past gun robberies.”166 
Recent RTM studies focused on predicting shootings and other assaultive 
conduct in Irvington, New Jersey,167 with initial statistical success.168 
RTM’s focus on risk allows for a more detailed place-based assessment of 
locations of violent crime. In a recent multi-jurisdictional survey, RTM 
demonstrated significant short- and long-term crime reduction across a wide 
variety of cities.169 
Finally, one company has chosen to integrate the theories behind PredPol 
and RTM into a single commercial product.170 HunchLab, part of the 
Azaeva company, was founded by a former crime analyst with the 
Philadelphia Police Department.171 HunchLab 2.0 looks at baseline crime 
rates, near repeat patterns, routine activities theory, socioeconomic factors, 
seasons, time of month, day of week, time, holidays, sporting events, 
weather, and other RTM-like factors.172 The information is integrated into a 
machine-learning algorithm with updates for every police shift. As of yet, 
 
 
 165. Id. at 75. 
 166. Kennedy et al., supra note 96, at 345–46. 
 167. Joel M. Caplan et al., Risk Terrain Modeling: Brokering Criminological Theory and GIS 
Methods for Crime Forecasting, 28 JUST. Q. 360 (2011) (discussing shootings in Irvington). See 
generally Joel M. Caplan et al., Risk Terrain Modeling for Spatial Risk Assessment, CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y 
DEV. & RES. (U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev.), 2015, at 7; William D. Moreto et al., “A Plague on 
both Your Houses?”: Risks, Repeats and Reconsiderations of Urban Residential Burglary, 31 JUST. Q. 
1102 (2014); Joel M. Caplan et al., Joint Utility of Event-Dependent and Environmental Crime Analysis 
Techniques for Violent Crime Forecasting, 59 CRIME & DELINQ. 243 (2013); Joel M. Caplan et al., 
Kansas City’s Violent Crime Initiative: A Place-Based Evaluation of Location-Specific Intervention 
Activities During a Fixed Time Period 4 CRIME MAPPING 9 (2012).  
 168. Kennedy et al., supra note 96, at 345–46. 
 169. See Leslie W. Kennedy et al., Results in Brief: A Multi-Jurisdictional Test of Risk Terrain 
Modeling and a Place-Based Evaluation of Environmental Risk-Based Patrol Deployment Strategies, 
RUTGERS CTR. ON PUB. SEC. (2010), http://www.rutgerscps.org/uploads/2/7/3/7/27370595/ 
nij6city_results_inbrief_final.pdf; Kennedy et al., supra note 162. 
 170. See HUNCHLAB, HUNCHLAB: UNDER THE HOOD (2015), https://cdn.azavea.com/pdfs/ 
hunchlab/HunchLab-Under-the-Hood.pdf.  
 171. Laura Nahmias & Miranda Neubauer, NYPD testing crime-forecast software, POLITICO NEW 
YORK (July 8, 2015, 5:52 AM), http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/city-hall/2015/07/ 
8571608/nypd-testing-crime-forecast-software [https://perma.cc/38N9-7HW9]. 
 172. See HUNCHLAB, supra note 170; Michael Thomsen, Predictive Policing And The Fantasy Of 
Declining Violence In America, FORBES (June 30, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
michaelthomsen/2014/06/30/predictive-policing-and-the-fantasy-of-declining-violence-in-america/. 
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HunchLab has not publicly released any formal studies on the effectiveness 
of its combined approach.173  
Applying predictive policing programs to prevent place-based violent 
crimes—Predictive Policing 2.0—follows the same logic as Predictive 
Policing 1.0. Essentially, place-based environmental vulnerabilities exist 
that encourage violent crime, and thus should create a higher risk that crime 
will occur in that location. Again, predictive policing is not actually 
predicting a particular crime, but predicting an elevated risk of crime based 
on pre-determined place-based factors. 
C. Predictive Policing 3.0: Targeting Persons Involved in Criminal 
Activity 
Place has been the central concept behind the rise of predictive policing. 
Place-based crimes can be predicted because of the environmental 
vulnerabilities that encourage criminal activity. Obviously, however, it 
takes a person to commit the crime in that place, and new predictive 
technologies are being created to target individuals predicted to be involved 
in criminal activity.174 This section examines the use of predictive 
technologies to identify individuals and groups involved in predicted 
criminal activity. 
This move to Predictive Policing 3.0 rests on the insight that negative 
social networks, like environmental vulnerabilities, can encourage criminal 
activity. In addition, it involves utilizing big data capabilities to develop 
predictive profiles of individuals based on past criminal activity, current 
associations, and other factors that correlate with criminal propensity.175 
While arrests based purely on pre-crime predictions will not likely happen 
any time soon, police have shifted surveillance and investigation resources 
to focus on prediction as part of a larger push toward proactive policing.176  
 
 
 173. Chammah, supra note 104. 
 174. See generally Erin Murphy, Databases, Doctrine & Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 37 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 830 (2010) (“But the use of databases to generate suspects represents a new 
kind of investigation altogether—whether based on particular information (e.g., ‘who called this 
number’) or upon predefined algorithms (e.g., ‘who has traveled to these three countries and bought 
these two items within a one month period’).”). 
 175. Mark Ward, Crime Fighting with Big Data Weapons, BBC (Mar. 18, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-26520013 [http:// perma.cc/4ETS-GKDF]; Mitchell, supra note 2; 
Bond-Graham & Winston, supra note 8. 
 176. Richard A. McFeely, Statement Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, FBI (June 20, 2011), 
http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/information-sharing-efforts-with-partners-span-many-fbi-
programs [https://perma.cc/KC33-GTJR]. 
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The insight that social networks can reveal potential criminal actors 
arises from two separate avenues of study. The first involves a public health 
approach to crime that has attempted to understand the interconnected 
causes and sources of youth violence.177 Similar to the insight that property 
crime is contagious, criminologists discovered that a small percentage of 
the population has an elevated risk of becoming the victim or perpetrator of 
gun violence.178 Using data analysis, these individuals then could be mapped 
out as a social network. The second insight evolved out of technology 
developed to map international terror networks.179 Social network theory 
maps associations and connections, and links to addresses, phone numbers, 
and other data sources, providing insights into ongoing investigations and 
identifying new patterns in crime.180 Both share a similar goal of identifying, 
targeting, and tracking individuals who have a high risk of committing 
certain offenses.  
In cities such as Chicago, Kansas City, and Boston, epidemic gun 
violence affected a relatively small group of young people.181 For decades, 
criminologists studied this phenomenon and then sought to isolate the 
causes and identify the participants.182 For example, in Chicago, researchers 
found that: 
[A] very small number of neighborhoods in Chicago are responsible 
for most of the city’s violence trends. The “city’s” crime problem is 
in fact geographically and socially concentrated in a few highly 
impoverished and socially isolated neighborhoods. Data also 
 
 
 177. Lenny Bernstein, Gun Violence as a Public Health Issue, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2014/04/10/gun-violence-as-a-public-
health-issue/.  
 178. See infra notes 181–189.  
 179. Los Angeles Police Using CIA Software to Track Criminals, Ex-cons, RT (Nov. 15, 2014) 
http://rt.com/usa/205727-lapd-criminals-data-collection/ [https://perma.cc/FTH4-M5MF]. 
 180. See generally Cynthia Rudin, Predictive Policing: Using Machine Learning to Detect Patterns 
of Crime, WIRED (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.wired.com/insights/2013/08/predictive-policing-using-
machine-learning-to-detect-patterns-of-crime [http://perma.cc/84SQ-RCBG] (“The algorithm tries to 
construct a modus operandi (M.O.) of the offender. The M.O. is a set of habits that the offender follows 
and is a type of behavior used to characterize a pattern. The M.O. for the burglaries included factors like 
means of entry (front door, back door, window), day of the week, characteristics of the property 
(apartment, single family house), and geographic proximity to other break-ins.”). 
 181. BRAGA ET AL., supra note 147 (“In 2006, roughly one percent of Boston youth between the 
ages of 15 and 24 participated in gangs, but these gangs generated more than half of all homicides, and 
gang members were involved in roughly 70 percent of fatal and non-fatal shootings as either a 
perpetrator and/or a victim.”) (citing Anthony A. Braga et al., Losing Faith? Police, Black Churches, 
and the Resurgence of Youth Violence in Boston, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 141 (2008)). 
 182. See, e.g., David M. Kennedy, Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime Settings, and a 
Theory of Prevention, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 449, 449–51 (1997); Andrew V. Papachristos et al., Social 
Networks and the Risk of Gunshot Injury, 89 J. URB. HEALTH 992, 993 (2012). 
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revealed that most victims (and offenders) of gun violence in Chicago 
tend to be young African American men who live in neighborhoods 
on the West or South sides of the city.183 
In Chicago, District Intelligence Officers were tasked with identifying those 
most at risk of gun violence. Police officers evaluated past criminal activity, 
past arrests involving other victims, whether the person had been identified 
as part of a gang audit,184 or identified to be on a “strategic subjects list.”185 
As described by Chicago Police Department Special Order S10-05: 
The Strategic Subjects List (SSL) is a rank-order list of potential 
victims and subjects with the greatest propensity for violence. The 
SSL model looks at individuals with criminal records who are ranked 
according to their probability of being involved in a shooting or 
murder, either as a victim or an offender, known as a “Party to 
Violence” (PTV). The software is generated based on empirical data 
that lists attributes of a person’s criminal record, including the record 
of violence among criminal associates, the degree to which his 
criminal activities are on the rise, and the types of intensity of 
criminal history.186 
Once an individual is identified and placed on this “heat list,”187 a police 
detective, a social worker, and a community leader (such as a football coach 
or pastor) conduct a “custom notification,” which involves a face-to-face 
meeting at home or a “call-in” at a public space, and the delivery of a custom 
notification letter.188 
While designed as a public health approach, the same techniques have 
been used in a more punitive way to identify and track gang violence in the 
city. The Chicago Police Department now uses “network analysis” to map 
 
 
 183. Meares et al., supra note 27. 
 184. See Chicago Police Department Special Order S10-05, § V.A (Oct. 6, 2015), 
http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/ (search “Basic Search” field for “S10-05,” then select 
“Custom Notifications in Chicago”). 
 185. Id. at § IV.B. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Monica Davey, Chicago Tactics Put a Major Dent in Killing Trend, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 
2013, at A1. See also Guarino, supra note 10. 
 188. Jeremey Gorner, Chicago Police Use ‘Heat List’ As Strategy to Prevent Violence, CHI. TRIB. 
(Aug. 21, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-08-21/news/ct-met-heat-list-20130821_1_ 
chicago-police-commander-andrew-papachristos-heat-list [https://perma.cc/GKJ7-29LQ]; Bryan 
Llenas, The New World of ‘Predictive Policing’ Raises Specter of High-Tech Racial Profiling, FOX 
NEWS LATINO (Feb. 25, 2014), http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2014/02/24/brave-new-world-
predictive-policing-raises-specter-high-tech-racial-profiling/ [https://perma.cc/N65R-JDND]. 
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relationships between thousands of gang members in the city.189 Police 
study social networks, and even social media, as many times retaliatory 
violence can be detected by monitoring such platforms.190 The shift from 
predicting and ranking “hot spots” to “hot people” has become a new focus 
for police.191 In fact, as a recent RAND study found, these early heat lists 
have been used to arrest suspects involved in suspected violence.192 The 
Heat Lists transformed into data-driven most wanted lists, as opposed to 
violence prevention programs.193 
A similar project has been undertaken in Kansas City. As part of a Smart 
Policing Initiative (SPI) funded by the Department of Justice’s Bureau of 
Justice Assistance, a sophisticated social network analysis was conducted 
of the likely offenders in the city:194  
[T]he SPI team employs advanced social network analysis using 
official offense data, field interview forms, and gang data. The 
analysis identifies a social deviant network that depicts the 
connections between individuals. The analysis begins with an 
identified list of target offenders. In Kansas City, the initial target list 
of offenders included those who were suspects in murders, shootings, 
or other serious assaults. The team examined all formal police 
contacts with each of these initial offenders to identify their 
 
 
 189. Buntin, supra note 8 (“Today, the Chicago Police Department is doing something similar with 
gangs. Using a tool academics call ‘network analysis,’ the CPD is mapping the relationships among 
Chicago’s 14,000 most active gang members. It’s also ranking how likely those people are to be involved 
in a homicide, either as victims or offenders.”). See also Joseph Goldstein & J. David Goodman, Seeking 
Clues to Gangs and Crimes, Detectives Follow Internet Rap Videos, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2014, at A20 
(“Directed by prosecutors to build evidence that individual shootings are part of larger criminal 
conspiracies, officers are listening to local rappers for a better sense of the hierarchy of the streets. ‘You 
really have to listen to the songs because they’re talking about ongoing violence.’”) (quoting Officer 
Fred Vanpelt, part of an anti-gang squad in Brooklyn, NY). 
 190. Douglas Belkin, Chicago Hunts for Answers to Gang Killings: Police Build Facebook-Like 
Database to Prevent Swift Cycles of Retaliation, WALL ST. J. (July 12, 2012, 7:34 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303644004577520863051001848 
[https://perma.cc/CUP4-UAMH]. 
 191. Buntin, supra note 8 (“[T]he CPD has discovered something striking: Cities don’t so much 
have ‘hot spots’ as ‘hot people.’ That finding is transforming the way the police do business in Chicago 
and has significant implications for how other cities should be policed.”); Mitchell, supra note 2 
(“Charlotte-Mecklenburg, N.C. is now going beyond predicting where and when crime will occur to 
predict who is likely to reoffend. Instead of studying just crimes and locations to decide where crimes 
will occur, police departments make predictions using criminal histories to predict who will commit a 
crime.”). 
 192. Jessica Saunders et. al., Predictions Put Into Practice: A Quasi-Experimental Evaluation of 
Chicago’s Predictive Policing Pilot, 12 J. EXP. CRIMINOLOGY 347, 363–64 (2016). 
 193. Matt Stroud, Chicago’s Predictive Policing Tool Just Failed a Major Test, THE VERGE (Aug. 
19, 2016), www.theverge.com/2016/8/19/12552384/chicago-heat-list-tool-failed-rand-test. 
 194. BRAGA ET AL., supra note 147, at 12–13. 
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associates (e.g., who had been arrested or stopped with the initial 
offender). The team then performed the same analysis with the newly 
identified associates, resulting in a social network that includes three 
layers of offenders: the initial target offenders, the target offenders’ 
associates, and the associates of the target offenders’ associates.195 
This initial process identified 120 individuals who were contacted by police 
and informed that they had been identified as a cause of the violence in the 
city.196 Police informed these predicted suspects that they would be held 
responsible for future violence, and advised them of available social 
services.197 When these individuals did commit a crime, they were punished 
more severely.198 Similar projects identifying “socially deviant networks” 
have been initiated in Boston, Las Vegas, and other jurisdictions.199 
Advanced analytics has also allowed police to begin collecting 
intelligence on suspected criminal networks and individuals. Palantir, a 
private company that once designed some of the most advanced data 
collection and analysis systems for the intelligence community, has 
partnered with police forces and local governments to address violent 
crime.200 In Los Angeles, a project called Operation LASER (Los Angeles 
Strategic Extraction and Restoration) identifies likely criminal actors201 and 
develops “Chronic Offender Bulletins” of targeted individuals.202 These 
bulletins are provided to police for surveillance and investigation purposes. 
As described, “[t]he basic premise is to target with laser-like precision the 
violent repeat offenders and gang members who commit crimes in the 
 
 
 195. Id. at 13. 
 196. Id.  
 197. Id. (“In April 2013, the team held their first offender call-ins (three were held throughout the 
day). Invitations were sent to more than 120 individuals and 38 attended the call-ins. Individuals received 
three basic messages at the call-in: (1) violence cannot be tolerated; (2) further violence will be met with 
certain and severe consequences from law enforcement; and (3) those who want help to change will 
receive it. A range of social services were available to the call-in attendees including education, job 
training, and substance abuse training.”). 
 198. John Eligon & Timothy Williams, On Police Radar for Crimes They Might Commit, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 25, 2015, at A1 (“Tammy Dickinson, the United States Attorney for the Western District 
of Missouri, related the story of a man in the program who was given a 15-year prison sentence for being 
caught with a bullet in his pocket.”). See also Ferguson, Predictive Prosecution, supra note 21, at 717–
20 (discussing how prosecutors enforce punishment through predictive policing systems).  
 199. Mitchell, supra note 2; BRAGA ET AL., supra note 146, at ii–iii.  
 200. RT, supra note 179; BRAGA ET AL., supra note 146, at 11 (“This data-driven approach includes 
the use of Palantir, a powerful analytical computer platform that allows CID to quickly access and 
search multiple databases.”). 
 201. CRAIG D. UCHIDA ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA SMART 
POLICING INITIATIVE: REDUCING GUN-RELATED VIOLENCE THROUGH OPERATION LASER 3 (2012).  
 202. Id. at 7; BRAGA ET AL., supra note 146, at 10 (describing the use of “Chronic Offender 
Bulletins, which contain detailed information about prolific offenders”). 
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specific target areas. The program is analogous to laser surgery, where a 
trained medical doctor uses modern technology to remove tumors or 
improve eyesight.”203 
In Louisiana, Palantir has partnered with the City of New Orleans to 
address gun-related homicides.204 Using network analysis, the technology is 
able to “illuminate[] the roles of feuds, retaliations, drugs, common 
disputes, and gangs in shootings and homicides.”205 Specifically, the 
technology identified approximately 3,000 individuals (1% of the 
population of 378,000) who had the highest risk of being involved in gun 
violence.206 According to Palantir’s own reporting, the technology could 
identify 35–50% of the likely shooting victims.207 Acting on these tips, and 
implementing an intervention strategy to target and investigate those 
involved, the City of New Orleans’ murder rate fell 21.9%.208 
These approaches each share several commonalities. First, the predictive 
assessments focus on identifiable individuals.209 Second, the technologies 
 
 
 203. UCHIDA ET AL., supra note 201, at 6.  
 204. PALANTIR, supra note 8, at 1–5 (describing NOLA for Life, a project to reduce homicides in 
New Orleans). See also Jeffrey Goldberg, A Matter of Black Lives, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/a-matter-of-black-lives/399386/ [https://perma. 
cc/GZ49-JFWR]; Jason Shueh, New Orleans Cuts Murder Rate Using Data Analytics, GOV’T TECH. 
(Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.govtech.com/data/New-Orleans-Cuts-Murder-Rate-Using-Data-Analytics. 
html [https://perma.cc/R64Q-7AKL]; CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, NOLA FOR LIFE: COMPREHENSIVE 
MURDER REDUCTION STRATEGY (2016), http://www.nolaforlife.org/files/n4l-2016-comprehensive-
murder-reduction-strategy-b/; PALANTIR TECHNOLOGIES, PHILANTHROPY ENGINEERING: 2015 ANNUAL 
IMPACT REPORT (2016), https://www.palantir.com/philanthropy-engineering/annual-
report/2015/murder-reduction/ [https://perma.cc/LH8X-8CUJ] (quoting Sarah Schirmer, Criminal 
Justice Policy Advisor in the Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice Coordination, as saying, “Since 2012, 
Mayor Mitch Landrieu has committed significant resources and effort to reducing murder in New 
Orleans, and has asked every partner and stakeholder in the city to play a role. Palantir has made it 
possible for our intelligence analysts to question preconceived ideas about murder victims and suspects. 
The analysis has strengthened our ability to prevent and intervene in violent conflicts, and connect at-
risk individuals to services.”).  
 205. PALANTIR TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 8, at 6.  
 206. Id. at 8. 
 207. Id. at 7, 9 (“NOLA analysts have developed advanced techniques to identify the most high-
risk and vulnerable populations. Using social graph analysis of data ranging from 2011 to the present, 
analysts can effectively identify 35–50% of the likely shooting victims from a population of 
approximately 3,900 citizens (1% of the total city population).”). 
 208. Id. at 9. 
 209. Even smaller jurisdictions like Rochester, Minnesota have developed similar technologies. 
Partnering with IBM, the Rochester police use a program called “Infosphere Identity Insight,” which 
allows police to identify juveniles who might be involved in criminal activity. Maya Rao, Rochester 
hopes predictive policing can steer juveniles away from crime, STAR TRIBUNE (Oct. 24, 2014, 11:18 
PM), http://www.startribune.com/rochester-police-plan-to-target-at-risk-teens-raises-concerns/ 2803 
85202/ [https://perma.cc/9BPT-ZXKU]; Sarah Rich, Cities Turn to Analytics for Targeting Habitual 
Criminals, GOV’T TECH. (Jan. 25, 2012) http://www.govtech.com/public-safety/Cities-Turn-to-
Analytics-for-Targeting-Habitual-Criminals.html [https://perma.cc/75HG-CMCN]. 
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augment identification, surveillance, investigation, and intervention, but do 
not independently create the justification to stop or arrest individuals.210 
Third, to ensure a deterrent effect, additional police resources are needed to 
interact with the identified suspects. Initial reports about reduced crime rates 
appear promising, but the potential of falsely accusing individuals based on 
associations or suspicions has raised many concerns.211 
D. Reflections on New Versions of Predictive Policing 
Predictive policing is evolving at a rapid rate. In fact, the technological 
developments have far outpaced legal or policy debates around the subject. 
Generally, local police administrators contract with predictive policing 
companies with little public oversight.212 On occasion a media story reveals 
the purchase of new technology, but only rarely does this publicity have any 
effect on the adoption of the practice.213 With the exception of a few 
journalists and scholars, the technology has largely escaped scrutiny.214 
As such, the different strains of predictive policing have been analyzed 
together, without focusing on the different theoretical bases, practical 
implications, and social science support underlying the technology. 
Suspicion based on correlation may be acceptable when talking about place-
based crimes, but it is insufficient when talking about person-based crimes. 
Sending a police car to patrol a suspected area is less consequential than 
sending a police detective to interrogate a suspect. Further, the hype 
surrounding property- and place-based predictive policing has been used to 
justify adoption of violent crime-focused or person-focused technology, 
despite a lack of equivalent empirical testing to support it. 
In some ways, labeling these different strains of technology with the 
broad title of “predictive policing” may well encourage such misleading 
hype and expectations. The algorithms in their current state really amount 
 
 
 210. Ferguson, Big Data, supra note 21, at 387–89. 
 211. Id. at 403; Jack Smith IV, ‘Minority Report’ is Real—And It’s Really Reporting Minorities, 
MIC (Nov. 9, 2015), http://mic.com/articles/127739/minority-reports-predictive-policing-technology-is-
really-reporting-minorities#.zwXVV93jm [https://perma.cc/35GD-56VL]. 
 212. But see Bellingham police consider ‘predictive policing’ software, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 
6, 2015). 
 213. But see Gov. Doug Ducey vetoes bill funding predictive policing program, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Apr. 14, 2015). 
 214. But see Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 
WASH. L. REV. 35 (2014); Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a 
Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 103 (2014); Matt Stroud, The 
minority report: Chicago’s new police computer predicts crimes, but is it racist?, THE VERGE (Feb. 19, 
2014), http://www.theverge.com/2014/2/19/5419854/the-minority-report-this-computer-predicts-
crime-but-is-it-racist; Bond-Graham & Winston, supra note 4. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1144 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:1109 
 
 
 
 
to “crime forecasting,” or perhaps even more precisely, “risk forecasting,” 
rather than actual crime prediction.215 Like an old-school weather 
forecast,216 the data can provide localized forecasts—“cloudy with a chance 
of murder”—with a significant degree of variability and fallibility. As in 
weather forecasting, the move to objective, data-driven computer models 
signals an improvement from subjective instincts or traditional guesses 
about the weather.217 And just as meteorology has improved its accuracy, 
the same will be true with predictive criminal forecasting as the data 
collection mechanisms and models grow in sophistication. 
All predictive innovations raise difficult questions about how to evaluate 
such new technologies. The next section attempts to organize the larger 
theoretical questions underlying adoption of any predictive technology by 
studying the questions that arise from existing predictive policing 
technologies. 
III. POLICING PREDICTION  
How should predictive technologies be policed? As has been 
demonstrated, the criminal justice system has eagerly embraced a data-
driven future without significant political oversight or public discussion. 
Worse, the temptations of new technology have at times overwhelmed 
considerations of utility or effectiveness and ignored considerations of 
fairness or justice. This claim is not to cast aspersions on police 
administrators adopting new approaches, or technologists inventing new 
predictive techniques, but simply to reflect the nature of new technologies. 
Certain vulnerabilities exist in predictive systems and this section proposes 
an analytical framework to evaluate current and future predictive policing 
technologies. The goal is to expose, analyze, and respond to these issues so 
that police departments, communities, courts, technologists, and citizens 
can honestly evaluate the next proposed predictive solution to crime. 
Building off the fundamental insight of predictive policing—that by 
addressing environmental vulnerabilities police can deter actors seeking to 
exploit those vulnerabilities—this section seeks to address the potential 
systemic vulnerabilities of any future predictive technology. These 
 
 
 215. Sherman, supra note 100, at 425 (recognizing that evidence-based police targeting “employs 
forecasting, not precise predictions, about when and where crimes are likely to occur”). 
 216. See NOAA’s Weather Forecasts Go Hyper Local With Next-Generation Weather Model, (Sept. 
30, 2014); http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2014/20140930_hrrr.html. 
 217. Jaikumar Vijayan, Big Data Key to Bringing Hyperlocal Weather Forecasts to Georgia 
Farmers, COMPUTERWORLD (April 25, 2014) http://www.computerworld.com/article/2488618/big-
data/big-data-key-to-bringing-hyperlocal-weather-forecasts-to-georgia-farmers.html.  
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vulnerabilities involve: (1) data; (2) methodology; (3) social science 
limitations; (4) transparency; (5) accountability; (6) vision; (7) practical 
implementation; (8) administration; and (9) security. In building this risk 
analysis framework, Part III offers practical responses to counteract these 
vulnerabilities. 
A. Data: Vulnerabilities and Responses 
The backbone of any new predictive technology is data.218 Predictive 
technologies require data, and the difficulty in obtaining usable, accurate, 
and clean data to integrate into a predictive system exposes a massive 
vulnerability.219 Predictive Policing 1.0 and 2.0 require crime data. 
Predictive Policing 3.0 requires integrated crime data, personal data, and 
pattern matching programs. Because any future predictive policing 
technology will require the collection of some data, the difficulties of 
obtaining good data must be identified and addressed. 
1. Bad Data 
Any data-driven system risks being undermined by bad data. This data 
includes flaws, fragmentation, and the internal and external pressures to 
collect vast amounts of information constantly, instantaneously, and 
without adequate financial resources to ensure accuracy.  
a. Human Error 
To be used, data must be collected, and much of that collection is done 
by human beings. Human beings make mistakes.220 Errors can arise in initial 
collection.221 For example, a police officer might write down the wrong 
address of a crime scene. Errors can arise during data input. For example, 
the officer could input the wrong address by transposing a number or 
misspelling a name. Errors can arise in the integration of the data. For 
example, combining data from different datasets could create duplicate 
 
 
 218. Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 106 (2014) (“In general, 
machine learning algorithms are only as good as the data that they are given to analyze.”). 
 219. Scherr, supra note 41, at 33 (2003) (“Prediction inevitably brings with it a risk of error. We 
can hope to reconstruct past events, but future events have not yet happened. Making ‘findings’ about 
the future thus carries a greater risk of error.”). 
 220. Joh, supra note 214, at 58 (“[N]o predictive policing program is entirely objective. The basic 
building blocks of a predictive software program necessarily involve human discretion.”). 
 221. Ferguson, supra note 73, at 191. 
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entries.222 Errors can arise in the cleansing of the data. For example, in an 
attempt to avoid duplicates, an entry can be erroneously deleted.223 The 
reality of this vast variety of error has been exposed in government-run 
databases relied upon by law enforcement.224 These errors grow 
exponentially when law enforcement databases are combined with 
commercial big data sources.225  
b. Fragmented and Biased Data 
Crime data is notoriously incomplete. Certain crimes like murder, 
burglary, and auto theft tend to be consistently reported to authorities, while 
other crimes like sexual assault, domestic violence, and fraud tend to be 
underreported.226 Some communities, frustrated with current policing 
practices, simply decline to report crimes.227 The Department of Justice has 
 
 
 222. Anita Ramasastry, Lost in Translation? Data Mining, National Security and the “Adverse 
Inference” Problem, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 757, 774 (2006) (“One factor in 
error rates is data quality, which refers to the accuracy and completeness of data used to draw inferences. 
Duplicate records, the inconsistent or complete lack of data standards, the timeliness of updates, and 
human error (e.g. incorrect data entry) can all impact how effective data analysis will be.”). 
 223. Alex R. Hess, Herring v. United States: Are Errors in Government Databases Preventing 
Defendants from Receiving Fair Trials?, 11 J. HIGH TECH. L. 129, 147 (2010) (“In . . . inter-linked 
databases, one error can spread like a disease, infecting every system it touches, plaguing the individual 
with false records and undue suspicion.”). 
 224. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 155 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The 
risk of error stemming from these databases is not slim. Herring’s amici warn that law enforcement 
databases are insufficiently monitored and often out of date. Government reports describe, for example, 
flaws in NCIC databases, terrorist watchlist databases, and databases associated with the Federal 
Government’s employment eligibility verification system.”) (citations omitted); Joshua D. Wright, The 
Constitutional Failure of Gang Databases, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 115, 129 (2005) (“In sum, gang 
databases appear to be riddled with factual inaccuracies, administrative errors, lack of compliance with 
departmental guidelines, and lack of oversight.”); Green v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 751 F.3d 1039, 
1042 (9th Cir. 2014) (“ALPR occasionally makes false ‘hits’ by misreading license plate numbers and 
mismatching passing license plate numbers with those listed as wanted in the database.”). 
 225. Hess, supra note 223, at 147 (“According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (‘BJS’), ‘[i]n the 
view of most experts, inadequacies in the accuracy and completeness of criminal history records is the 
single most serious deficiency affecting the Nation’s criminal history record information systems.’”) 
(citations omitted). 
 226. James J. Tomkovicz, On Teaching Rape: Reasons, Risks, and Rewards, 102 YALE L.J. 481, 
491 n.32 (1992) (“Statistics indicate that sexual assaults upon women are grossly underreported—more 
so than perhaps any other crime.”); Rebecca S. Ross, Because There Won’t Be A “Next Time”: Why 
Justice Court Is an Inappropriate Forum for Domestic Violence Cases, 13 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 329, 333 
(2011) (“Domestic violence is … chronically underreported.”); Mark Mermelstein, Strategic Remedies 
for Corporate Crime Victims, 35 L.A. LAW. 12, 12 (2012) (“There is little doubt that crime, particularly 
fraud, goes underreported.”).  
 227. Montré D. Carodine, “Street Cred”, 46 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 1583, 1596–97 (2013) 
(“Minorities who do not trust the police are not as likely to report crimes or voluntarily assist police in 
their investigations and other law enforcement tasks.”). 
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reported that half of crimes with victims go unreported.228 Internal 
administrative pressures sometimes result in the manipulation of formal 
police reports.229 Audits of the NYPD crime statistics exposed manipulated 
numbers.230 Police-reported data about arrests in other jurisdictions has also 
been shown to be inaccurate, misleading, and occasionally fraudulent.231 As 
such, the data that forms criminal predictions may be limited by the types 
of crime data collected, and may be further distorted by errors in the 
collection process.232 
As to incompleteness, the fragmented nature of crime data on the state 
and local level makes reliance on it questionable. As Professor Ronald 
Wright explained, “there are 17,876 state and local law enforcement 
agencies operating in the United States. Only 6.1% of those agencies 
employ 100 or more full-time sworn officers. Seventy-four percent of the 
agencies employ fewer than twenty-four officers.”233 Necessarily, local data 
collections create small datasets from which to build a predictive system.234 
 
 
 228. Cecelia Klingele et al., Reimagining Criminal Justice, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 953, 956 (2010) 
(“[A]ccording to the U.S. Department of Justice, at least half of all crimes in which a victim is aware of 
having been victimized go unreported to police.”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Nearly 3.4 
Million Violent Crimes Per Year Went Unreported to Police from 2006 to 2010 (Aug. 9. 2012), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/vnrp0610pr.cfm [https://perma.cc/BH9L-UF9N]. 
 229. Klingele et al., supra note 228, at 957 (“Sometimes offenses that are reported to police are not 
recorded as crimes, and consequently, may not be investigated fully. . . . Police may have reason to doubt 
the citizen-reporter’s accuracy or truthfulness. The facts presented may not clearly establish that a crime 
has occurred. The investigating officer may feel administrative pressure to define incidents as non-
criminal activity. Officers may believe that because little can or will be done to solve the crime, little 
will be gained by initiating an investigation.”); William K. Rashbaum, Retired Officers Raise Questions 
on Crime Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2010, at 1. 
 230. Jeff Morganteen, What the CompStat audit reveals about the NYPD, THE NEW YORK WORLD 
(July 3, 2013), http://www.thenewyorkworld.com/2013/07/03/compstat/ [https://perma.cc/PP7R-
P2MX] (“The outside audit . . . not only confirmed that such data manipulation takes place but found 
several weak points in the ways the department tracks and uncovers it.”); see also DAVID N. KELLEY & 
SHARON L. MCCARTHY, THE REPORT OF THE CRIME REPORTING REVIEW COMMITTEE TO 
COMMISSIONER RAYMOND W. KELLY CONCERNING COMPSTAT AUDITING (2013), http://www.nyc. 
gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/public_information/crime_reporting_review_committee_final_report_2
013.pdf. 
 231. See, e.g., David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling 
and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 312 (2001); David A. Harris, The 
Reality of Racial Disparity in Criminal Justice: The Significance of Data Collection, 66 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 81–82 (2003). 
 232. Klingele et al., supra note 228, at 956 (“Many crimes simply go undetected by police. It is 
estimated, for example, that police detect only about one out of every two hundred to five hundred illegal 
retail drug transactions and only about one out of every two thousand drunken driving trips.”). 
 233. Ronald F. Wright, Fragmented Users of Crime Predictions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 91, 94 (2010) 
(“These markets are too small to offer reliable predictions of crime.”). 
 234. Thomas E. Feucht & William J. Sabol, Comment on A “Modest Proposal” for A Crime 
Prediction Market, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 81, 84 (2010) (“[L]ocal crime data may be subject to greater relative 
error and easier manipulation (compared to national data like UCR [Uniform Crime Reports]), and crime 
reports in local newspapers or other local media may be more vulnerable to spurious factors like 
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As discussed in the next section, predictive judgments suffer as sample size 
decreases. National crime statistics exist, but they cannot provide a relevant 
database necessary to predict local crime patterns because the information 
is not localized. The result is that the existing data may be of limited value 
for predictive validity in the vast majority of jurisdictions and only useful 
in large urban cities with significant crime data collection capabilities.  
To be fair, predictive policing companies tend to focus on areas with 
sufficient data. The large test cities of Los Angeles, Chicago, Seattle, New 
York City, and so on, tend to be areas with not only large crime problems, 
but large enough data collection systems. Further, at least with Predictive 
Policing 1.0, the original models focused only on crimes that were regularly 
and rather consistently reported (burglary, auto theft, and theft from auto). 
So PredPol’s primary business of targeting burglary and auto-related crimes 
avoids many of the data collection problems of a broader crime focus. 
But beyond property crime, and with the advent of aggregating big data 
information sources, the vulnerabilities of bad data grow. Both limited 
datasets for non-property crime and rapidly growing datasets of personal 
information raise real concerns for the accuracy of data underlying any 
algorithm-based prediction. 
Data can also be biased. The assumptions behind predictive technologies 
are affected by unseen influences that may have unintended and 
discriminatory consequences. First, the data itself can be the result of biased 
collection.235 Implicit bias has been demonstrated to impact policing 
decisions on the street.236 The targeting of certain areas or certain races 
creates the impression of higher crime rates in those areas, which then 
justifies continued police presence there.237 As Professor Shima Baradaran 
has noted: “As law enforcement dedicates more of its resources to patrolling 
and investigating blacks in urban areas, the resulting arrest population is not 
a proportional representation of all offenders, but rather disproportionately 
represents black citizens.”238 
The result has been to justify disproportionate minority contacts and the 
collection of minority names in databases. These actions then feed a 
confirmation feedback loop that equates those currently in the system with 
 
 
unbalanced crime reporting in the media. With local crime data, there is no corollary to the national 
compilation of UCR data that can help eliminate error.”). 
 235. Ferguson, Big Data, supra note 21, at 389–90. 
 236. See, e.g., L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 
2035 (2011); Adam Benforado, Frames of Injustice: The Bias We Overlook, 85 IND. L.J. 1333, 1367 
(2010). 
 237. Ferguson, supra note 20, at 297. 
 238. Baradaran, supra note 49, at 180. 
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those who need to be policed by the system.239 Essentially, high-crime areas 
or high-value suspects might only be considered “high” because police 
already have data about those areas or people. Some scholars have even 
argued that such a predictive focus merely increases arrests rather than 
decreases crime.240 Finally, explicit bias has also been a factor in the 
collection of data on suspects, potentially undermining the basis of the 
predictive technologies. Sadly, racial and class-based bias remain a problem 
in American policing.241 
More bluntly, the initial predictive policing projects have raised the 
question of whether this data-driven focus serves merely to enable, or even 
justify, a high-tech version of racial profiling.242 If the underlying data is 
biased, then how can a data-driven system based on that data not also be 
biased?243 As civil liberties advocate, Hanni Fakhoury, has warned: 
It ends up being a self-fulfilling prophecy. . . . The algorithm is telling 
you exactly what you programmed it to tell you. “Young black kids 
in the south side of Chicago are more likely to commit crimes,” and 
the algorithm lets the police launder this belief. It’s not racism, they 
can say. They are making the decision based on what the algorithm 
is, even though the algorithm is going to spit back what you put into 
it. And if the data is biased to begin with and based on human 
judgment, then the results the algorithm is going to spit out will 
reflect those biases.244 
 
 
 239. Aaron Cantú, Algorithms and Future Crimes: Welcome to the Racial Profiling of the Future, 
SAN DIEGO FREE PRESS (Mar. 1, 2014), http://sandiegofreepress.org/2014/03/algorithms-and-future-
crimes-welcome-to-the-racial-profiling-of-the-future/ [https://perma.cc/YP5M-Q9FJ] (“Any attempt to 
predict future criminality will be based on the crime rates of the past. It’s well known that blacks and 
Hispanics are arrested at a higher rate than whites and comprise the majority of the prison population. If 
that’s the reality that is supposed to inform who we criminalize in the future, won’t initiatives like 
predictive policing just perpetuate the racist criminal justice policies and practices of the present?”). 
 240. Baradaran, supra note 49, at 176–77 (“When police rely on predictive methods, success is 
amplified by increased arrests (rather than decreased crime).”); HARCOURT, supra note 23, at 123 
(arguing that focusing on maximizing arrest rates will only increase arrests of African-Americans). 
 241. James B. Comey, Director, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Remarks at Georgetown University: 
Hard Truths: Law Enforcement and Race (Feb. 12, 2015), https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/hard-
truths-law-enforcement-and-race [https://perma.cc/8VGG-8MUR]; Terrence M. Cunningham, 
President, Int’l Ass’n of Chiefs of Police (IACP, Remarks Made at the 2016 IACP Annual Conference: 
The Law Enforcement Profession and Historical Injustices (Oct. 17, 2016) http://www.iacp.org/ 
ViewResult?SearchID=2690 [https://perma.cc/39E3-PGKT]. 
 242. Stroud, supra note 214. 
 243. Ezekiel Edwards, Predictive Policing Software is More Accurate at Predicting Policing than 
Predicting Crime, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 31, 2016, 2:58 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/entry/predictive-policing-reform_us_57c6ffe0e4b0e60d31dc9120 [https://perma.cc/8H79-3K9G]; 
ROBINSON & KOEPKE, supra note 3, at 3–5. 
 244. Llenas, supra note 188. 
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Some predictive companies, like PredPol, would respond by stating that 
their data is based on reported crime rather than arrest statistics, and thus is 
not biased by officer judgments. In other words, police responding to a 
reported crime (e.g., “my car has been stolen”) creates a data point not 
dependent on police patrol patterns. This counterargument merits analysis. 
Reported crimes are less subject to bias than mere arrests. Some crime only 
comes to the attention of police because of a victim’s report. In traditional 
Predictive Policing 1.0 cases, usually the homeowner reports the burglary 
or the car owner the theft. As such, in that instance, crime reports might be 
less biased and more reliable than arrest statistics. However, sometimes the 
crime and arrest overlap. When a police officer stops an individual breaking 
into cars with a screwdriver, there is both an arrest and a reported crime. 
But in the latter case all of the issues of implicit bias or other factors are 
present to explain the police officer’s presence in the area and suspicion of 
the suspect. If this dual arrest and crime is included in the data, then the 
predictive model is still impacted by arrest patterns and not just reported 
crimes, thereby giving rise to the concern of data bias. 
While “data bias” presents a potential vulnerability, it may not be any 
worse than the existing policing practice. The same implicit and explicit 
biases that influence the data also influence the police officer on the street 
(with or without the data). Thus, supporters of predictive policing might 
rightly argue that while predictive policing programs are not completely free 
from bias, the move to a data-driven system could reduce bias, or at worst 
maintain the status quo.245 Further, if these vulnerabilities could be 
addressed, then an overall reduction of bias would occur.246 
2. Data: Responses 
In response to the problem of bad or biased data, predictive technologies’ 
proponents must address the errors inherent in data collection, data 
matching, data warehousing, and data cleansing.247 This section looks at 
 
 
 245. Marsha Garrison, Taking the Risks Out of Child Protection Risk Analysis, 21 J.L. & POL’Y 5, 
19 (2012) (“Algorithms also have the capacity to improve the quality of predictive judgments, and they 
are particularly valuable in taming the biases that can flow from interview situations, where first 
impressions often overpower other important data.”). 
 246. As I have written previously, this defense may fail when focused on Predictive Policing 3.0, 
which targets individuals based on data. Biased data can distort suspicion when it comes to person-based 
suspicion. With more information in the database about an individual, it is easier to generate a level of 
suspicion sufficient to justify stopping or arresting the individual. While it might be bad to rely on biased 
data for patrol decisions, it is unacceptable to allow biased data to justify deprivations of liberty. 
Ferguson, Big Data, supra note 20, at 403. 
 247. Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503, 1518 (2013).  
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mechanisms that could be adopted to improve data collection and retention. 
It first focuses on the raw material of data, and then addresses issues of 
predictive methodology, transparency, accountability, and security.  
a. Acknowledging Error 
Data-driven systems promote themselves as being better than human-
controlled systems because of their perceived objectivity. Algorithms, the 
argument goes, cannot be biased or discriminatory. Yet the data underlying 
the algorithm can suffer from the influence of bias or error. The first step in 
responding to this reality is to acknowledge it.248 Predictive technologies 
will be wrong at times, and police departments reliant on them must 
acknowledge this fact. Acknowledging error does not discount the value of 
predictive technologies, but only qualifies the findings and tempers the 
unquestioning acceptance of the information. Acknowledging error also sets 
the stage for correcting error, auditing error, and training humans to prevent 
error.  
Many predictive policing systems, however, avoid admitting to the 
inherent data problems. This is so for two main reasons. First, the economic 
competition between companies that design such programs makes it more 
difficult to admit the flaws in the underlying data collection system. While 
police likely know that mistakes might be made or predictions may be 
wrong, an actual acknowledgment of systemic error is harder to sell. 
Second, the attractiveness of predictive technologies is bound up with a faith 
in technological precision. While society might not understand the 
algorithm (or even what an algorithm is),249 there is a trust in technology. 
Acknowledging that the algorithm is based on an error-filled database, 
however, undercuts that trust.  
Adopters of predictive policing technologies need to accept the 
limitations of the data itself, and the resulting limitations of the conclusions 
that can be drawn from it. Acknowledging the systemic error and looking 
for ways to remedy it will be ultimately more constructive than ignoring it. 
b. Catching & Correcting Error 
The vulnerability of data to error can be corrected by mechanisms to 
catch and correct the errors. Auditing mechanisms can be established to 
 
 
 248. Angwin et. al., supra note 52. 
 249. See Paul Ford, What is Code?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 11, 2015), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-paul-ford-what-is-code/ [https://perma.cc/Z3DP-HG3W].  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1152 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:1109 
 
 
 
 
check the quality of inputs. This can be as simple as supervisors or analysts 
double-checking daily crime reports, to large-scale forensic audits of the 
reporting system.250 Data services can cleanse databases for duplicate or 
erroneous records. Systems can be designed to manage error. While beyond 
the scope of this article, a systems approach to error in police databases 
might be needed to design a thorough error reduction strategy.251  
The difficulty, of course, is that the sheer amount of data being 
collected—from daily crime statistics to individual citizens’ personal 
information—will overwhelm most police systems. Police administrators, 
even those experienced with sophisticated data collection systems, do not 
have the resources (or sometimes the will) to make data inputting error-
free.252 Worse, the nature of shared and aggregated data systems means that 
even correcting an error in one location might not also correct the same error 
now populating other datasets. While steps can and should be taken to catch 
and correct error, the data will likely remain imperfect. 
c. Training and Technology  
To ease the burden on a system to catch and correct errors, adopters of 
predictive technologies must ensure proper training for the frontline 
collectors of the data. Most police officers did not go into the profession for 
the paperwork, and the training and incentives for perfectly accurate data 
inputs are lacking. Adopters of predictive policing technologies must focus 
on training and technology to address these concerns. 
Formal training mechanisms, while burdensome, may be necessary for a 
data-driven system to be successful. Police officers obviously know the 
importance of police paperwork as it is regularly used in criminal 
prosecutions. Simple transposition errors, while embarrassing fodder for 
cross-examination, do not usually result in more than a few questions at 
trial. However, in a data-driven system, the wrong code or the wrong 
address can undermine the integrity of the system itself. Thus, police 
administrators will need to educate police officers about the importance of 
detail and accuracy in data collection. The inclusion of crime analysts into 
 
 
 250. Kelley & MCCARTHY, supra note 230. 
 251. See generally James M. Doyle, Learning from Error in American Criminal Justice, 100 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109 (2010). 
 252. Sherman, supra note 100, at 434 (“For all the progress that COMPSTAT has brought policing, 
it is striking how little measurement it has used of what police do. In 1999–2005, for example, the 
Philadelphia Police Department’s COMPSTAT never reviewed data on where police patrolled, where 
they made arrests, where they conducted stop-and-frisks, or even how many police were scheduled to 
work by time or day in relation to the hourly frequency of crime in any police district.”). 
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the police forces of some major police districts may have an added benefit 
of creating built-in trainers for these lessons.253 
Similarly, data companies whose products are being adopted by police 
have an incentive to create and staff formal training programs. The police, 
by generating the crime data, in many ways are helping to fuel the 
development of future predictive technologies for those companies. The 
companies thus have a real incentive to ensure that police officers on the 
ground are accurately and completely collecting the data that will ultimately 
be relied upon. 
As a final response to the vulnerabilities associated with data error, 
adopters of predictive technologies should look to advances in predictive 
technology and automation to minimize human error. Whereas most police 
officers are required to fill out a crime report with a statement or estimation 
of the crime time, duration, and location, new technology involving Global 
Positioning Satellite (GPS) might be used to automatically mark the time, 
date, and location of an incident.254 For example, if the technology existed 
to automatically record a crime’s precise time and geo-location, then 
estimates of addresses or transcribed number errors and other details would 
be minimized. Furthermore, technologies that encourage other passive 
collection of information would ease the burden on officers. Many police 
departments still require handwritten police forms, sometimes in duplicate 
form. New automated document generation forms would not only ease 
transcription work of arresting officers, but also allow for automated 
transmittal of that information into a central database.255 Once automated, 
other data mechanisms could be implemented, including automated 
checklists to ensure completion, forcing functions to ensure compliance, 
and redundancy mechanisms to ensure accuracy. In these ways, technology 
can encourage the accuracy, completeness, and usefulness of data. 
B. Methodology: Vulnerabilities and Responses 
Beyond the fuel of data, the engine of predictive technologies lies in its 
methodology. Predictive policing relies on proprietary algorithms that adopt 
 
 
 253. Bond-Graham & Winston, supra note 4 (“Virtually every police department in medium to large 
cities today has one or more crime analysts on staff to crunch numbers and plot past crimes on maps.”). 
 254. Such technology may also create issues, as GPS technology has its limitations. GPS technology 
may need to be augmented with wireless Internet points of presence in order to capture the data. Thank 
you to John Hollywood for this and other suggestions. 
 255. Avery Hartmans, This Startup Founder Rode Around in Police Cars for Hours to Build His 
Software, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 27, 2016) http://www.businessinsider.com/mark43-builds-software-
to-aid-police-forces-2016-11. 
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a particular analytical methodology. Yet the methodologies surrounding 
predictive techniques are fraught with vulnerabilities. In fact, since the 
advent of prediction in the criminal justice system, critics have repeatedly 
pointed out the flaws inherent in many predictive techniques.256 
1. Methodological Vulnerabilities 
Not surprisingly, predictive technologies built on incomplete datasets 
exacerbate methodological vulnerabilities. These limitations go beyond 
human bias or incorrect assessments to complex statistical problems.257 
Three interrelated problems—validity, error rates, and overgeneralization—
will be discussed in this section, with the recognition that a full discussion 
of methodological vulnerabilities is beyond the scope of this article. 
a. Internal Validity 
Predictive policing technologies purport to provide a more effective 
means of reducing crime. Studies demonstrating that claim exist, but have 
certain vulnerabilities in terms of validity. Internal validity “is the extent to 
which a methodology can accurately determine cause-effect 
relationships.”258 Internally valid studies must be such that individual 
variables can be isolated and results reproduced.259 Currently, at the early 
stages of evaluation, most of the traditional concerns about internal validity 
(like selection bias, testing errors, and history) apply to predictive 
policing.260 
 
 
 256. See generally Christopher Slobogin, supra note 63; Scherr, supra note 41.  
 257. Joh, supra note 214, at 58 (“The assumptions underlying any method of crime prediction rely 
upon the decision to choose one model of risk prediction over another. The data used to build the models 
will depend on discretionary judgments about the types of crimes used for prediction, and the type of 
information used to predict those crimes.”). 
 258. John B. Meixner & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Hidden Daubert Factor: How Judges Use 
Error Rates in Assessing Scientific Evidence, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 1063, 1131 (2014). 
 259. William A. Woodruff, Evidence of Lies and Rules of Evidence: The Admissibility of fMRI-
Based Expert Opinion of Witness Truthfulness, 16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 105, 204 (2014) (“Internal validity 
‘refers to the degree to which the research design isolates the variable of interest and permits drawing 
valid inferences about the relationships between variables from the resulting data.’”); Tammy W. Cowart 
et al., Two Methodologies for Predicting Patent Litigation Outcomes: Logistic Regression Versus 
Classification Trees, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 843, 875 (2014) (“Internal validity (reproducibility) is the ability 
to achieve the same results when applied to the same population of the data.”). 
 260. Joseph Sanders, Scientific Validity, Admissibility, and Mass Torts After Daubert, 78 MINN. L. 
REV. 1387, 1401 (1994) (discussing “the threats to internal validity” including “history (the threat that 
an observed effect may be due to an event that takes place between two points of measurement when 
this event is not the treatment under investigation), testing (the threat that an effect may be due to the 
number of times responses are measured), and selection (a threat that groups being compared are 
composed of different types of individuals and, therefore, that observed differences are due to factors 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/5
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The first PredPol test in the Foothill section of Los Angeles attempted a 
blind study that gave police officers predictive information about an area 
but not told whether the prediction came from an algorithm or from a crime 
analyst.261 The positive results showed a reduction in crime, but could not 
be fully attributed to the technology due to flaws in the study and the 
complexity of testing in real world situations. Further studies have shown a 
significant decrease in predicted crime,262 although some critics caution that 
the PredPol success story involves cherry-picked statistics.263 Other 
technologies have also demonstrated positive correlative effects. Initial tests 
of RTM demonstrate a relatively accurate correlation between the predicted 
areas and actual gun violence.264 But, however strong these correlations are, 
they do not show an actual causal connection. As such, it will be difficult 
for predictive policing to ever become an internally valid technology.  
Simply put, for Predictive Policing 1.0 and 2.0, there have been no 
sustained studies demonstrating cause and effect. Crime rates go up and 
down.265 Even in jurisdictions that have adopted PredPol with initial 
success, crime rates have later risen for unknown reasons.266 Thus, as a 
measure of internal validity, the question is still open as to whether any 
particular predictive policing technology really shows a causal success.  
In addition, the limited data available for some crimes interferes with 
measurement validity. For example, PredPol’s White Paper on gun violence 
claims, “Crimes involving guns continue to have an impact on future gun 
homicides for 30–100 days and risk spreads over as much as 1/2 mile in 
area.”267 Even if completely accurate, this information offers little 
constructive information to police officers. Unlike the 500 by 500 square 
foot box for property crimes (updated every day), with gun crimes police 
 
 
other than the treatment under investigation)”). 
 261. Bond-Graham & Winston, supra note 4 (“Foothill Division, a sprawling LAPD patrol sector 
in the northeast San Fernando Valley that, at 46 square miles, is about as big as San Francisco, was 
chosen as the site of a pilot program in 2012.”). 
 262. PredPol reported a 29% drop in crime. See PredPol Partners LAPD-Foothill Records Day 
Without Crime!, PREDPOL BLOG, (Feb. 22, 2014), http://www.predpol.com/predpol-partners-lapd-
foothill-records-day-without-crime/ [https://perma.cc/PN4H-YMWC]. 
 263. Kushing, supra note 85. 
 264. Kennedy et al., Results: Executive Summary, supra note 162.  
 265. Bond-Graham & Winston, supra note 4 (Philip Stark, chair of the statistics department at UC 
Berkeley expressed caution at the findings, stating, “I’m less than convinced.” When asked whether 
using PredPol leads to a decrease in a city’s crime rate, he responded, “You would need to do a 
comparison of similar-sized cities, with similar conditions, similar trends in their crime rates, with one 
group of cities using predictive policing, and the others not. Then you’d compare them to each other. . . 
. A comparison of the same jurisdiction to itself means nothing. . . . Crime fluctuates normally from year 
to year in the same city.”). 
 266. Aldax, supra note 128. 
 267. THE PREDICTIVE POLICING CO., supra note 138, at 3. 
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would need to be alert for one to three months and in a much larger 
geographical space. Extra police presence in that area might deter the next 
shooting, but it can hardly be considered a strong prediction. Nor is the 
prediction really all that insightful, as most experienced police officers 
could predict future gun violence three months out in particular areas.  
Predictive Policing 3.0 presents an even more difficult causation versus 
correlation dilemma. As has been well debated in the context of preventative 
detention and recidivism, causal factors that can identify risk do not 
determine risk. The fact that a young man makes the Chicago “Heat List” 
might be in error, might mean nothing, or might mean he is a potential 
victim rather than a potential offender.268 Further, risk factors might change 
in a way that a list does not reflect. For example, the heightened risk factor 
for being an unemployed high school dropout might be remedied by a career 
training program. The risks can change, but the lists of risk-associated 
people might not, distorting even the correlative accuracy of the prediction. 
Initial reports from Chicago present a few contradictory conclusions.269 
First, the Heat List predictions have, according to police reports, been 
accurate at identifying victims of violence.270 Police officials stated that on 
Memorial Day weekend in 2016, 78% of the 64 people shot had been 
identified on the Heat List,271 and that on Mother’s Day weekend in 2016, 
80% of the 51 people shot had been identified on the Heat List.272 At the 
same time, the first independent research study of the Heat List’s 
effectiveness demonstrated that the identification process largely failed.273 
RAND conducted a study on the first iteration of the Chicago Heat List and 
found no predictive accuracy: “[T]he main result of this study is that at-risk 
individuals were not more or less likely to become victims of a homicide or 
shooting as a result of the SSL, and this is further supported by city-level 
 
 
 268. In a public health model, the goal is to try to intervene with both potential victims and offenders 
involved in gun violence. 
 269. Nissa Rhee, Can police big data stop Chicago’s spike in crime?, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (June 2, 2016), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2016/0602/Can-police-big-data-
stop-Chicago-s-spike-in-crime [https://perma.cc/64SE-SLLD]; Monica Davey, Chicago Police Try to 
Predict Who May Shoot or Be Shot, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/ 
24/us/armed-with-data-chicago-police-try-to-predict-who-may-shoot-or-be-shot.html?_r=0. 
 270. Editorial: Who will kill or be killed in violence-plagued Chicago? The algorithm knows, CHI. 
TRIB. (May 10, 2016, 5:00 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-gangs-
police-loury-algorithm-edit-md-20160510-story.html [https://perma.cc/8333-CVAZ]. 
 271. Andrew V. Papachristos, Commentary: CPD’s Crucial Choice: Treat Its List as Offenders or 
as Potential Victims?, CHI. TRIB. (July 29, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ 
opinion/commentary/ct-gun-violence-list-chicago-police-murder-perspec-0801-jm-20160729-story. 
html [https://perma.cc/G8TU-PBXA]. 
 272. Editorial, supra note 270. 
 273. Saunders et al., supra note 192, at 355–64.  
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analysis finding no effect on the city homicide trend. We do find, however, 
that SSL subjects were more likely to be arrested for a shooting.”274 
The RAND researchers found that police failed to follow up with 
Custom Notification Letters or social services, and used the program more 
as a “data-driven most-wanted list.”275 At-risk individuals became targets 
for arrest, rather than candidates for violence prevention.276 The Chicago 
Police Department has responded to such criticism by pointing out that the 
early Heat List system studied by RAND has changed and any criticism 
relates to an out-of-date algorithm. But no matter the accuracy of the 
technology, the facts are that the use of the Heat List has not reduced 
violence in Chicago. In fact, in August 2016, Chicago saw its deadliest 
month in two decades with a spike of murders.277 
b. External Validity – Overgeneralization  
Because of the fragmented nature of crime data and the inexact nature of 
data aggregation, the few jurisdictions that have ample and accurate data are 
sometimes used to justify the universal application of the technology. 
Success in one jurisdiction is used to suggest future success in another 
jurisdiction. However, the predictive results in Los Angeles or Chicago may 
not apply to, say, Topeka or Anchorage because of differences in 
geography, crime patterns, or police culture. Generally speaking, the 
vulnerability of overgeneralization runs throughout predictive risk 
assessments and should be a caution for new adopters.278  
Similarly, the predictive judgments of certain types of crime may be 
impacted by the lack of crime data. For example, because certain violent 
crimes like shootings are comparatively rare, the data can be of a limited 
predictive value. Partially for that reason, some predictive techniques have 
 
 
 274. Id. at 363–64. 
 275. Matt Stroud, Chicago’s Predictive Policing Tool Just Failed a Major Test, THE VERGE (Aug. 
19. 2016, 10:28 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2016/8/19/12552384/chicago-heat-list-tool-failed-
rand-test [https://perma.cc/JAJ6-3BRX]. 
 276. Nissa Rhee, Study Casts Doubt on Chicago Police’s Secretive “Heat List”, CHI. MAG. (Aug. 
17, 2016), http://www.chicagomag.com/city-life/August-2016/Chicago-Police-Data/; Papachristos, 
supra note 271. 
 277. Monica Davey, Chicago Has Its Deadliest Month in About Two Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/02/us/chicago-august-homicides.html?_r=0. 
 278. Hamilton, supra note 39, at 730 (“It is also important to recognize that one of the most 
important limitations of actuarial assessments as a rule is the problem of overgeneralization or, more 
empirically, external validity. One overgeneralizes results of research by presuming the results derived 
from one population (the reference group) are reliable when applied to a second population. If the second 
population differs in any risk-relevant way from the reference group, then the predictive result is 
invalid.”). 
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chosen to focus on precursor crimes (not violent in and of themselves)279 or 
fixed geographic markers (bus stops, liquor stores, etc.).280 As a result of 
this limited data, the conclusions themselves may be weaker. As LAPD 
Sergeant Christi Robbin admitted to a reporter, “With gun crimes you have 
fewer incidents, so the predictions aren’t as strong.”281 Of course, this is not 
to say that there are not numerous studies to demonstrate that violent acts 
generate retaliatory violent responses, or that social networks cannot be 
studied to show webs of violence in communities, but studying whether 
predictive policing can deter violence is only just now being tested in any 
rigorous way.282  
c. Error Rates 
Predictive technologies have error rates. Error rates encompass both 
false negatives and false positives.283 For Predictive Policing 1.0 and 2.0, 
false positives (no crime in a predicted high risk area) create unwanted 
police-citizen contact or unwanted surveillance in certain areas. False 
negatives (crime in a predicted low risk area) divert police resources by 
sending officers to the wrong areas. Both are suboptimal, but not necessarily 
any worse than non-predictive policing, which also leads officers to 
investigate non-crimes and miss actual crimes.  
For Predictive Policing 3.0, the risk of error grows when police use big 
data technologies to match suspicious patterns in large databases.284 A false 
positive predictive tip could result in innocent individuals being singled out 
and investigated for noncriminal activity. These investigations could 
involve physical police contact, which might be threatening or even violent. 
 
 
 279. THE PREDICTIVE POLICING CO., supra note 138. 
 280. RUTGERS CTR. ON PUB. SEC., supra note 133. 
 281. Mitchell, supra note 2.  
 282. Christopher Moraff, The Problem with Some of the Most Powerful Numbers in Modern 
Policing, NEXT CITY (Dec. 15, 2014), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/predictive-policing-crime-stats-
data-measure [https://perma.cc/RS9J-A7KB]. 
 283. Slobogin, supra note 39, at 291. 
 284. Bruce Schneier, Why Data Mining Won’t Stop Terror, WIRED (Mar. 9, 2006, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2006/03/70357 [https://perma.cc 
/8PV5-ZV3U]; Bruce Schneier, Data Mining for Terrorists, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Mar. 9, 2006, 8:54 
AM), http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/03/data_mining_for.html [https://perma.cc/ 87UU-
NKF6]; Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for A Legal Framework, 43 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 435, 473 (2008) (“Data mining for national security and law enforcement presents far 
greater challenges than data mining for target marketing for many reasons. . . . Government data mining 
often is searching for a needle not in a haystack, but among millions of other needles.”). 
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Such contacts build resentment toward the perceived over-aggressive police 
presence.285 
In addition, any understanding of error rates can only be evaluated by 
understanding the base rate.286 A base rate is the frequency with which the 
behavior (suspected crime) occurs in the overall group studied (usually the 
population). Currently, because of poor reporting, inadequate resources, and 
the nature of certain crimes, police do not know the base rate for different 
crimes in many jurisdictions. 
2. Methodological Responses  
These methodological vulnerabilities lead to four main lessons for the 
future adoption of predictive technologies. First, because predictive 
policing is largely untested, jurisdictions must independently evaluate initial 
claims of success. The San Francisco Police Department examined the 
possibility of adopting predictive policing, but declined to adopt the PredPol 
technology due to concerns about effectiveness.287 Currently, independent 
data does not exist to verify the methodology of the companies selling the 
technology.288 Because the efficacy remains unknown, jurisdictions seeking 
to purchase the technology need to check the methodology and prepare 
responses to future legal and community challenges. 
Second, adopting jurisdictions must remain cautious about extending 
conclusions from one jurisdiction to another. Problems of 
overgeneralization can be addressed by recognizing that the urban 
landscape, police culture, and economic realities might be very different in 
different parts of the country. Just because predictive policing works in 
sprawling areas of Los Angeles does not mean it would work in the 
vertically constructed New York City. Just because burglaries appear to 
encourage repeat offending in nearby areas does not mean that aggravated 
assault or other crimes will follow suit. 
 
 
 285. SOC. PSYCHOL. ANSWERS TO REAL-WORLD QUESTIONS, STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE: 
RESEARCH INITIATIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN 
OAKLAND, CALIF. (Jennifer L. Eberhardt ed., 2016); REBECCA C. HETEY ET AL., SOC. PSYCHOL. 
ANSWERS TO REAL-WORLD QUESTIONS, DATA FOR CHANGE: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF POLICE 
STOPS, SEARCHES, HANDCUFFINGS, AND ARRESTS IN OAKLAND, CALIF., 2013–2014 (2016). 
 286. Slobogin, supra note 39, at 292 (“The accuracy of expert predictions can be fully understood 
only if base rates of recidivism are taken into account.”). 
 287. Bond-Graham & Winston, supra note 4. 
 288. Moraff, supra note 282 (“[T]he vast majority of what we know about predictive policing comes 
from data released unilaterally by individual police agencies, or by the firms peddling software to them. 
This not only makes it hard to compare results from city to city, but raises serious questions of data 
reliability.”). 
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Third, communities adopting predictive policing must remain cognizant 
of the temporal limitations of the predictions. One of the oft-ignored 
limitations of predictive policing involves its timeframe for predictions. For 
example, PredPol’s property-based predictions occur on a daily (and even 
hourly) basis, allowing for a rather sophisticated matching of time and 
place. However, PredPol’s violence-predicting technologies look at a 30–
100 day window, allowing for far less useful actionable data.289 Both might 
be accurate in their predictions, but the former provides a much more useful 
and relevant dataset for police officers looking for immediate suspicious 
activity. 
Finally, the predictive technologies targeting individuals face even 
harder questions. Correlation should not be confused with causation when 
individual liberties are concerned.290 When the physical and emotional 
impact of police authority is involved, some individualized suspicion is 
required.291 The fact that a prediction identifies a particular individual 
should not, without more, be enough to initiate investigation. Strikingly, 
Jeffrey Brantingham, one of the founders of modern predictive policing and 
the creator of PredPol, was quoted saying: “These ‘person-centric’ models 
are problematic . . . because they carry an elevated margin of error and can 
legitimize racial, gender-based and socioeconomic-driven profiling. As a 
scientist you better be damn sure the model of causality is right or else it’s 
going to lead to a lot of false positives.”292 These false positives have grave, 
liberty-eroding consequences, and so responses must be built in to ensure 
accuracy. Even if sufficient suspicion could be generated through pattern-
matching or social network theory, acting on that suspicion should not be a 
foregone conclusion. While perhaps these predictive techniques could be 
useful for an initial lead, further screening mechanisms must be created 
before reliance on correlation leads to the physical and sometimes painful 
power of the state being brought to bear on an individual. 
These methodological responses can be summarized into two simple 
recommendations. First, the acknowledged vulnerabilities of predictive 
 
 
 289. The near repeat effects of violent crime have not been strongly demonstrated, which may 
provide a second reason to qualify the utility of this approach. 
 290. Underwood, supra note 38, at 1446 (“A statistical correlation in data about one group of people 
may not hold when used as a basis for predictions about another group of people. A causal theory helps 
to identify any relevant differences between the two groups, or differences in the surrounding 
circumstances.”). 
 291. Arguably, if all that were at issue were therapeutic interventions without coercive law 
enforcement or judicial impacts, a looser correlation standard might be justified. But, as predictive 
policing is connected with real policing, more than therapy is at issue.  
 292. Moraff, supra note 277. 
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methodologies need to be addressed before adopting the technology. 
Second, the limitations should encourage a more scientifically rigorous 
approach. The second response will be the subject of the next section. 
C. Social Science: Vulnerabilities and Responses  
Social science, not simply technology, underlies the promise of 
predictive policing.293 As a legitimizing principle, the fact that predictive 
policing rests on established social science experiments has carried 
significant weight in its promotion and adoption. Decades of criminology 
theory and practice support many of the insights behind why crime can be 
predicted.294 At the same time, new iterations of predictive policing have 
evolved without equivalent empirical testing. While some studies are 
currently in progress, police adoption has outpaced scientific findings, 
leading to ongoing uncertainty. 
1. Social Science: Vulnerabilities 
Only one published peer-reviewed scientific paper has evaluated the 
claims of PredPol.295 The paper, written in collaboration with the founders 
of PredPol, offers a good illustration of the limits of current social science 
on predictive policing. This first published article describes the results of an 
approximately eight-month study in Los Angeles that compared PredPol 
predictions with professional crime analyst predictions.296 The focus was on 
Predictive Policing 1.0 crimes (burglary, car theft, and theft from 
automobiles), and the algorithm and analyst alternated days of the week to 
offer criminal predictions.297 Over the period of comparison (117 days), the 
analyst successful predicted 2.1% of crimes, while the PredPol algorithm 
predicted 4.7% of crimes. The PredPol model thus demonstrated a 
predictive accuracy 2.2 times greater than the control.298  
As with any study, questions of size, scope, and generalizability arise. 
 
 
 293. See, e.g., Chainey et al., supra note 96, at 5; Braga et al., supra note 78, at 9. 
 294. Tompson & Townsley, supra note 110, at 25; Caplan, supra note 140, at 60. 
 295. See George O. Mohler et al., Randomized Controlled Field Trials of Predictive Policing, 94 J. 
AM. STAT. ASS’N 1399 (2015), http://paleo.sscnet.ucla.edu/MohlerEtAl-2015-JASA-Predictive-
InPress.pdf. In contrast, the researchers conducting Risk Terrain Modeling tests have conducted several 
research studies emphasizing the risk factors underlying certain criminal activity. As detailed supra 
notes 115, 166, 263, they have published a series of scholarly articles demonstrating significant success 
in risk forecasting abilities. These reports have not been peer reviewed.  
 296. See Mohler, et al. supra note 295. The study also compared crime prediction in Kent, England, 
but a discussion of the Kent findings is omitted from this discussion. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id.  
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But more fundamentally, the methodology underlying the PredPol study 
presents difficult questions. First, PredPol sets up the study comparing its 
algorithm to crime analysts. But the predictions of crime analysts 
themselves have no scientific or empirical validity; while the algorithm 
beats the analyst, the analyst is not a valid scientific control.299 Second, 
“success” is difficult to prove. If the algorithm predicts a crime and the 
crime occurs (without police intervention), it is hard to claim a success 
(because actual crime increased). But if the crime is predicted and it doesn’t 
occur because the police have acted as a deterrent, how can one measure 
that non-event as a success? Maybe the police deterred the crime, or maybe 
it was not going to happen, but it seems difficult to call it a measurable 
success. These concerns are emblematic of the type of methodological 
difficulties in studying real world crime. 
While PredPol has begun to analyze its programs, most of the other 
commercial products claim no scientific proof of their technology’s 
effectiveness.300 Part of the reason for this absence of data and peer-
reviewed publications is that scientists require time and funding to conduct 
experiments, and policing urban areas with real criminals and real victims 
provides an imperfect testing environment.301 In addition, the variables for 
why crime occurs or why crime rates drop across jurisdictions and over time 
are multifaceted, so it remains difficult to draw causal conclusions. 
Early criminology studies which developed the near repeat theory and 
the flag and boost theories all arose from academic settings.302 These 
theories explained why predicting certain crimes might work, and offered 
scientifically valid studies to support the claims. These theories, tested over 
 
 
 299. A valid response to this criticism is that the study was designed specifically to see if it was 
better than the analysts because crime analysts are the professional norm. As Jeff Brantingham explained 
to me in an email, “The reason why we tested against real human analysts was that the critique of our 
[earlier] paper was: “Sure, you can beat another algorithm, but you could never beat a real human expert 
in the field.” We took that criticism to heart and designed an experiment to test the hypothesis with two 
police agencies who reasonably represent the some of the best the profession has to offer in terms of 
analysis and its use in the field. The experiments establish what is called “ecological validity,” which is 
essential for real-world functionality.” See E-mail from Jeffrey Brantingham, Professor of 
Anthropology, UCLA, to Andrew Ferguson, Professor of Law, UDC David A. Clarke School of Law 
(Nov. 1, 2016) (on file with author). 
 300. Academic researchers at Rutgers University have produced studies on Risk Terrain Modeling, 
and further studies are ongoing. See supra notes 112, 167, 264, The Risk Terrain Modeling website 
includes a series of academic journal articles and book chapters detailing the results of RTM tests. See 
Publications, RUTGERS CTR. ON PUB. SEC., http://www.rutgerscps.org/publications.html (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2016). 
 301. Bond-Graham & Winston, supra note 4 (quoting Jerry Ratcliffe, the chair of Temple 
University’s department of criminology, as saying, “Testing these systems requires experimental 
conditions which are rarely conducted in policing and crime prevention, unfortunately.”). 
 302. See supra notes 107–109.  
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time with publicly released data, provided a means for other scholars to 
challenge and refine the theories. These studies did not, however, purport to 
prove that any particular technology could predict crime. While certain 
predictive policing theories have arisen from the academic environment, the 
drivers of predictive policing programs have largely been commercial 
entities. These companies, while supportive of the concept of scientific 
validity, also recognize that positive statistics, even without scientific 
validity, might be enough to convince police departments to purchase the 
technology. Thus, the veneer of scientific legitimacy has been embraced 
without significant peer-reviewed findings to back it up. 
In fact, the only independent scientific assessment of predictive policing 
technology resulted in largely inconclusive findings. A 2012 RAND report 
studied a predictive policing pilot program in Shreveport, Louisiana.303 
Funded in part by the National Institute of Justice, RAND sought to 
compare predictive policing techniques with traditional law enforcement 
methods. The report was “the first published randomized controlled trial 
(RTC) of predictive policing.”304 According to the Report, “[Shreveport 
Police Department] wanted to predict and prevent the emergence of . . . 
property crime hot spots rather than employ control and suppression 
strategies after the hot spots emerged.”305 Researchers conducted a twenty-
nine-week study evaluating six police units.306 The researchers adopted a 
traditional Predictive Policing 1.0 approach. This approach was not based 
on the technology developed by PredPol, RTM, or HunchLab, but was 
designed by Shreveport Crime Analysts with technical assistance from 
RAND analysts.307 To evaluate predicted areas of property crime, 
researchers factored in the presence of residents on probation or parole, the 
previous six months of tactical crime, forecasts of tactical crime, 911 calls 
for disorderly conduct, vandalism, juvenile arrests, and weighted fourteen 
days of tactical crime.308 After a lengthy study, RAND concluded, “Overall, 
the program did not result in a statistically significant reduction in property 
crime, as envisioned. This could be because the program does not work, the 
program was not implemented as intended, or that there was insufficient 
 
 
 303. HUNT ET AL., supra note 130, at 1. 
 304. Id.  
 305. Id.  
 306. Id. at 4. 
 307. Id. at 9 (“The predictive analytics team used statistical software to build and test regression 
models that estimate probabilities of crime, along with geospatial software to plot these estimated future 
probabilities of crime per geospatial unit onto maps.”). 
 308. Id. at 10. 
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statistical power to detect the effect.”309 Researchers conceded that such a 
finding does not mean that predictive policing cannot work, but merely that 
one approach in one location did not work.  
The lack of scientific studies remains a real vulnerability in the 
development of predictive policing. As will be discussed in the next section 
on transparency, this problem is exacerbated by the fact that much of the 
data rests in private hands and is controlled by proprietary interests.  
2. Scientific Studies: Responses 
The simple response to the lack of scientific studies would be to develop 
studies to test competing predictive policing technologies. These studies 
will likely emerge over time as part of the larger movement of evidence-
based policing. According to the Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy 
at George Mason University, only a limited number of studies have been 
done with a moderate level of scientific rigor.310 That is beginning to change 
with the influence of the National Institute of Justice, which has begun 
funding such projects,311 and other philanthropic organizations focusing on 
data-driven criminal justice innovation.312 Other academic institutions such 
as the Rutgers Center on Public Security, host of the RTM research, have 
provided more funding for scholarly research into the effectiveness of 
predictive policing technologies.313 Further, as predictive policing gains 
currency in the media and academia, scholars will begin testing the 
scientific validity of the theories and how transferrable they are to other 
jurisdictions.314 
 
 
 309. Id. at 38. See also id. at 33 (“There was no statistically significant impact of the program on 
crime overall, but it is unclear if that is because of a failure in the program model or a failure in the 
program implementation.”). 
 310. See Evidence-Based Policing Matrix, CTR. FOR EVIDENCE BASED CRIME POLICY, 
http://cebcp.org/evidence-based-policing/the-matrix/ [https://perma.cc/29JV-VCTP] (providing a 
resource to collect and study evidence based policing studies). 
 311. See Law Enforcement Policing Strategies, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, http://www.crime 
solutions.gov/TopicDetails.aspx?ID=84 [https://perma.cc/ET64-9YUF]. 
 312. PRETRIAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND. (Nov. 2013), 
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF-Pretrial-CJ-Research-
brief_FNL.pdf; LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 53. 
 313. See Risk Terrain Modeling, RUTGERS CTR. ON PUB. SEC., http://www.rutgerscps.org/ rtm.html 
[https://perma.cc/ML96-SZM8] (last visited Jan. 15, 2017). 
 314. Sherman, supra note 100, at 432 (“There is also a scientific question of how reliably research 
in one police agency (or more) will predict effectiveness in any other agency.”).  
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D. Transparency: Vulnerabilities and Responses 
The appeal of predictive policing has in large measure been that it offers 
a “black box” solution to crime. The corresponding vulnerability, however, 
is that such solutions lack sufficient transparency to ensure that the “black 
box” really works. The lack of transparency in data collection, data use, and 
effectiveness requires designing processes to guarantee that predictive 
policing technologies live up to the promise of their creation.315 
1. Transparency: Vulnerabilities  
As currently implemented, a lack of transparency exists at all levels of 
predictive policing. Even something as simple as crime statistics, which in 
many cases are publicly available, remain rife with concerns about accuracy 
and completeness.316 Adding personal data dossiers to these crime statistics 
creates new problems, as the sheer volume of information complicates 
transparent assessment of the sources underlying the predictions.317 How do 
you fix an error in the data if you cannot see that such an error exists? How 
do you even know who has the responsibility to input information into these 
big aggregated databases?318 In addition, unintended personal or cultural 
biases can infect the data, the scoring systems, the source codes, and thus 
the resulting predictive outcome.319 Simply stated, without significant 
investment in exposing the data collection methods, weaknesses, and gaps, 
and without equal investment in understanding the challenges associated 
 
 
 315. Zarsky, supra note 247 at 1521 (recognizing that transparency in the context of automated 
prediction must be broken down into three segments: “(1) the collection of data and aggregation of 
datasets, (2) data analysis, and (3) actual strategies and practices for using the predictive models, 
effectiveness of which could be measured by both the way they are applied ex ante and their final impact 
ex post”). 
 316. James F. Gilsinan, The Numbers Dilemma: The Chimera of Modern Police Accountability 
Systems, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 93, 95 (2012) (“The simple act of deciding to count or not count 
something confers or denies a certain importance to an object or outcome.”). 
 317. Andrew M. Smith & Peter Gilbert, Privacy and Fair Credit Reporting Act Update—2014, 70 
BUS. LAW. 585, 586 (2015) (“The sheer volume of big data and the complexity of algorithms used to 
analyze it complicate transparency in data collection and use, and the rapidly increasing volume of 
aggregated personal data increases the risks of data security breaches for consumers.”). 
 318. Erin Murphy, supra note 174, at 831 (“Databases also are often, by their nature, secret from 
within. They have multifarious inputs, which means both that the identity of the relevant agent can be 
difficult to discern, along with their responsibility for particular substance.”). 
 319. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated 
Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 25 (2014) (arguing for FTC transparency: “The FTC’s expert 
technologists could test scoring systems for bias, arbitrariness, and unfair mischaracterizations. To do 
so, they would need to view not only the datasets mined by scoring systems but also the source code and 
programmers’ notes describing the variables, correlations, and inferences embedded in the scoring 
systems’ algorithms.”). 
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with inputting and analyzing the data, the entire system runs the risk of 
being built on an unknown and unknowable database.320 
The nature of algorithms further obscures the process, except perhaps to 
technical experts. Police officers and administrators receive the results, but 
due to the complexity of the chosen algorithm they can rarely understand 
the underlying math. Thus, predictive policing runs into the same problems 
as other automated predictive technologies: the technical complexity of the 
design makes it nearly impossible for outsiders to determine the accuracy, 
effectiveness, or fairness of the program.321 True, police can see if the 
system works, but police cannot see how the system works. This lack of 
transparency is not simply the result of new technology, but also the 
influence of the proprietary nature of the software. The companies involved 
in these real-world tests are in a multimillion-dollar race to convince police 
departments to adopt their particular products. The companies have 
financial interests and proprietary secrets to protect, and every incentive to 
report positive outcomes.322  
Effectiveness itself remains a contested issue. Early tests show a 
correlation between use of certain predictive policing techniques and 
decreased crime rates (for some crimes). But how do police districts 
determine metrics in the future? Crime may go up or down independent of 
the chosen computer program. Crime analysts may make a more or less 
accurate comparative judgment. Most importantly, how can outsiders audit 
the data? In similar police data collection experiments (DNA databases, 
“stop and frisk” reporting), the police have audited themselves with mixed 
results.323  
These vulnerabilities exist with any data-driven solution, and, as such, 
lessons can be learned from other data-based systems. Every aspect of the 
data collection system must be imbued with a focus on transparency in an 
effort to catch, correct, and understand errors. 
 
 
 320. Wayne A. Logan & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Criminal Justice Data, 101 MINN. L. 
REV. 541, 545–55 (2016). 
 321. Frank Pasquale, Restoring Transparency to Automated Authority, 9 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 235 (2011) [hereinafter Restoring Transparency]; Zarsky, supra note 247, at 1534; Frank 
Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified Transparency in Internet 
Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105 (2010); Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search 
Commission? Access, Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 
1159 (2008); Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 895–96 (2006). 
 322. Bond-Graham & Winston, supra note 4. 
 323. Stephen Mercer & Jessica Gabel, Shadow Dwellers: The Underregulated World of State and 
Local DNA Databases, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 639, 681 (2014) (discussing lack of transparency 
in local DNA databases); KELLEY & MCCARTHY, supra note 230. 
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2. Transparency: Responses 
Transparency is difficult, but it matters to a functioning predictive 
system that deals with individuals’ lives and liberty. Transparency serves as 
a check on governmental power.324 Intentional openness encourages better 
behavior of police on the street in recording data, administrators at 
headquarters in analyzing it, and error reduction at a systemic level.325 In 
the context of sophisticated algorithms, it may not ever be perfect,326 but a 
focus on transparency can create a better sense of trust in the technology.327 
It was for this reason that many people originally considered the public 
mapping of crime a victory for transparency advocates.328 
To ensure transparency three basic things must happen. First, an 
independent auditing system must be created to span the entire collection, 
analysis, and data maintenance process.329 Compliance systems must be 
created that can check whether and how data is being collected, recorded, 
and inputted.330 Auditing of the system must include peer review and outside 
testing of the algorithms.331 This audit would need to be conducted by 
professional data analysts who understand the predictive systems and can 
see whether the claims made are supported by the data. Finally, auditing 
systems must create a notice mechanism to preserve the auditing results and 
potentially publish them at the appropriate time. 
 
 
 324. Zarsky, supra note 247, at 1533 (“The most basic and popular justification for transparency is 
that it facilitates a check on governmental actions.”). 
 325. Mary D. Fan, Panopticism for Police: Structural Reform Bargaining and Police Regulation by 
Data-Driven Surveillance, 87 WASH. L. REV. 93, 129 (2012) (“Monitoring through data generation 
exerts its own control function. The greater transparency produced by data generation is a technique of 
police panopticism. When police are subject to the watchful gaze of courts, the public, and self-
surveillance, they behave in better conformity with expectations.”); Zarsky, supra note 247, at 1534 
(“Transparency facilitates ‘shaming.’ The fear that a broad segment of the public will learn of the 
bureaucrats’ missteps will deter these decision makers from initially engaging in problematic conduct.”). 
 326. Cynthia Dwork & Deirdre K. Mulligan, It’s Not Privacy, and It’s Not Fair, 66 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 35, 37 (2013) (“Exposing the datasets and algorithms of big data analysis to scrutiny—
transparency solutions—may improve individual comprehension, but given the independent (sometimes 
intended) complexity of algorithms, it is unreasonable to expect transparency alone to root out bias.”). 
 327. Julie Brill, The Internet of Things: Building Trust and Maximizing Benefits Through Consumer 
Control, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 205, 215 (2014) (discussing transparency and trust in the context of the 
Internet of Things). 
 328. Gilsinan, supra note 316, at 93–94 (“The increasing use of accessible, web-based, real time 
crime data, using geographic information system (GIS) technology to display neighborhood crime 
patterns, represents the move toward transparency on the part of major city police departments.”).  
 329. Zarsky, supra note 247, at 1553–68 (advocating for strong process protections to compensate 
for the difficulty of making predictive algorithms transparent). See also, e.g., Pasquale, Restoring 
Transparency, supra note 321, at 235–36; Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 
1163 (2000). 
 330. Danielle K. Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1305 (2008). 
 331. See Logan & Ferguson, supra note 320, at 599.  
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Second, metrics must be publicly released to allow a judgment about 
whether the promise of predictive policing has met its goal. A transparent 
system must provide a way to show that predictive policing works.332 This 
metric may be objective—a set target for a crime rate reduction. The metric 
may be comparative—a target set in comparison to a crime analyst’s 
prediction. The metric might be subjective—a judgment by a designated 
official that the program has met certain goals. Whichever types of metric 
are selected, some metrics that can be measured and evaluated are necessary 
to judge the effectiveness of any system. 
Finally, training programs within police departments must be established 
at all levels to ensure that the data processes work and are being followed. 
Everything that is going to be audited and judged by an officer should first 
be made part of a comprehensive training program.  
E. Accountability: Vulnerabilities and Responses 
 
Improved transparency leads to increased accountability.333 
“Accountability refers to the ethical obligation of individuals (in this case, 
governmental officials) to answer for their actions, possible failings, and 
wrongdoings.”334 The concepts of transparency and accountability, while 
related, are distinct. As Tal Zarsky has written, “[t]ransparency is an 
essential tool for facilitating accountability because it subjects politicians 
and bureaucrats to the public spotlight.”335 But accountability involves more 
than transparency’s sunlight, including providing citizens the power to hold 
decision-makers responsible for their actions.  
1. Accountability: Vulnerabilities 
Police accountability has long been a fraught issue, involving local 
political tensions, community tensions, and legal oversight.336 Adoption of 
 
 
 332. See Ferguson, Predictive Policing, supra note 20, at 324 (“To allow predictive policing such 
influence without mechanisms of accountability for the data and analysis, and without full transparency, 
may result in a troubling lack of protection for individuals who end up in the forecasted areas.”). 
 333. David A. Harris, Across the Hudson: Taking the Stop and Frisk Debate Beyond New York City, 
16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 853, 878 (2013) (“One hears the term ‘transparency’ in many contexts 
these days. The idea is that by making the workings of government open to public scrutiny, the public 
will better understand what those in charge are doing, and can hold officials accountable in appropriate 
ways.”).  
 334. Zarsky, supra note 247, at 1533. 
 335. Id. at 1533–34. 
 336. See generally Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761 (2012).  
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predictive policing technologies changes little about these ongoing issues. 
This section looks at specific concerns with predictive policing, putting 
aside larger structural issues with police accountability in general. 
As discussed earlier, the lack of transparency and technological expertise 
make accountability very difficult. Political and community leaders can be 
held accountable only if individuals understand what the predictive 
technology is doing. As it currently stands, many politicians defer to the 
“black box” promise of predictive policing without actually understanding 
why or how it works. Even with robust data collection and sharing, most 
politically accountable leaders care as much about the bottom line crime 
statistics (up or down) than the efficiency or fairness of any particular 
technology. In fact, political accountability has only rarely taken the lead in 
police accountability, as politicians usually delegate authority to local police 
chiefs, thus insulating themselves from responsibility for the results.337 
A larger issue involves lack of legal accountability for most internal 
policing decisions. With the exception of federal oversight through practice 
and pattern lawsuits338 and individual civil rights lawsuits,339 there are few 
legally cognizable claims a plaintiff or the government can raise regarding 
policing strategy. This means police administrators can choose the approach 
that they believe works best for their communities without running afoul of 
constitutional challenges.340 Even the NYPD stop and frisk lawsuits—one 
of the most prominent challenges to policing in recent memory—did not 
directly focus on the choice of police tactics, but on the racially disparate 
impact of the practices.341 Similarly, there will be no accountability-based 
legal challenges to predictive policing, absent some inequity in application. 
Finally, a lack of accountability exists because of the immaturity of the 
technology. Predictive policing is still experimental, and as such it gets the 
benefit of being thought too new to judge. This may well be true, but the 
nature of the technology is that it will always be new. Predictive policing 
 
 
 337. See Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1827, 
1831 (2015) (“Policing agencies may not be entirely immune from democratic oversight–police chiefs 
typically serve at the pleasure of the mayor, police commission, or city council, and sheriffs are directly 
elected by the people…. Given their incentives, executive officials to whom police report typically will 
grant policing agencies carte blanche so long as crime remains in check.”). 
 338. See generally Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of Police Accountability: The U.S. Justice 
Department “Pattern or Practice” Suits in Context, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3 (2003). 
 339. See David Rudovsky, Litigating Civil Rights Cases to Reform Racially Biased Criminal Justice 
Practices, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 97, 116–19 (2007). 
 340. But see Henry Gass, Chicago Police, ACLU Reach Agreement on ‘Stop and Frisk’ Practice, 
THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2015/0807/  
Chicago-police-ACLU-reach-agreement-on-stop-and-frisk-practice [https://perma.cc/2KPQ-9P84]. 
 341. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (addressing the 
constitutionality of the NYPD’s stop and frisk practices). 
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technologies, almost by definition (if not design), will continue to improve, 
innovate, and change. In that constantly shifting framework, it will be a 
moving target to say any particular technique has failed.342 Presumably, the 
next generation of the technology will fix the error, and there may never be 
a moment of true accountability.343 Such is the nature and speed of 
continuously innovating technologies. By the time evaluators have 
accounted for past successes or failures, the technology will already have 
evolved to the next version. 
2. Accountability: Responses 
Despite vulnerabilities, predictive policing can be a force for 
accountability. The original data-driven police systems were created to 
foster accountability.344 In New York City, Commissioner Bratton’s 
innovation of demanding real-time reports of crime statistics allowed for 
both internal and external accountability about crime rates.345 CompStat 
organizational meetings literally brought police leaders into a room to be 
held accountable for what had happened in their district.346 The recognition 
that accountability matters should be central to the next generation of 
predictive policing technologies. 
At an operational level, if accountability becomes a priority, the data-
driven nature of the technologies makes accountability easier to implement. 
Building off the CompStat model, such statistics could be made available to 
city administrators and the larger community.347 In some jurisdictions, 
 
 
 342. The 2016 RAND study of Chicago’s Heat List proves the point. See supra note 192 and 
accompanying text. RAND found the algorithm and program provided no statistical evidence that the 
Heat List worked to reduce violence. The Chicago Police discounted this criticism, stating that the 
algorithm had since been improved, so any criticism was dated and unwarranted. See Stroud, supra note 
192. 
 343. Stroud, supra note 193 (discussing the Chicago Police Department’s upgrade of the algorithm 
since the RAND study had been conducted). 
 344. Ferguson, supra note 73, at 193 (“CompStat created an integrated data-management system 
for police statistics that required weekly data updates, crime mapping, targeted police responses, and an 
accountability mechanism that was primarily data driven.”); Ronal W. Serpas & Matthew Morley, The 
Next Step in Accountability Driven Leadership: “CompStating” the CompStat Data, POLICE CHIEF 
MAG. (May 2008), http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch  
&article_id=1501&issue_id=52008.  
 345. Gilsinan, supra note 316, at 94 (“[T]he rapid adoption of COMPSTAT-like programs in mid 
to large size departments speaks to a willingness to be held accountable for crime occurrences and their 
control.”). 
 346. Willis et al., supra note 80, at 148; Eli B. Silverman, With a Hunch and a Punch, 4 J.L. ECON. 
& POL’Y 133, 144–45 (2007). 
 347. Robert D. Behn, THE PERFORMANCESTAT POTENTIAL: A LEADERSHIP STRATEGY FOR 
PRODUCING RESULTS, 12–21 (2014). 
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crime data regularly gets reported to the public through open-access 
websites. Posting the predictive policing results (after they have been 
utilized by police) would provide the public with a mechanism to assess the 
technology’s efficacy, fairness, and scope.  
At a theoretical level, the world of data-driven police accountability is 
just being imagined.348 While beyond the scope of this article, scholars have 
proposed a host of data-driven tactics to hold police accountable to the 
community.349 Technologies that can track and record police activity have 
been proposed.350 Consumer technologies that “police the police” have been 
developed.351 Administrative procedures have been suggested.352 New legal 
oversight structures that involve both federal intervention and community 
accountability have been envisioned.353 What these suggestions share in 
common is a belief that a focus on police data might provide a two-way 
street of accountability—reducing crime and reducing police misconduct.354 
F. Practical Implementation: Vulnerabilities and Responses 
Even assuming perfect data collection and well-calibrated algorithms, 
vulnerabilities exist in applying predictive policing techniques to the real 
world of police practice. While application will be different in each 
 
 
 348. I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Surveillance, and Communities, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 959, 961 
(2013); Kami Chavis Simmons, New Governance and the “New Paradigm” of Police Accountability: A 
Democratic Approach to Police Reform, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 373 (2010). 
 349. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing ‘Stop and Frisk’ with ‘Stop and Track’ Policing, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 17, 2014, 4:54 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrew-guthrie-
ferguson/policing-stop-and-frisk-w_b_5686208.html [https://perma.cc/A3LW-8KT3]. See also infra 
Part III.H.1. Cf. Sherman, supra note 100, at 392. 
 350. Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital Age, 
88 TEX. L. REV. 669, 723 (2010) (discussing regulating technologies); Fan, supra note 325. 
 351. ACLU Launches Police Watch App in Oregon and Other States, ACLU (Nov. 6, 2014), 
https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-launches-police-watch-app-oregon-and-other-states 
[https://perma.cc/5SRM-UW75]; Law Enforcement Wants Police-Tracking App Waze Disabled, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Jan. 26, 2015, 5:00 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/ 
01/26/law-enforcement-wants-police-tracking-app-waze-disabled [https://perma.cc/TL2G-RLW5]. 
 352. Harmon, supra note 336, at 762–64 (discussing the importance of sub-constitutional 
regulations to improve police accountability); David A. Harris, How Accountability-Based Policing Can 
Reinforce—Or Replace—the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 149, 195, 
203–07 (2009). 
 353. Walker, supra note 338. 
 354. See, e.g., Rachel Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Policing?, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1119, 
1134 (2013) (“Federal law authorizes federal agencies to produce data on law enforcement, but those 
data are not well tailored to facilitate public accountability, strengthen local governance, or improve 
state and federal regulation of the police.”); Andrew E. Taslitz, Foreword: The Political Geography of 
Race Data in the Criminal Justice System, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 11–12 (2003) (“Data 
collection and revelation can play a part in improving police-community relations because transparency 
and accountability breed trust.”). 
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jurisdiction, certain commonalities exist that need to be studied before 
adoption. This section examines the reality for police officers on the street, 
and the next section examines the impact on police administration and 
policy. 
1. Practical Implementation: Vulnerabilities 
New predictive policing technologies may shift the way police officers 
do their jobs. This may include where police patrol, how they patrol, and 
how they treat the people they interact with on patrol. For example, early 
reports out of Los Angeles offer cautionary lessons about deployment. The 
San Francisco Police Department’s Chief Information Officer, Susan 
Merritt, publicly expressed concern that police could become too fixated on 
the boxes.355 “In L.A. I heard that many officers were only patrolling the red 
boxes, not other areas . . . . People became too focused on the boxes, and 
they had to come up with a slogan, ‘Think outside the box.’”356 While this 
was certainly not the intent of the program, in practice the goal of targeting 
certain areas overwrote normal policing strategy. Police officers, told to 
focus on predicted areas, focused on those areas to the neglect of others. 
In addition, officers’ perceptions about predicted areas can become 
distorted. If expecting to find a high crime area, police will become hyper-
vigilant about the perceived dangerousness of the area. As criminologist 
Peter Scharf worried, “the red-box designation might cause young cops to 
exaggerate a neighborhood’s dangers.”357 Obviously, this sense about an 
area or individuals in an area may also affect how police officers treat a 
suspect. Issues of implicit or explicit bias discussed earlier in the context of 
crime data are also at issue in how police treat citizens on the streets. The 
perception of danger may be well-grounded in crime data, making it 
difficult or dangerous for police officers to ignore. After all, if police are 
targeting violent shootings in particular areas, officers would be wise to be 
cautious in interacting with people they encounter. 
Adoption of a predictive policing strategy can also have other 
unintended impacts on police practice. An interesting byproduct of the 
RAND study on the Shreveport Police Department’s experiment was the 
revelation of how the new technology impacted routine police tactics.358 As 
described in the RAND study, police shifted their emphasis from generating 
 
 
 355. Bond-Graham & Winston, supra note 4. 
 356. Id.  
 357. Huet, supra note 3. 
 358. HUNT ET AL., supra note 130, at 12. 
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arrests to developing intelligence, or (in the parlance of the officers) from 
increasing the quantity of arrests to increasing “quality arrests.”359 This 
meant in practice that police were encouraged to do more intelligence 
gathering by using their continuing presence in the predicted area. As 
described: 
There was a large emphasis on intelligence gathering through 
leveraging low-level offenders and offenses. Officers stopped 
individuals who were committing ordinance violations or otherwise 
acting suspiciously and would run their names through database 
systems. If an individual had significant prior convictions, he or she 
would be arrested for the violation (as applicable). If the individual 
was on probation or parole, officers would check his or her standing 
with the parole or probation officers. For those not in good standing, 
a parole or probation officer was asked to come to the scene. Lastly, 
individuals with warrants were arrested. For those not meeting these 
criteria, officers stated that they gave these individuals a warning and 
were as polite as possible in order to note that they were trying to take 
action against property crimes in the area and to ask whether the 
individual had any knowledge that would be useful to police.360 
Police admitted that under this new guidance they “[s]topped and 
questioned juveniles committing truancy offenses” more often, “[w]alked 
around apartment complexes and discussed criminal activities in [the] area, 
particularly narcotics, with residents,” and “[v]isited people they kn[e]w, 
especially parolees, probationers, and truants, to learn about criminal 
activities (largely drug activity) in the neighborhood.”361 This extra 
emphasis on individual interaction—arguably more of a micro-community 
policing initiative—362 was caused by the data-driven targeting of particular 
areas. Patrol officers began focusing on who was in these areas and used 
information from those individuals to generate leads for other crimes. 
One way to look at the result is that officers began prioritizing the 
investigation of other crimes and developing suspects not normally 
associated with the investigation of property crimes.363 This extra 
 
 
 359. Id. at 12–13. 
 360. Id. at 12.  
 361. Id. at 13. 
 362. See generally James Forman, Jr., Community Policing and Youth as Assets, 95 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2004); Tracey L. Meares, Praying for Community Policing, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1593 
(2002). 
 363. HUNT ET AL., supra note 130, at 13 (“Officers reported that PILOT changed the amount of 
recent information provided per case. This occurred because PILOT officers at a crime scene asked more 
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information was then passed on to detectives who, counter-intuitively, were 
less than appreciative because it added more investigative responsibilities 
from cold leads.364 In practice, detectives resented receiving this 
information without a connection to an actual case. While the additional 
information should have been helpful in developing an intelligence-oriented 
approach to a community, without the appropriate information-management 
structure it actually produced resistance among police colleagues.365 
Further, this patrol-level intelligence focus delayed officers from continuing 
on to the next emergency call for service.366  
This change in policing strategy resulted in both positive and negative 
community effects independent of the crime rate, which remained 
unchanged. From the positive side, 
According to officers, since the public saw so-called real criminals 
being inconvenienced and since police were conducting more follow-
up questions after crimes, the public became more willing to provide 
additional information or call in with tips. This improved relationship 
with the public was evidenced, in part, by members of the public 
waving hello to patrol cars.367 
On the less positive side, more people were stopped in these areas and 
inconvenienced without any corresponding reduction in the crime rate. 
Predictive policing resulted in more social control of communities already 
targeted by the criminal justice system. Predictive policing, thus, changed 
the reality on the street, even if it had no statistical impact on the crime rate. 
On the opposite side of the spectrum from police being too engaged in 
predicted areas, or too involved in investigating individuals in those areas, 
is the concern that police will simply ignore the predictive tools. While 
initial adoption of predictive policing has been met with general acceptance, 
some veteran officers have dismissed the idea as telling them what they 
already know.368 Many experienced police officers not only have a good 
sense of the likely areas of crime, but an instinct that has served them well 
 
 
questions of victims, their neighbors, and individuals in the neighborhood, which is not normally done 
for property theft cases, as there is not enough time before officers have to respond to another call for 
service.”).  
 364. Id. (“Officers indicated that this was problematic for solving the case, because officers were 
essentially handing detectives a cold case when the detectives already had full caseloads.”).  
 365. Id. 
 366. Id.  
 367. Id. at 26. 
 368. Vince Beiser, To Catch a Thief, SANTA CLARA MAG. (Winter 2013), http://www.scu 
.edu/scm/winter2013/features.cfm?c=15053 [http://perma.cc/H8U3-S6KW] (“On a more practical 
level, hard-headed street cops are understandably skeptical about the whole notion.”). 
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before geo-locational mapping technology was available.369 Further, some 
question the utility of only focusing on place. As one Santa Cruz patrol 
officer stated: 
This box here [pointing a PredPol predicted area], it doesn’t tell us 
what crime or who to watch out for. We know this is a busy street 
with a lot of stuff getting stolen out of parked cars. We don’t need 
predictive policing to tell us that. I personally don’t think it’s very 
helpful . . . . Most of my guys feel the same way.370  
In the Shreveport RAND study, some officers complained that chasing the 
boxes was a waste of time and fuel, even as others thought the experiment 
was an improvement on traditional techniques.371 Even the best predictive 
policing system will not provide useful information if it is ignored by the 
police charged with implementing it.  
2. Practical Implementation: Responses 
Two main responses exist to the vulnerabilities in implementing 
predictive policing technologies. First, the technology will require an 
additional level of administrative review to examine how police officers are 
implementing the data-driven mission. This administrative focus involves 
both an awareness of what is being measured and how this measurement 
may shape officer actions. Second, predictive policing requires training and 
compliance mechanisms to ensure that police are, in fact, utilizing the 
technology as designed. The administrative responses discussed in this 
section are targeted to the actions of police on the streets, independent of 
the concern discussed in the next section of how predictive policing might 
affect broader administration policy. 
The need for oversight responds to the concern that police officers will 
react to how they are evaluated. If “quality arrests” means those individuals 
with more informational value, rather than the number of arrests, then police 
practice will change. If police are rewarded for spending more time in the 
targeted box, then police will follow those incentives. The difficulty is that 
neither of those ways might be the best way to reduce crime. That is to say, 
the metrics being established may be consistent with the technology, but not 
 
 
 369. Alene Tchekmedyian, Police Push Back Against Using Crime-Prediction Technology to 
Deploy Officers, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2016, 8:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-
police-predict-crime-20161002-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/NL7V-3ZKW] (describing police 
officers in Burbank, California’s reluctance to use the predictive policing technology). 
 370. Beiser, supra note 368. 
 371. HUNT ET AL., supra note 130, at 14. 
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the ultimate goal of crime reduction. 
Similarly, following the technology without additional training may 
create a distorted picture of targeted areas or targeted individuals. Many 
people live and work in areas of targeted crime, and the vast majority of 
them do not engage in criminal activity. Priming police officers’ responses 
in ways that encourage aggressive policing in particular areas might 
undermine the larger social goals of police-citizen cohesiveness or 
community building. Training on the implications of implicit bias or 
confirmation bias may reduce some of those negative impacts. And, as can 
be seen at least from the police perception of the RAND project, some 
community members had a better understanding of why police were present 
in their community and responded with positive acts of good will,372 
meaning that these programs might have positive results for those broader 
community goals. 
In addition, training and compliance is necessary to ensure that the 
system designed becomes the system implemented. Many systems can be 
undercut at the ground level by very practical problems. For example, in 
Shreveport, the predictive policing experiment was hampered by the fact 
that the police had a limited number of police cars with air conditioning 
available during the hot Louisiana summer.373 Fewer cars meant fewer 
volunteers for the project. Other problems arose, too; for example, while the 
“predictive analytics team produced the maps and attended roll calls to 
provide and discuss maps and other intelligence gathered, . . . [t]he 
participants did not attend the planned monthly deployment meetings.”374 
This information gap created implementation problems.375 Each of these 
problems could be addressed with better management, but it takes 
identifying these foreseeable challenges before implementation to solve 
them. 
G. Administration: Vulnerabilities and Responses 
Parallel to the practical concerns of implementing predictive policing on 
the streets are the administrative and management concerns associated with 
running a predictive policing system. Stepping back to consider the 
traditions of police practice, the act of centralizing data with administrators 
and analysts means a shift in power from police officers to police 
 
 
 372. Id. at 26. 
 373. Id. at 15. 
 374. Id. at 23. 
 375. Id.  
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administrators.376 As has been noted concerning the proto-predictive 
policing CompStat system, data tend to centralize power to those who 
crunch the numbers.377 In New York City under CompStat, police 
administrators studied and were held accountable for weekly changes in 
crime statistics, which shaped staffing allocation, police tactics, and 
resource deployment.378 The result did contribute to the reduction of crime 
rates, but also dramatically shifted decision-making power to those who 
controlled the data.379 
1. Administration: Vulnerabilities 
For administrators, three interrelated vulnerabilities exist in any system 
influenced by predictive algorithms. The first involves the natural 
inclination to be overly influenced by data-based metrics. If the identified 
metrics revolve around arrests, then arrests are what get measured and 
tracked.380 If monetary fines for minor crimes are the goal, then police focus 
on those fines.381 If administrators are rewarded for crime-rate reduction, 
then crime-rate reduction data becomes the controlling focus.382 The 
consequences of an arrest-driven stop and frisk policy in New York City, or 
a fine-driven system in Ferguson, Missouri, resulted in significant damage 
to the relationship between police and residents in those areas.383 Similarly, 
a potential vulnerability for predictive policing systems is that data collected 
and analyzed becomes prioritized over other crime-stopping measures. 
As a related concern, a well-understood byproduct of data-driven 
 
 
 376. George L. Kelling, Why Did People Stop Committing Crimes? An Essay About Criminology 
and Ideology, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 567, 578 (2000). 
 377. Silverman, supra note 346, at 146 (describing how COMPSTAT reinforced a top-down 
command and control model). 
 378. Willis et al., supra note 80, at 148.  
 379. Id. 
 380. Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 
633 n.53 (2014) (“There is also significant evidence to show that as time passed misdemeanor arrests 
and summonses became institutionalized as performance metrics inside the NYPD and incentivized by 
their quantitative management system, irrespective of the quality-of-life or crime-reducing benefit of the 
activities.”). 
 381. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 79 (2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6CM-
JDB5] (detailing a systemic focus on collecting fines through minor criminal and civil enforcement 
actions). 
 382. Al Baker & Ray Rivera, On Secret Tape, Police Press a Tickets Quota, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 
2010, at A1 (“[T]here is persuasive evidence of the existence of quotas.”); Jim Hoffer, NYPD Officer 
Claims Pressure To Make Arrests, WABC-TV (Mar. 2, 2010, 10:37 PM), http://abclocal.go.com/ 
wabc/story?section=news/investigators&id=7305356 [http://perma.cc/66T3-6VB7]. 
 383. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 381, at 79. 
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systems is data-based myopia. Police administrators follow the data even if 
questions arise from it. This phenomenon is called “automation bias,” and 
can be observed in many contexts.384 As Kenneth Bamberger writes, 
“Human judgment is subject to an automation bias, which fosters a tendency 
to ‘disregard or not search for contradictory information in light of a 
computer-generated solution that is accepted as correct.’”385 In the 
predictive policing context, this focus might result in following the 
judgment of algorithms at the expense of other information. In the 
Predictive Policing 1.0 context, this could just amount to a waste of 
resources (such as sending patrol cars to the wrong box). But in the 
Predictive Policing 3.0 context, it could lead to erroneous contact with 
individuals wrongfully suspected of a crime. Blind reliance on such 
automated results leads to what Gary T. Marx, professor emeritus of 
sociology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, termed “the tyranny 
of the algorithm.”386 
The combination of policy priorities and automation bias can also create 
self-reinforcing or self-fulfilling predictions.387 Predictive policing 
technologies direct officers to certain areas, which causes them to make 
arrests in those areas, which generates arrest statistics to be fed into some 
future algorithm, which in turn identifies those areas as higher crime 
areas.388 Administrators focus on those areas because of the predictive 
validity of the tip, and the cycle repeats. This phenomenon has been 
recognized in both early crime mapping experiments389 and modern 
predictive policing projects.390 As the RAND study reported: 
An additional issue noted by officers was that the predicted hot spots 
changed little from month to month—for the most part, grid squares 
flagged one month would show up the next month. RAND team 
 
 
 384. Citron, supra note 330, at 1271–72 (2008) (defining “‘automation bias’—the ‘use of 
automation as a heuristic replacement for vigilant information seeking and processing.’”) (quoting Linda 
J. Skitka et al., Automation Bias and Errors: Are Crews Better Than Individuals?, 10 INT’L J. AVIATION 
PSYCHOL. 85, 86 (2000)). 
 385. Bamberger, supra note 350, at 711–12 (2010) (quoting Mary L. Cummings, Automation and 
Accountability in Decision Support System Interface Design, 32 J. TECH. STUD. 23, 25 (2006)). 
 386. Berg, supra note 15. 
 387. Kevin Miller, Total Surveillance, Big Data, and Predictive Crime Technology: Privacy’s 
Perfect Storm, 19 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 105, 124 (2014) (“[E]ven relatively unbiased models may be 
plagued by self-reinforcement: police look for crime where the model tells them to look, and each time 
they find it the model seems more valid—much like the proverbial drunk who only looks for his keys 
under the streetlight because that is where the light is.”). 
 388. Sengupta, supra note 137; Rashbaum, supra note 229, at 1. 
 389. Ferguson, supra note 73, at 195 (describing early crime mapping strategies in Miami-Dade 
County). 
 390. HUNT ET AL., supra note 130, at 27. 
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members, for example, observed officers on ride alongs . . . looking 
at newly distributed maps and remarking that they already knew 
where the hot spots were.391 
Some predictive technologies attempt to avoid this trap by only focusing on 
reported crimes, not arrests (like PredPol). But other technologies’ 
predictions, as an examination of the RAND Shreveport factors shows 
(presence of residents on probation or parole, previous six months of tactical 
crime, juvenile arrests, etc.), analyze factors that will not quickly shift over 
time, creating rather fixed predicted areas of crime. 
Finally, these self-fulfilling systems can create a ratchet effect that 
distorts a broader focus on crime suppression and undermines an efficient 
allocation of police resources. Harcourt has explained the inefficiency 
behind certain predictive strategies.392 He describes how predictive 
techniques require resources to investigate and arrest certain groups, 
resulting in a higher distribution of arrests of those groups.393 As he writes, 
“[c]riminal profiling, when it works, is a self-confirming prophecy. It 
aggravates over time the perception of a correlation between the group trait 
and crime.”394 At the same time, those not targeted may in fact increase their 
crime rates due to the shift in resources.395 Overall, crime may go up, even 
if the targeted population’s crime rate goes down. His insightful work 
carries far beyond the scope of this article, but offers another potential 
vulnerability associated with decisions by administrators as to how to 
allocate resources to implement predictive policing. 
 
 
 391. Id.  
 392. HARCOURT, supra note 23, at 145; Harcourt, supra note 34, at 112; Harcourt, supra note 40; 
Bernard E. Harcourt, A Reader’s Companion to Against Prediction: A Reply to Ariela Gross, Yoram 
Margalioth, and Yoav Sapir on Economic Modeling, Selective Incapacitation, Governmentality, and 
Race, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 265, 267–69 (2008) [hereinafter A Reader’s Companion to Against 
Prediction]. 
 393. HARCOURT, supra note 23, at 145 (describing a “ratchet effect”). 
 394. Id. at 154. 
 395. Id. at 124–25 (“If the police shift their allocation of resources away from white motorists and 
toward minority motorists, the offending rate among minority motorists may well decrease, but 
simultaneously the offending rate among white motorists may increase. The problem is, of course, that 
there are more white motorists. Depending on the relationship between the comparative elasticity of 
offending to policing of white and minority motorists and the comparative offending rates, the total 
increase in absolute numbers of offending by white motorists may outweigh the total decrease in absolute 
numbers of minority offending.”). But see Yoram Margalioth, Looking at Prediction from an Economics 
Perspective: A Response to Harcourt’s Against Prediction, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 243, 248–49 
(2008); Harcourt, A Reader’s Companion to Against Prediction, supra note 392, at 267–69. 
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2. Administration: Responses 
Because of the complexity and scale of police operations, the 
vulnerabilities inherent in administrating a predictive policing system are 
significant. Yet one of the most promising aspects of predictive policing 
systems is that they can be evaluated and changed in real time. For example, 
at the LAPD’s Real-Time Analysis and Critical Response Division, police 
administrators can evaluate crime data, security cameras, and satellite 
images showing recent arrests, and observe patterns and trends instantly.396 
This allows police administrators to respond in real time to increase patrols 
or design other intervention strategies. Similar programs exist in other large 
cities, such as New York City.397 These predictive systems go beyond using 
data as productivity metrics to using data as strategic intelligence, which 
can result in a more adaptive approach to policing. 
Police systems can also adapt by taking select aspects of predictive 
policing and linking them to other types of police intervention. Certainly, 
by investing time and energy into building a predictive policing strategy, 
the risk becomes that the technology will control the outcome. But 
sometimes other synergies result. While the RAND study ultimately 
concluded that predictive policing did not reduce the crime rate in 
Shreveport, it did generate a more intelligence-focused policing strategy. 
Perhaps some jurisdictions will adopt predictive policing techniques not 
primarily to reduce crime, but to rethink their strategies for gathering 
information from the community. Predictive policing might inadvertently 
promote an intelligence-based, problem-solving approach, and that could be 
a positive result in its own right. 
H. Vision: Vulnerabilities and Responses 
One step removed from the administration of predictive policing 
technologies exist the deeper questions of whether a focus on predicting 
crime addresses the ultimate goal of reducing crime in society. Generally 
speaking, police administrators or police officers are not tasked with “the 
 
 
 396. Berg, supra note 15. 
 397. See Thomas H. Davenport, How Big Data is Helping the NYPD Solve Crimes Faster, FORTUNE 
(July 17, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/07/17/big-data-nypd-situational-awareness/; Chris Dolmetsch 
& Henry Goldman, New York, Microsoft Unveil Join Crime-Tracking System, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 8, 
2012) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-08-08/new-york-microsoft-unveil-joint-crime-
tracking-system; TALKPOLITIX, New York City - Domain Awareness, YOUTUBE (June 7, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ozUHOHAAhzg (excerpt from NOVA - Manhunt - Boston 
Bombers, New York City Domain Awareness System). 
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vision question,” but by adopting a predictive strategy they have, in part, 
helped answer it. This section explores three big questions about how 
predictive policing shapes our vision of criminal justice policy. By adopting 
a data-driven, crime-based predictive approach, certain other aspects of the 
crime problem become obscured or distorted. 
1. Vision: Vulnerabilities 
The vision question looks at three choices the current policing system 
has made which are reinforced by the move toward predictive policing: (1) a 
focus on targeted hotspot places, and not overall crime patterns; (2) a focus 
on crime statistics, and not root socio-economic problems; and (3) a focus 
on criminal activity, and not police activity.  
First, predictive policing raises the problem of displacement. The utility 
of predictive policing relies on its geo-locational precision. The smaller the 
predicted areas, the easier it becomes for police to target and disrupt crime 
in those areas. The question, however, is whether—even assuming crime 
goes down in the hotspot areas—the overall crime rates also go down.398 
The general trends have been positive, but the continued focus on particular 
areas does not address the displacement effect. Scholars have been debating 
displacement for years, as the issue emerged in studying pre-predictive hot 
spots, or other targeted areas of crime.399 The concern of displacement is 
that police may succeed in shifting crime from one place to another, but not 
actually in reducing overall crime.  
Second, there exists the perennial question of why we direct our energy 
and investment to invent new police technologies, rather than spend that 
same money to target the root problems underlying crime. Most property-, 
drug-, and gang-related crime occurs in poor neighborhoods where residents 
have significant socio-economic disadvantages. Predicting levels of crime 
might be less constructive than addressing the foreseeable barriers to 
education, employment, and stable housing that contribute to an 
individual’s decision to turn to crime. This is so because remedying some 
of those disadvantages might provide a positive forecast for less criminal 
activity overall. 
 
 
 398. Bond-Graham & Winston, supra note 4 (“Ed Schmidt, a criminologist and veteran police 
officer. . . . [says] ‘I look at this all with skepticism . . . . Where are they coming from, how are they 
implementing [the technology]? Are they just displacing crime between divisions? Are they just 
displacing crime from one precinct to another? Mine goes down, yours go up?’”). 
 399. See, e.g., Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and 
Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831, 1839–40 (2005) (discussing the displacement 
effect literature).  
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Third, another big question is why we focus on criminal activity and not 
also police activity to reduce crime. For example, crime mapping is now a 
routine part of policing, as reported crimes, calls for service, and arrests are 
regularly monitored and mapped.400 But this mapping is incomplete because 
it does not include information about where the police officers were at the 
time of the crime. Were the officers two blocks away when the robbery 
occurred? Had they just passed the alley? Were there physical barriers 
keeping police from seeing the crime? These questions could be analyzed 
by a complete crime map that included both reported crimes and real-time 
police locations during those reported crimes. Just as seeing the place of 
crime can provide insights about the cause of crime, seeing the location of 
police officers (through GPS mapping) during the crime can provide 
insights about the failure to prevent it.401 In addition, police supervisors 
would have a better sense of what the officer is doing on a daily basis, 
including a complete record of the officer’s daily travels.402 A focus on “stop 
and track policing”403 would allow police administrators to see the near 
misses, the areas in need of attention, and even daily logs of police 
interaction with the community. By focusing on both aspects of the problem 
(the location of crimes and the location of police during the crimes), police 
administrators might be better able to address the gaps in coverage. 
Currently, we only see half the picture of how criminals and police interact.  
2. Vision: Responses 
The obvious response to concerns about “the vision question” is that 
predictive policing has never claimed to be the ultimate solution, but only 
an improvement over existing practices which have not managed to 
eradicate crime from society. While that is a fair response, it avoids 
addressing some of the intriguing possibilities arising from new predictive 
technologies if one takes the criticisms seriously. 
For example, the displacement effect may very well occur from an 
intensive targeting of selected areas. Criminal actors may react to policing 
 
 
 400. Ferguson, supra note 73, at 185, 191.  
 401. Sherman, supra note 100, at 434 (“Since then, technologies such as GPS have made such 
measurement even easier. All that is required is a commitment to tracking policing along with crime and 
an investment in information technology to produce the data and graphics. Mapping police presence in 
relation to crime harm, for example, would produce an algorithm that could identify outliers. Wherever 
a patrol district deployed its patrols (or arrests) in too great a departure from the occurrence of crime, a 
list of such “exceptions” can be generated for police managers. If they fail to correct the discrepancies, 
the lists can be reviewed in aggregate at COMP-STAT meetings.”). 
 402. Id. at 436. 
 403. Ferguson, supra note 349. 
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strategies in a way that avoids unnecessary exposure. But unlike some 
strategies, predictive policing is designed to account for that change. The 
targets of predictive policing are not static. An uptick in crimes in the next 
block over will make that block a new target. Many predictive policing 
strategies embrace the constantly evolving patterns of crime and the factors 
that contribute to it, designing equally evolving algorithms to track changes. 
In addition, displacement disrupts crime, making it harder to complete. 
This disruption effect may well be the reason for the observed reduction in 
crime rates. As proponents of predictive policing explain, increasing 
deterrence can be more impactful than increasing arrests.404 With Predictive 
Policing 1.0, placing the squad car in the box may not stop a thief from 
breaking into a car (it may only displace him), but it will disrupt him in the 
short term. For some, this disruption might be enough to prevent certain 
crimes of opportunity altogether. For other, more committed criminals, it 
might not. But either way, displacement acts as a barrier, increasing the 
costs, risks, and effort of crime. Similarly, while the nature of many violent 
crimes defies a pure deterrence rationale, displacement can at least reduce 
crimes on the margins. For example, retaliatory gang shootings regularly 
involve emotional motivations of loss, respect, bravado, and self-
sacrifice.405 The presence of additional police cruisers at the gang border 
may delay the immediate retaliatory shooting, and possibly even deter it 
completely. Estimates hold that one third of shootings are in retaliation for 
other shootings, so delaying the opportunity to retaliate and making it more 
difficult might reduce the overall number of violent acts.406 
Furthermore, predictive policing may not address the root causes of 
crime, but it does offer ways to identify some of those root causes. To be 
clear, as predictive policing is currently implemented police have not 
embraced this secondary use of the technology, but it exists and responds 
quite forcefully to the concerns. 
First, underlying the theory of Predictive Policing 1.0 are the 
environmental vulnerabilities that generate criminal activity. Instead of 
simply focusing on the targeted box, predictive policing can help ask why 
that box exists. Is it because the area is dark, difficult to patrol, or near other 
 
 
 404. Emily Thomas, Why Oakland Police Turned Down Predictive Policing, VICE MOTHERBOARD 
(Dec. 28., 2016), http://motherboard.vice.com/en_ca/read/minority-retort-why-oakland-police-turned-
down-predictive-policing (discussing how predictive policing shifted the strategic focus from generating 
arrests to preventing victimization). 
 405. Madhumita Venkataramanan, A Plague of Violence: Shootings are Infectious and Spread Like 
a Disease, SLATE, (May 18, 2014) (interviewing Gary Slutkin, Professor at University of Illinois and 
founder and executive director of CURE Violence). 
 406. Id. 
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attractors of crime (like bars or ATMs)? Some of those environmental issues 
are root causes, and can be remedied once identified. Predictive policing, if 
so used, can map out the social and economic vulnerabilities in an area, and 
(given the political will) help to improve them.407 
Second, the general theory behind Predictive Policing 3.0 is that certain 
individuals face external challenges that increase the chance for violence. 
The public health model for identifying people in need of protection could 
be expanded to identify people in need of other social services (education, 
employment, mental health treatment). While fraught with concern about 
stigma and stereotypes, this approach can lead to positive interventions 
between at-risk youth and government services.408  
Finally, as to whether predictive policing should embrace the task of 
studying police activity as well as criminal activity, there are two added 
benefits of doing so. First, all data, including police routes, patterns, and 
practices could be mapped against crime, creating a full picture of crime 
patterns. This would allow police to react more quickly to changing crime 
realities. Second, one could go even farther to try to predict police activity 
that might have a negative impact on community relations. Just as police 
investigators are beginning to turn to predictive analytics to target particular 
people suspected of committing crimes, so that same technology could be 
used to identify red flags or patterns of police misconduct.409 This is not to 
say that one could predict which officers will violate constitutional rights, 
but neither does the best system of predictive suspicion necessarily predict 
who will commit a crime. It simply focuses attention on potential 
vulnerabilities and risk factors that can and should be addressed.  
 
 
 407. See Kennedy et al., supra note 162 (discussing the RTM model, which includes addressing 
environmental vulnerabilities through a more holistic approach). 
 408. Goldberg, supra note 204; CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, supra note 204; David M. Kennedy, DON’T 
SHOOT: ONE MAN, A STREET FELLOWSHIP, AND THE END OF VIOLENCE IN INNER-CITY AMERICA 4, 6 
(2011). 
 409. In a similar vein, some jurisdictions have turned litigation data into early warning systems. See, 
e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, What Police Learn from Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 841, 845 (2012); 
Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement 
Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1061 (2010). Other jurisdictions have asked big data scientists 
to examine causes of police stress and violence. See, e.g., Michael Gordon, CMPD’s Goal: To Predict 
Misconduct Before it Can Happen, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Feb. 26, 2016), 
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/crime/inside-courts-blog/article62772592.html; Jaeah 
Lee, How Science Could Help Prevent Police Shootings, MOTHER JONES (May/June 2016), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/04/data-prediction-police-misconduct-shootings. 
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I. Security: Vulnerabilities and Responses 
A predictive system based on crime data, police data, and personal data 
requires mechanisms to protect that data. Security difficulties arise both 
from generic data security vulnerabilities that affect all data-driven systems, 
as well as specific vulnerabilities that arise from the collection of law 
enforcement investigative data.  
1. Security: Vulnerabilities 
Police collect vast amounts of data, some quite personal. Pure crime 
statistics such as place, time, and type of crime present few concerns with 
privacy, and thus few concerns with security.410 In fact, many jurisdictions 
publicly post such information on the Internet.411 Other types of crime 
data—locations of domestic violence victims, gang associates, or known 
drug markets—may be more privileged, because they reveal personal 
information or because they could reveal tactical plans of police 
intervention. While police may wish to possess such data, public release 
could interfere with use of the information. For example, police would 
likely not want to forecast the next location of a predicted hot spot, in order 
to avoid undermining strategies to arrest the predicted perpetrators.  
The real problem arises with personal data in big data systems. While 
police benefit from collecting, aggregating, and sharing that individualized 
and sometimes-sensitive data, concerns about data security exist. Social 
network predictions or pattern matches are built on databases with personal 
identifying information.412 Social security numbers, dates of birth, addresses 
and other personal information form the basis of the networked information 
that can be linked and searched for clues about criminal patterns or 
relationships.413 For many police departments, the available databases have 
been either locally and organically developed or borrowed from larger 
national sources. Part of the reason for a lax data control system is that much 
of the raw data was properly collected through the criminal justice system, 
which is largely a publicly run, if not publicly accessible, data system. Such 
 
 
 410. Predictive Policing 1.0 systems, such as PredPol, thus have fewer data security issues. 
 411. See, e.g., Clear Map, CHICAGO POLICE DEP’T, http://gis.chicagopolice.org/clearmap/ 
startpage.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2017). 
 412. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES 
30–31 (2014).  
 413. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept 
of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1828–36 (2011); Tal Z. Zarsky, 
Governmental Data Mining and Its Alternatives, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 285, 330 (2011).  
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raw material requires fewer data security protocols, because of the 
perceived legitimate and quasi-public nature of the information. In addition, 
the posture of traditional police efforts did not embrace a robust data 
security mindset.414 While it has always been theoretically possible that 
criminal elements might hack into police databases, the concerns seemed 
less important than obtaining and maintaining the data about criminals. 
Police officials take care to keep the information confidential, but the 
information is not necessarily secure from external cyber threats. As such, 
data controls and data security protocols in police systems have lagged 
behind private databases. 
This reality has not changed despite the growing adoption and 
integration of larger third party and private networks.415 While the FBI and 
national criminal justice databases recognize the need to protect personal 
data,416 as these databases expand to include more sources of data, the 
information becomes more valuable and more vulnerable to data breaches. 
The recent inclusion of biometric data only increases the risk.417 These 
threats include internal dangers from rogue police officers misusing the 
personal data418 and external dangers of criminal elements hacking, 
manipulating, or erasing the data with damaging results to the investigative 
capabilities and legitimacy of the system.419 Finally, while perhaps of lesser 
 
 
 414. See Paul Suarez, AntiSec Hackers Steal, Post Police Data, PCWORLD (Aug. 6, 2011, 1:31 
PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/237459/antisec_hackers_steal_post_police_data.html [https://perma. 
cc/432K-V2YD]. 
 415. Robert O’Harrow Jr. & Ellen Nakashima, National Dragnet Is a Click Away, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 6, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/05/AR2008030 
503656.html; Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other 
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to Launder Data About “The People”, 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 950, 951 (2009); Bob Sullivan, Who’s 
Buying Cell Phone Records Online? Cops, MSNBC.COM (June 20, 2006, 11:59 AM), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12534959/ [https://perma.cc/GPD3-8EPR]. 
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VERSION 5.5 (2016), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/cjis-security-policy-v5_5_20160601-2-1.pdf.  
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value, if criminal elements knew the location of predictive targets or social 
network linkages, such information might thwart on-going police 
intervention strategies.  
2. Security: Responses 
Security strategy in predictive policing parallels responses to data 
security risks in other industries.420 Data security has become a big business 
because almost every private and public entity must account for the personal 
data it collects and stores. From health care services,421 to consumer 
products,422 to government agencies,423 and even computer security firms 
themselves,424 the concerns of data breaches have become all too real.  
Predictive policing systems, especially as they move toward big data-
infused surveillance, must protect against external and internal data threats. 
The first concern will be to build computer systems that include security by 
design against outside threats.425 Privacy by design principles,426 network 
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protection,427 increased firewalls,428 and encryption must all be considered 
when designing the system.429 Preventing the mischief that could occur if 
hackers were able to penetrate or manipulate crime statistics or police 
databases must be a priority. This protection from external threats becomes 
more complicated when networked systems are designed to be shared by 
different law enforcement organizations.430 Access controls, password 
protection, and written memoranda of understanding must be put in place to 
ensure the confidentiality of the data. Such protections will also minimize 
internal threats, such as the intentional misuse by law enforcement officers 
or inadvertent exposure through lax procedures.431 
Security by design must be supported by security protocols that include 
systemic network tracking, data audits, and policies to ensure data security 
compliance.432 While difficult and time consuming, a positive byproduct of 
data-driven systems is that supervisors can track who has had access to the 
data in the system. These protocols will require formal training for police 
and analysts tasked with managing the information. Protocols will also need 
to be created to minimize or delete unnecessary data in the system. Finally, 
police administrators will need to make clear that new privacy protections 
may arise because of the connection to growing databases of private 
consumer information.433  
CONCLUSION 
The lessons of history show that predictive technologies will continue to 
be an attractive goal for police and the criminal justice system. As data 
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becomes easier to collect, and as computer algorithms become more 
sophisticated, more advanced predictive technologies will be developed. 
From the Chicago School to the future, the desire to understand, categorize, 
and forecast criminal risk will continue to drive innovation and policing.  
Police have entered the age of actuarial justice and, as demonstrated, 
there is no real hope of going back. The technology exists, is adapting, and 
is pushing much farther ahead than lawyers, courts, and policymakers. 
Predictive policing will alter policing strategy across the country. Real-time 
reporting, professional crime analysts, and expanding computer capabilities 
have turned the daily crush of incidents, reports, and human tragedies into 
measurable and usable data. The result will be to inform officers about the 
realities of criminal patterns in a community and redirect resources to 
address the causes of those criminal actions. At the same time, real 
vulnerabilities exist in the adoption of the technology. This article has 
sought to develop an analytical framework to analyze current and future 
predictive policing techniques. The vulnerabilities, while real, can be 
mitigated by thoughtful responses and careful implementation. 
The recent pattern in predictive analytics has been invention first, then 
adoption, and finally assessment only after the fact. This article has sought 
to provide a framework to put assessment and predictive analysis at the 
beginning of the process. Simply put, if a community or administrator 
cannot respond to the nine vulnerabilities of all predictive technologies, they 
cannot responsibly move forward with next-generation technology. This 
systemic analysis should become the first step for all new predictive 
technologies. Any jurisdiction interested in adopting predictive policing 
techniques must be able to respond to the vulnerabilities discussed in this 
article. Without successful answers to these difficult questions about data, 
methodology, scientific legitimacy, transparency, accountability, vision, 
practice, administration, and security, any predictive policing system 
remains open to criticism and challenge.  
Predicting the future of predictive technologies is never wise, but one 
safe prediction is that these issues will be coming to more cities and towns 
in the very near future. As former NYPD Commissioner Bratton stated in 
2016, “Predictive policing used to be the future. Now it’s the present.”434
 
 
 
 434. David Black, Here Comes Predictive Policing, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS (Jan. 24, 2016, 5:00 
AM) http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/david-black-predictive-policing-article-1.2506580 [https:// 
perma.cc/Q2MX-8PZ5]. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
